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  1. The fundamental principle of practical reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):189 – 209.
    The fundamental principle of practical reasoning (if there is such a thing) must be a rule which we ought to follow in all our practical reasoning, and which cannot lead to irrational decisions. It must be a rule that it is possible for us to follow directly - that is, without having to follow any other rule of practical reasoning in order to do so. And it must be a basic principle, in the sense that the explanation of why we (...)
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  • Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.
    Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his (...)
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  • Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32-57.
    Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in someminimalsense, moral sentences are truth‐apt but claim that in some morerobustsense they are not. TheImmodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction betweenreduciblyandirreduciblytruth‐apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a moremodestversion of his theory, friendlier to Expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of (...)
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  • Against Truth-value gaps.Michael Glanzberg - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press. pp. 151--94.
    ∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...)
     
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