Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity.

David Rose and his colleagues (2020) argue on the basis of a large cross-cultural study that the story of the Ship of Theseus is a genuine puzzle in a sense that people who consider it feel inclined to assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions (‘Ambivalence’). In response, Marta Campdelacreu and her colleagues (Forthcoming) argue that the data reported by Rose et al. fail to support Ambivalence. Namely, the data show that there is sharp interpersonal disagreement among different readers of the (...) Ship of Theseus story, but they fail to demonstrate intrapersonal conflict or indecision. Should intrapersonal Ambivalence be demonstrated, this, according to Campdelacreu et al., would be a good indicator of the presence of a puzzle. Here, I provide empirical evidence for intrapersonal Ambivalence about the story of the Ship of Theseus. (shrink)