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  1. Margaret MacDonald’s scientific common-sense philosophy.Justin Vlasits - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):267-287.
    Margaret MacDonald (1907–56) was a central figure in the history of early analytic philosophy in Britain due to both her editorial work as well as her own writings. While her later work on aesthetics and political philosophy has recently received attention, her early writings in the 1930s present a coherent and, for its time, strikingly original blend of common-sense and scientific philosophy. In these papers, MacDonald tackles the central problems of philosophy of her day: verification, the problem of induction, and (...)
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  • Ernest Gellner's Words and Things: A Case Study of Empirical Philosophy.Stefan Schubert - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (2):300-316.
    This article considers how Ernest Gellner used sociology and anthropology to attack ordinary language philosophy in Words and Things. It argues that this attack can be seen as a part of the movement to make philosophy more empirical or “naturalized,” something that has not been generally noted. It also discusses what general lessons to draw from Words and Things regarding how empirical knowledge should be used in philosophy. Among other things, the article argues that one important lesson is that empirical (...)
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  • How to Read Moore's "Proof of an External World".Kevin Morris & Consuelo Preti - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (1).
    We develop a reading of Moore’s “Proof of an External World” that emphasizes the connections between this paper and Moore’s earlier concerns and strategies. Our reading has the benefit of explaining why the claims that Moore advances in “Proof of an External World” would have been of interest to him, and avoids attributing to him arguments that are either trivial or wildly unsuccessful. Part of the evidence for our view comes from unpublished drafts which, we believe, contain important clues concerning (...)
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  • The Revolutions in English Philosophy and Philosophy of Education.Peter Gilroy - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 45 (2):202-218.
    This article was first published in 1982 in Educational Analysis (4, 75–91) and republished in 1998 (Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.), Philosophy of education: Major themes in the analytic tradition, Vol. 1, Philosophy and education, Part 1, pp. 61–78. London: Routledge). I was then a lecturer in philosophy of education at Sheffield University teaching the subject to Master’s students on both full- and part-time programmes. My first degree was in philosophy, read under D. W. Hamlyn and David Cooper (...)
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  • The Limits of “Philosophy of Education”.Barry Chazan - 1971 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 3 (1):55-62.
  • On Precision of Expression.Adam Schaff - 1961 - Diogenes 9 (35):34-59.
  • The Problem of Analytic Philosophy.Joseph Agassi & Ian C. Jarvie - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (5):413-433.
    Dainton and Robinson’s Companion traces lines of descent of analytic philosophy from ancestors. They characterize analytic philosophy as a movement, a tradition, a style, and a commitment to the va...
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  • John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...)
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