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Personal identity and persisting as many

In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume 2. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-242 (2018)

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  1. One: But Not the Same.John Schwenkler, Nick Byrd, Enoch Lambert & Matthew Taylor - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (6).
    Ordinary judgments about personal identity are complicated by the fact that phrases like “same person” and “different person” have multiple uses in ordinary English. This complication calls into question the significance of recent experimental work on this topic. For example, Tobia (2015) found that judgments of personal identity were significantly affected by whether the moral change described in a vignette was for the better or for the worse, while Strohminger and Nichols (2014) found that loss of moral conscience had more (...)
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  • Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford:
    Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity.
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  • Two Ships of Theseus.Vilius Dranseika - manuscript
    David Rose and his colleagues (2020) argue on the basis of a large cross-cultural study that the story of the Ship of Theseus is a genuine puzzle in a sense that people who consider it feel inclined to assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions (‘Ambivalence’). In response, Marta Campdelacreu and her colleagues (Forthcoming) argue that the data reported by Rose et al. fail to support Ambivalence. Namely, the data show that there is sharp interpersonal disagreement among different readers of the (...)
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