This paper puts forward the argument that there are various, competing, and antithetical evidence‐based practice (EBP) definitions and acknowledges that the different EBP definitions are based on different epistemological perspectives. However, this is not enough to understand the way in which nurse professionals choose between the various EBP formations and consequently facilitate them in choosing the most appropriate for their needs. Therefore, the current article goes beyond and behind the various EBP epistemologies to identify how individuals choose an epistemology, which (...) consequently will assist our understanding as to how an individual chooses a specific EBP formation. Individuals choose an epistemology on the mere belief that the specific epistemology offers the ideals or ideas of best explaining or interpreting daily reality. These ideals or ideas are termed by science, history, and politics as ideology. Similarly, individual practitioners choose or should choose between the different EBP formations based on their own personal ideology. Consequently, this article proceeds to analyse the various ideologies behind different EBP definitions as to conclude that there are two broad ideologies that inform the various EBP formations, namely the ideology of truth and the ideology of individual emancipation. These two ideologies are analysed and their connections to the various EBP formations are depicted. Eventually, the article concludes that the in‐depth, critical, and intentional analysis by individual nurses of their own ideology will allow them to choose the EBP formation that is most appropriate and fitting for them, and their specific situation. Hence, the conscious analysis of individual ideology becomes the criterion for choosing between competing EBP formations and allows for best evidence to be implemented in practice. Therefore, the best way to teach EBP courses is by facilitating students to analyse their own ideology. (shrink)

This paper evaluates attempts to defend established concepts of expertise and clinical judgement against the incursions of evidence‐based practice. Two related arguments are considered. The first suggests that standard accounts of evidence‐based practice imply an overly narrow view of ‘evidence’, and that a more inclusive concept, incorporating ‘patterns of knowing’ not recognised by the familiar evidence hierarchies, should be adopted. The second suggests that statistical generalisations cannot be applied non‐problematically to individual patients in specific contexts, and points out that this (...) is why we need clinical judgement. In evaluating the first argument, I propose a criterion for what counts as evidence. It is a minimalist criterion but the ‘patterns of knowing’, referred to in the literature, still fail to meet it. In evaluating the second argument, I will outline the powerful empirical reasons we have for thinking that decisions based on research evidence are usually better than decisions based on clinical judgement; and show that current efforts to rehabilitate clinical judgement seriously underestimate the strength of these reasons. By way of conclusion, I will sketch the ways in which the concept of expertise will have to be modified if we accept evidence‐based practice as a template for health‐care. (shrink)

For decades, nursing as a discipline has tried to establish itself within the socio‐professional and the socio‐political arenas. To date, several theorists have attempted to thoroughly define the essence (ontology) of nursing while others have proposed means (syntax) to achieve this ‘collective’ objective. Considering that this preoccupation, rooted in essentialism, is pervasive in the nursing literature, our claim is that these quests should be criticized because they impede innovative and transdisciplinary approaches to nursing theory. Our criticism includes the perspective supported (...) by the so‐called ‘postmodern nursing theorists’. We argue that the oeuvre of some nursing postmodern scholars is as prescriptive and linear as the ones they critique. Like it was done before, the discourse of these thinkers perpetuates the status quo by excluding alternative forms of knowledge that cross the boundaries of the discipline of nursing. Using the work of Deleuze and Guattari, this paper proposes an alternative way to conceive the development of nursing knowledge, which, we think, could represent an alternative way to explore the discipline of nursing. (shrink)

There are those who would argue that, recently, the profession of nursing has made a radical shift, while others believe that a schism has been created among both scholars and clinicians as a result of the emerging dominance of the evidence‐based nursing movement. This paper offers a philosophical critique of this movement using Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of schizoanalysis. As a conclusion, the authors posit that nursing professionals maintain a stance of academic freedom of thought and scientific integrity (...) through the acceptance of multiplicity, diversity, and polyvocality, and by challenging with politically charged concepts the totalizing perspectives that often spread through the profession/discipline of nursing. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to critique health policy discourses that are taken for granted. This perspective will allow for the identification of ‘exclusionary’ health policies, which we define as policies that are thought to offer universal benefit, despite yielding adverse effects for significant groups of people in society. As such, policies that are said to be designed ‘for all’ frequently benefit only a subset of the population. Our intent is to highlight the distributional consequences of certain health policies (...) that are largely institutionalized in contemporary society. We believe that these distributional effects are explicit representations of power in society and that institutions may provide individual ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ that, in turn, yields separation as an outcome, a separating equilibrium. Specifically, if those who benefit from policies of partition are numerous and are to obtain significant advantage or incur limited costs, or if those who are adversely affected are scarce (or hidden), or the size of these adverse effects are small (or perceived to be minor), then partition becomes more likely as a ‘legitimate’, but exclusionary, instrument of public policy. (shrink)