The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far (...) from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. (shrink)

According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because (...) of (intellectual) timidity that Locke does not draw Hume's conclusions from his empiricism. It is, rather, because of his much sounder method. (shrink)

An important part of Hume's philosophy is grounded in a fundamental distinction between two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas. Existing views of the distinction are that the former are livelier than the latter, that the former are causally prior to the latter, that the latter are copies of the former, that the former but not the latter are perceptions of an objective realm, and that the former are feelings whereas the latter are thoughts. I argue that all of these (...) views of the distinction are problematic and should be replaced by the Reflection view, according to which (simple) ideas are, while impressions are not, the direct products of reflection on other perceptions. (shrink)

Pretende-se oferecer uma reconstituição do argumento de Darwin no capítulo 6 da Origem das espécies contra a ideia de finalidade como princípio de explicação das partes funcionais dos seres vivos, de modo a elucidar sua dívida, deliberada ou não, em relação à crítica do finalismo exposta na parte 3 dos Diálogos sobre religião natural. A ideia é situar o ponto preciso em que a teoria de Darwin se vincula à filosofia de Hume, desfazendo, ao mesmo tempo o mal-entendido que encontra (...) no filósofo escocês uma espécie de profeta da teoria da evolução, em pleno século XVIII – um contrassenso que ignora a situação epistemológica da fisiologia e da anatomia no período, ciências para as quais uma teoria como essa teria parecido pura e simples especulação sem base experimental ou teórica. A contribuição de Hume para a biologia do século XIX é outra, e situa-se num nível talvez mais profundo que o da teoria dos seres vivos: consiste em ter solapado em definitivo a noção de que as formas dos seres vivos se deixariam explicar pela funcionalidade que os naturalistas encontram em sua organização específica, vendo aí o sinal de um desígnio. Para Hume, bem como para Darwin, tudo o que há nessa ideia é uma analogia com a forma dos produtos da técnica humana. (shrink)

This paper provides support for the unorthodox view that Hume’s simple ideas are most fruitfully understood as theoretical posits by showing that adopting this interpretation solves a lingering interpretive difficulty, the missing shade of blue. The missing shade of blue is thought to pose a serious challenge to the legitimacy of Hume’s copy principle. Thinking of Humean simple ideas as theoretical posits reveals a dialectical mismatch between Hume and his envisioned reader that, once understood, makes it clear that the case (...) holds little sway against the copy principle. The solution developed and defended has some significant advantages over extant solutions. (shrink)

Hume regards the ‘absolute’ necessity attending demonstrable propositions as an expression of the limitations of human imagination. When we register our modal commitments in ordinary descriptive language, affirming that there are such-and-such absolute necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities, we are projecting our sense of what the human mind can and cannot conceive. In some ways the account parallels Hume’s famous treatment of the necessity of causes, and in some respects it anticipates recent expressivist theories of absolute modality. I marshal the evidence (...) for this interpretation, show how it can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of Hume’s modal epistemology and metaphysics, and situate this account of our modal discourse in Hume’s wider programme for a science of human nature. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the context and significance of the first instalment of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature , Books One and Two, on the understanding and on the passions, published in 1739 without Book Three. I argue that Books One and Two taken together should be read as addressing the question of the relation between reason and passion, and place Hume's discussion in the context of a large early modern philosophical literature on the topic. Hume's goal is (...) to show that the passions do not require government by reason, and to illustrate various ways in which the passions of social beings regulate themselves. The underlying theme of the first Treatise is thus a new theory of sociability: sympathetic sociability. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar la teoría humeana de las pasiones indirectas. Pretende señalar el vínculo entre un campo intersubjetivo que oficia de marco para el desarrollo afectivo del sujeto y el carácter irreductiblemente encarnado del mismo. Para ello: a. se reconstruye esquemáticamente la clasificación humeana de las pasiones; b. se discute la idea de que las pasiones indirectas son impresiones simples y se sostiene que esto no impide a Hume poder pensar las condiciones circundantes como causalmente necesarias (...) para la aparición de estas impresiones dentro del haz de percepciones que conforman la mente; c. se defiende la tesis de que estas condiciones causales son de carácter cognitivo: a medida que se incorporan diversas mediaciones cognitivas, nuestras pasiones adquieren progresivos grados de sofisticación que permiten pensar el refinamiento y desarrollo gradual de la estructura afectiva del individuo. (shrink)

Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms and to understand the character-especially the normative character-of Hume's philosophical project. This paper argues that Hume is a naturalist-and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist-in quite robust ways; and that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as "rationally justified" in several different senses of that (...) term. (shrink)

An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms (...) of philosophical scholarship. This paper aims to show that, even though Hume’s recognition in the cognitive sciences has so far been limited, there is an opportunity to reevaluate his work in the context of more recent scientific developments. In particular, it is argued that we can gain a better understanding of his overall philosophy by tracing the ongoing establishment of the enactive approach. In return, this novel interpretation of Hume’s ‘science of man’ is used as the basis for a consideration of the current and future status of the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds (...) that the passions are not representational but do have intentionality extrinsically. (shrink)

Hume’s views concerning the existence of body or external objects are notoriously difficult and intractable. The paper sheds light on the concept of body in Hume’s Treatise by defending three theses. First, that Hume’s fundamental tenet that the only objects that are present to the mind are perceptions must be understood as methodological, rather than metaphysical or epistemological. Second, that Hume considers legitimate the fundamental assumption of natural philosophy that through experience and observation we know body. Third, that many of (...) the contradictions and difficulties that interpreters attribute to Hume’s concept of body should be attributed instead, as Hume does, to every system of philosophy. (shrink)

In his discussion of our idea of time in the Treatise, Hume makes the perplexing claim that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure. While Hume is targeting the Newtonian conception of absolute time, it is not at all clear how his denial that unchanging objects are in time fits with this target. Moreover, Hume diagnoses our belief that unchanging objects endure as the product of a psychological fiction, but his account of this fiction is also riddled with puzzling claims (...) about our experience of unchanging objects. In this paper, we argue that Hume’s claims are a lot less baffling and indeed, much more sophisticated than they appear. We do so by considering his arguments as a response to Locke’s specific approach to the concept of absolute time. (shrink)

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.

Este artículo revisa el diálogo que Husserl establece con Humemientras reconstruye la génesis de la filosofía. Lo discutiréen dos partes: la primera se refiere a la “verdadera filosofía”y, la segunda, desarrolla una lectura fenomenológica delmétodo experimental de Hume. Intento explicar la evaluaciónambivalente que hace Husserl del proyecto de Hume, yproponer una manera en la que Hume pueda responder a suscríticas. Concluyo, más allá de Husserl, que Hume abrió uncamino promisorio para la fenomenología, que yo llamo una“fenomenología detrascendentalizada”.

Ziel der Arbeit ist zu zeigen, dass sich in der theoretischen Philosophie David Humes Ansätze zu einer therapeutischen Methode finden, wie sie von Ludwig Wittgenstein angewandt und beschrieben wurde. Im ersten Teil wird Wittgensteins Konzeption der Philosophie und ihre Anwendung anhand einer genauen Textexegese dargestellt. Der zweite Teil untersucht primär die Humeschen Überlegungen zu Kausalität und Induktion, seine methodologischen Aussagen sowie seine Perzeptionstheorie und argumentiert für die These, dass Hume ebenfalls, wenn auch mit Einschränkungen, Elemente einer therapeutischen Methode und eine (...) entsprechende Konzeption der Philosophie zugeschrieben werden können. (shrink)

Cet article montre qu'il est faux de considérer le scepticisme mitigé que présente Hume dans la section 12 de l' Enquête sur l'entendement humain comme un scepticisme modéré. Afin d'établir ce point, l'argument principal est qu'il existe un rapport de causalité par lequel l'affect que laissent derrière eux les doutes pyrrhoniens est en grande partie responsable de la production du scepticisme mitigé. Cet affect n'est pas la mélancolie paralysante dont parle le Traité de la nature humaine , mais ce qui (...) motive le sceptique à être prudent parce qu'il est sensible à la fragilité des facultés qu'il a radicalement éprouvée dans l'exercice des doutes outrés. Le scepticisme mitigé n'est pas un oubli, mais, au contraire, une mémoire du scepticisme excessif. (shrink)