- Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.details
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Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.details
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Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.details
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Practical reason and desire.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358.details
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How we know what ought to be.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.details
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The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth.Thomas Schindler & Julian J. Schlöder - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):695-712.details
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Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props.Wade Munroe - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198.details
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The epistemological argument for content externalism.Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):257-280.details
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Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.details
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The bias paradox: Why it's not just for feminists anymore.Deborah K. Heikes - 2004 - Synthese 138 (3):315 - 335.details
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In dialogue with Augustine’s Soliloquia. Interpreting and recovering a theory of illumination.Anthony Dupont & Matthew W. Knotts - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 74 (5):432-465.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.details
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Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.details
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The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth.Thomas Schindler & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Third-Order Epistemic Exclusion in Professional Philosophy.Zahra Thani & & Derek Anderson - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.details
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Rationality in inquiry : on the revisability of cognitive standards.Jonas Nilsson - 2000 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 1:154.details
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Wie individuell sind intentionale Einstellungen wirklich?Ralf Stoecker - 2000 - Metaphysica 1:107-119.details
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