Since Turing proposed the first test of intelligence, several modifications have been proposed with the aim of making Turing’s proposal more realistic and applicable in the search for artificial intelligence. In the modern context, it turns out that some of these definitions of intelligence and the corresponding tests merely measure computational power. Furthermore, in the framework of the original Turing test, for a system to prove itself to be intelligent, a certain amount of deceit is implicitly required which can have (...) serious security implications for future human societies. In this article, we propose a unified framework for developing intelligence tests which takes care of important ethical and practical issues. Our proposed framework has several important consequences. Firstly, it results in the suggestion that it is not possible to construct a single, context independent, intelligence test. Secondly, any measure of intelligence must have access to the process by which a problem is solved by the system under consideration and not merely the final solution. Finally, it requires an intelligent agent to be evolutionary in nature with the flexibility to explore new algorithms on its own. (shrink)

In this paper, we look at the possibility of a machine having a sense of humour. In particular, we focus on actual machine utterances in Turing test discourses. In doing so, we do not consider the Turing test in depth and what this might mean for humanity, rather we merely look at cases in conversations when the output from a machine can be considered to be humorous. We link such outpourings with Turing’s “arguments from various disabilities” used against the concept (...) of a machine being able to think, taken from his seminal work of 1950. Finally we consider the role that humour might play in adding to the deception, integral to the Turing test, that a machine in practice appears to be a human. (shrink)

In social interactions, it is common for individuals to possess different amounts of knowledge about a specific transaction, and those who are more knowledgeable might perform opportunistic behavior to others in their interest, which promotes their value but demotes others’ value. Such a typical social behavior is called opportunistic behavior. In this paper, we propose a formal account of opportunism based on the situation calculus. We first propose a model of opportunism that only considers a single action between two agents, (...) and then extend it to multiple actions and incorporate social context in the model. A simple example of selling a broken cup is used to illustrate our models. Through our models, we can have a thorough understanding of opportunism. (shrink)