ABSTRACTThe ten essays in this symposium offer a rich and varied set of challenges to the market-democratic research program. Rather than replying to each critic in turn, I respond only to the main lines of critical challenge raised in this collection: that my account of thick economic liberty is too vague, that economic liberties are not basic, that market democracy gives too little attention to socialist possibilities, that market democracy can accommodate only an impoverished conception of fair equality of opportunity, (...) and, most notably, that market democracy is grounded upon a tendentious or “bourgeois” conception of the person. To meet these criticisms, I refine a central claim of market democracy: that the right to private ownership of productive property is a basic right. In response to the worry that market democracy allows for class domination, I revise market democracy on the issue of bequests. After replying to the critics I extend my challenge to social democracy, presenting an historical argument against liberal democratic socialism. (shrink)

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ (...) the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas. (shrink)

While John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness is ambitious, provocative, and does much to reinvigorate debate about economic justice, his argument for market democracy is not compelling. I discuss two objections. First, I offer doubts about whether “thick” economic freedom is a condition of democratic legitimacy. While Tomasi raises the intriguing possibility that liberal commitments may justify a somewhat more expansive list of economic rights than traditionally recognized, he fails to give a well-worked-out account of these rights. Instead, he argues for (...) unfettered economic liberty without adequately connecting it to citizens' self-authorship, or showing how it could feasibly be protected alongside other basic liberties. Second, I argue that a concern for citizens' agency and economic self-authorship should lead us to endorse a social-democratic regime, not a market-democratic one. Market democracy leaves out or heavily revises key aspects of justice as fairness as developed by Rawls, including fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of the political liberties. Moreover, while Tomasi claims that social democracy rests on a perfectionist prioritizing of citizens' status over their agency, I argue that social democracy is best defended on agency-based grounds. (shrink)

I argue that Tomasi’s most fundamental “bleeding heart libertarian” insights are not adequately served by Rawls’s lexical framework and his idealized theory of institutional choice. Perhaps paradoxically, using Rawls’s lexical framework to articulate Tomasi’s declared concerns for both economic liberty and “social justice” gives the latter concern very little weight. For that reason, Tomasi’s own objections against classical liberalism would ultimately apply to his own positive contribution as well: the satisfaction of a distributional adequacy condition is secured on purely contingent (...) grounds. Furthermore, Tomasi’s endorsement of Rawls’ conception of the first tasks of political philosophy might render his case for laissez-faire forms of capitalism immaterial. This is because Rawls fails to appreciate the very narrow theoretical relevance of identifying institutional arrangements purely as a matter of “ideal theory”. Feasibility concerns have always been an important element in the classical liberal critique of interventionist and redistributive politics. Yet they have invariably failed to be featured, in any theoretically prominent way, within the most philosophically oriented defenses of the classical liberal order. A formulation of bleeding heart libertarianism along Rawlsian lines would be equally wanting in this regard. (shrink)