- Aesthetic Reasons.McGonigal Andrew - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 908–935.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.details
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The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):106-126.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.details
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Goodness beyond Reason.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):78-85.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Making space for the normativity of coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):393-415.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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Normative Transmission and Necessary Means.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):555-568.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.details
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How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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The Balancing View of Ought.Thomas Schmidt - 2024 - Ethics 134 (2):246-267.details
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Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment.Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy:1-22.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reason and the Toxin Puzzle間違った種類の理由と毒パズル.Kodai Sato - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):43-53.details
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Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences.Richard Rowland - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.details
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Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.details
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Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
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Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.details
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Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
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Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story.Pamela Robinson & Katie Steele - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):922-941.details
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Forgiveness and the Significance of Wrongs.Stefan Riedener - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (1).details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics.Andrew Peet - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):914-932.details
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The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.details
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The fitting resolution of anger.Oded Na’Aman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2417-2430.details
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The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake?Yair Levy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2021-2038.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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