Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • Intentionality of perceptual experience.B. Yoon - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):339-355.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Simple Remembering.Arieh Schwartz - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    Dretske has provided very influential arguments that there is a difference between our sensory awareness of objects and our awareness of facts about these objects—that there is a difference, for example, between seeing x and seeing that x is F. This distinction between simple and epistemic seeing is a staple of the philosophy of perception. Memory is often usefully compared to perception, and in this spirit I argue for the conditional claim that if Dretske’s arguments succeed in motivating the posit (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
    Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in ‘blindsight’. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis, on which representational content plays no explanatory role: we make (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2973-2992.
    Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How visual perception yields reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.
    It is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces.William E. S. Mcneill - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):411-431.
    It is often assumed that when we see common opaque objects in standard light this is in virtue of seeing their facing surfaces. Here I argue that we should reject that claim. Either we don't see objects' facing surfaces, or—if we hold on to the claim that we do see such things—it is at least not in virtue of seeing them that we see common opaque objects. I end by showing how this conclusion squares both with our intuitions and with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Perceiving empirical objects directly.Robert G. Hudson - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.
    The goal of this paper is to defend the claim that there is such a thing as direct perception, where by ‘direct perception’ I mean perception unmediated by theorizing or concepts. The basis for my defense is a general philosophic perspective which I call ‘empiricist philosophy’. In brief, empiricist philosophy (as I have defined it) is untenable without the occurrence of direct perception. It is untenable without direct perception because, otherwise, one can't escape the hermeneutic circle, as this phrase is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Hobbs - 1975 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9:109-121.
    To be an Empiricist with respect to knowledge of the natural world, is to insist that all knowledge of that world is rooted in perceptual experience. All claims which go beyond the deliverances of the senses must, in the end, be justified by, and understood in terms of, relations holding between those claims and sensory data. Crucial to the Empiricist case, therefore, is an account of how perception can be a source of knowledge. How can sensory experiences provide, for the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Hobbs - 1975 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9:109-121.
    To be an Empiricist with respect to knowledge of the natural world, is to insist that all knowledge of that world is rooted in perceptual experience. All claims which go beyond the deliverances of the senses must, in the end, be justified by, and understood in terms of, relations holding between those claims and sensory data. Crucial to the Empiricist case, therefore, is an account of how perception can be a source of knowledge. How can sensory experiences provide, for the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Belief, experience and the act of picture-making.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):1-14.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 17, Issue 1, Page 35-48, March 2014.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. M. Davies - 1996 - Avebury.
    This book is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. Martin Davies - 1993 - Dissertation,
    This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.Alex Byrne - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism.
    $32.82 used   $120.00 new   (collection)    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations