Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

This research explores the carnal, experienced self as processual and becoming, situating life as zoe (as per Braidotti) in the context of the Western culture, characterized by alienation (Fromm, Foucault). The study first addresses the ontological disposition of the carnal self and then turns to the concepts of life and death (Freud, Fromm), to explicate the tie between materiality and discourse conditions. Erich Fromm’s classical distinction of having and being is restated as a distinction of having and becoming, which are (...) then explored as complimentary ontological, cultural, and characterological directionalities. A genealogy of their mutual dynamics then allows situating the relations of carnal bodies and inorganic prosthesis (e.g. technologies) in the light of life considered as the necessary synthesis of forces of preservation and perpetual change, beyond subject-object duality. (shrink)

Eine der grundsätzlichen Thesen von Maurice Merleau-Ponty lautet, dass unser Zur-Welt-Sein nicht ausgehend von der Instanz des Bewusstseins, sondern ausgehend von der Instanz der Leibes zu verstehen ist. Auch wenn Merleau-Ponty aus dieser These selbst kaum politische Konsequenzen gezogen hat, sind seine Überlegungen doch im Feld der politischen Philosophie von einer ganzen Reihe von Theoretikerinnen und Theoretikern aufgenommen worden, von denen ich im Folgenden zwei aufgreifen möchte: Iris Marion Young und Judith Butler. Beide, so werden ich zeigen, knüpfen in ihren (...) Überlegungen nicht nur direkt an Merleau-Pontys Überlegungen am, um zu zeigen inwiefern der Leib sowohl Objekt als auch Subjekt des politischen Handelns ist, zugleich auch entwickeln beide dessen Überlegungen in entscheidenden Hinsichten weiter: Während uns Young vor Augen führt, dass die Persistenz von politischen Machtverhältnissen ausgehend von der Eigensinnigkeit des Leibes verstanden werden kann, zeigt uns Judith Butler ausgehend von der Idee der Geschichtlichkeit der Leibes, dass dieser als ein Ort von transformativen Möglichkeiten verstanden werden kann. Ausgehend von diesen Anknüpfungen an Merleau-Ponty durch Young und Butler werde ich abschließend argumentieren, dass ‚Weltlichkeit’, ‚Eigensinnigkeit’ und ‚Geschichtlichkeit’ drei wesentliche Momente einer Politik der Leiblichkeit sind. (shrink)

The article explores embodied critical thinking (ECT) for engaging with the enfleshed and trans-corporeal self on an affectual and experiential level. By discussing three exemplifying affectual instances that expose the experiential level of processuality, emergence, and intercarnality, the article shows the methodological use of ECT as a fruitful approach to developing embodied ontologies and a toolkit for the experiential reflection of one's en-fleshment, as tuning into the body-environment.

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...) constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to. (shrink)

The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...) Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation. (shrink)

This study investigates the educational thought of Confucius with focus on the educational relationship in the Analects, which is a historical text that defines the foundations of Confucianism. The first part of the investigation examines Confucius’ concept of the educational relationship and how it is characterized with a dialogical spirit, which consists of worldly and secular human-orientedness, co-existentiality as a fundamental principle for educational practice, and dialogue to become an ideal ruler through self-discipline. The second stage of this study further (...) examines the spirit of dialogue in the Analects with consideration of its historical–cultural context. Through this process, the study unravels the historical and cultural limitations of original Confucian educational thought for modern society and proposes a possible way to reengage Confucius’ educational value in today’s modern educational context. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore, from a phenomenologically informed perspective, the phenomenon of the operative spatialization of human thinking, viewed in its relationship with the embodied human organism’s spatial experience. Operative spatialization in this context refers to the cognitive role and functioning of spatial schematizations and differentiations in human thinking. My particular focus is the domain of conceptualization. By drawing on Husserl’s discussion of the (linguistic) process of a sedimentation of meaning, I aim to show that spatialization (...) functions in a structurally ambivalent manner. On the one hand, spatialization predisposes and thus narrows the scope of human conceptual thought. On the other hand, spatialization establishes an implicit cognitive scaffold indispensable for the development and practice of human higher-order thinking. The structure and functioning of this scaffold, I argue, is intrinsically related to the spatial structure and dynamics of human embodiment. Synthesizing insights from phenomenological studies concerning the experiential constitution of space, and classic and recent research findings from fields such as cognitive linguistics and psychology concerning the cognitive dimension of image-schemas and gestural behavior, I argue that the living human body functions centrally as the sense-constitutive ‘site of conversion’ (Husserl) between concrete structures of spatial experience and abstract structures of conceptual thought. (shrink)

Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is (...) not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that selects and “evaluates” what is “important.” Finally, cross-cultural comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure. (shrink)

Starting from the experience of the Other, phenomenology takes otherness as something which withdraws from my own experience and exceeds the limits of our common orders. Radical otherness is something extraordinary, arising in my own body, situated between us and striking us before we look for it. Psychiatry confronts us with a peculiar sort of pathological otherness which in ethnopsychiatry is doubled to an otherness of a higher degree. We encounter the anomalies of other orders as if we were dipping (...) into the Other’s shadow. This brings up many questions. How is the pathic related to the pathological, the normal to the abnormal? How can psychiatry take account of the intercultural Other without sacrificing its otherness to universal points of view? How is the unconsciousness of our own culture connected with that of other cultures? To what extent does intercultural otherness affect our intracultural otherness? Is there an alternative to the extremes of fundamentalism and globalism, which tend either to repress otherness or to level it? (shrink)

In opposition to traditional forms of dualism and monism, the author holds that our bodily self includes certain aspects of otherness. This is shown concerning the phenomenological issues of intentionality, of self-awareness and of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing the dimension of pathos. We are affected by what happens to us before being able to respond to it by acts or actions. Every sense, myself and others are born out of pathos. The original alienness of our own body, including neurological processes, creates (...) shifting degrees of nearness and remoteness, and allows for pathological deviations such as depersonalisation, paranoia or trauma. Such a phenomenology of body crosses the borderlines of different disciplines. (shrink)

The critical aspects of deep brain stimulation are usually the focus of the ethical debate about the implantation of electrodes into the brain of patients with Parkinson’s disease. Above all, potential postoperative side effects on personality caused by DBS mark the debate. However, rehabilitation of agility and mobility by DBS can be posited against critical aspects. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to emphasize the hitherto neglected positive aspects of that technology. A detailed study of the rehabilitation of controlled (...) movements will thus be the object of this article. The possibility to move again in a controlled way will be discussed as freedom of movement. The concept freedom of movement is being linked to the observation of feelings of euphoria and joy that can occur after surgery for patients with PD stimulated in the subthalamic nucleus. This is done based on phenomenological analysis and qualitative interviews, in which the relation between freedom of movement and feelings of joy becomes clear. The aim here is to show that these feelings of exaltation express an essential feeling of freedom – a bodily felt freedom – which is grounded in movement and can be regained by STN-DBS. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight the relevance of Bernhard Waldenfels’ responsive phenomenology for questions related to normality and to the different kinds of deviation from what is taken tobe normal. The article begins with a discussion of two limit cases in the understanding of the concepts of normality and deviation: a strictly normative understanding, according to which each deviation is norm-deviation, and a descriptive understanding, according to which deviation is what underlies individuality. Considering Waldenfels’ responsive philosophy in connection with Kurt (...) Goldstein’s and George Canguilhem’s philosophies of the organism, both understandings are critically discussed. In particular, the article shows how both views turn out to be one-sided and should be revised on the basis of a responsive account of the organism (particularly of the human organism) and its situated relation to circumstances, events, and affordances in the world it inhabits. The analysis of the different forms of responsiveness of the human organism, and notably the distinction between ‘catastrophic’ or pathological and ‘creative’ or organising kinds of responsiveness, can allow us to develop a relational and dynamic account of normality and deviation. Accordingly, neither normality nor deviation should be taken as univocally defined states; they should rather be reassessed on the basis of the processes in and through which order is interrupted, disturbed, and possibly reshaped or newly instituted. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental premises of feminist philosophy is the assumption of an invidious asymmetry between the genders that has to be overcome. Parallel to this negative account of asymmetry we also find a positive account, developed in particular within the context of so-called feminist philosophies of difference. I explore both notions of gender asymmetry. The goal is a clarification of the notion of asymmetry as it can presently be found in feminist philosophy. Drawing upon phenomenology as well as (...) feminist difference theory , I argue that a gender asymmetry does exist that cannot-as in the first assumption-be transformed into symmetry. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental premises of feminist philosophy is the assumption of an invidious asymmetry between the genders that has to be overcome. Parallel to this negative account of asymmetry we also find a positive account, developed in particular within the context of so-called feminist philosophies of difference. I explore both notions of gender asymmetry. The goal is a clarification of the notion of asymmetry as it can presently be found in feminist philosophy. Drawing upon phenomenology as well as (...) feminist difference theory, I argue that a gender asymmetry does exist that cannot-as in the first assumption-be transformed into symmetry. (shrink)

Evaluation of quality of life, psychic and bodily well-being is becoming increasingly important in oncology aftercare. This type of assessment is mainly carried out by medical psychologists. In this paper I will seek to show that body experience valuation has, besides its psychological usefulness, a normative and practical dimension. Body experience evaluation aims at establishing the way a person experiences and appreciates his or her physical appearance, intactness and competence. This valuation constitutes one’s ‘body image’. While, first, interpreting the meaning (...) of body image and, second, indicating the limitations of current psychological body image assessment, I argue that the normative aspect of body image is related to the experience of bodily wholeness or bodily integrity. Since this experience is contextualized by a person’s life story, evaluation should also focus on narrative aspects. I finally suggest that the interpretation of body experience is not only valuable to assess a person’s quality of life after treatment, but that it can also be useful in counseling prior to interventions, since it can support patients in making decisions about interventions that will change their bodies. To apply this type of evaluation to oncology practice, a rich and tailored vocabulary of body experiences has to be developed. (shrink)

This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed (...) that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”. The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another. (shrink)

Gerade in Ausnahmesituationen rücken Menschen zusammen – eigentlich. Das ist in Zeiten des Coronavirus anders, denn hier gilt das Gebot des „Social Distancing“. Ich möchte die Ambivalenz, die nicht nur in dieser paradoxen Wortkombination zum Ausdruck kommt, sondern auch in der Erfahrung von vielen Menschen, mit Hilfe eines leibphänomenologischen Zugangs näher beleuchten. Dabei untersuche ich, wie sich das spannungsreiche Verhältnis von Nähe und Distanz in Zeiten der Corona-Pandemie in Alltagssituationen sowie in Bildungskontexten zeigt. Darüber hinaus gehe ich der Frage nach, (...) was die Erfahrung des „Social Distancing“ für die Philosophie – nicht nur in Ausnahmesituationen – bedeuten kann, und plädiere dafür, sie als eine Übungsmöglichkeit des Philosophierens zwischen Nähe und Distanz, Körper und Geist, Eigenem und Fremdem sowie Natur und Kultur zu sehen, um auf diese Weise problematischen Extremen auf beiden Seiten zu entgehen. (shrink)

Im neueren Denken Judith Butlers nimmt der Begriff der Vulnerabilität eine Schlüsselrolle ein. Kaum eines der vielen Themen, denen sich die US-amerikanische Autorin seit der Jahrtausendwende widmet, kann ohne Kenntnis ihrer Überlegungen zu diesem Terminus angemessen verstanden werden. Der Versuch einer Rekonstruktion ihrer Konzeption von Vulnerabilität steht allerdings vor der Schwierigkeit, dass Butlers Gedanken hierzu über zahlreiche Texte hinweg verstreut sind, wobei bisweilen unterschiedliche Aspekte betont und verschiedene Schwerpunktsetzungen vorgenommen werden. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden Butlers vulnerabilitätstheoretische Ausführungen in gebündelter Weise (...) dargestellt und interpretiert. Dabei wird die Bedeutsamkeit von Butlers Überlegungen zur Vulnerabilität für ihre Vorstellung von Körperlichkeit aufgewiesen, der Zusammenhang von Vulnerabilität und Anerkennung erläutert und gezeigt, welche ethischen Erwägungen Butler ausgehend von ihrer Anerkennungskonzeption und ihrem Denken der Vulnerabilität anstellt und inwiefern Vulnerabilität und politische Handlungsfähigkeit einander nicht ausschließen. Abschließend wird Butlers Vulnerabilitätsverständnis mit einigen kritischen Rückfragen konfrontiert. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show the relations between responsiveness and strangeness in the work of Bernhard Waldenfels. I will expose this relationship in six theses, so that they complement each other and show, in the most appropriate possible way, the relationship between responsiveness and the experience of the strange. These points are, 1. A brief clarification of terminology. Difference between the other and the strange. 2. The relationship between written and spoken speech. 3. The conception of order, (...) linked to mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. 4. The relationship between pathos and response, as focal points of responsive rationality. 5. The relationship between saying and what is said and the temporality that links and separates them. And finally, 6. I will deal with the problem of how to talk about the strange and the problem of indirect language. (shrink)

When it comes to the body, the professional pedagogical field shows a paradoxical attitude: With regard to sense-oriented school subjects, educational policies tend to underline a close relatedness of body and mind. However, where learning is primarily connected with mental activities and intellectual engagement, the body is rarely assigned an integral role. Discussing the grounding ideologies of this paradox, I will consult phenomenological and enactivist perspectives in order to develop an approach to embodied learning which takes into account both sense-oriented (...) as well as intellectual domains. I will argue that considering the interdependence of body and mind including their situatedness does not only benefit the cultivation of the body and the senses, but also opens up further perspectives for intellectual engagement. (shrink)

Recent work on the relation between narrative and selfhood has emphasized embodiment as an indispensable foundation for selfhood. This has occasioned an interesting debate on the relation between embodiment and narrative. In this paper, I attempt to mediate the range of conflicting intuitions within the debate by proposing a scalar approach to narrative and an accompanying concept of a split-self. Drawing on theoretical developments from contemporary narratology, I argue that we need to move away from a binary understanding of narrative (...) as something an entity strictly is or is not; rather, we need to see narrative as an attribute admitting of degrees. I suggest that the relation between narrative and embodiment should be seen along these lines, proposing three levels of the narrativity of embodied experiencing: 1) the unnarratable, 2) the narratable and 3) the narrative. Finally, I discuss the implications this framework has for the general question of the narrative constitution of selfhood. (shrink)

It is often emphasised that persons diagnosed with borderline personality disorder show difficulties in understanding their own psychological states. In this article, I argue that from a phenomenological perspective, BPD can be understood as an existential modality in which the embodied self is profoundly saturated by an alienness regarding the person’s own affects and responses. However, the balance of familiarity and alienness is not static, but can be cultivated through, e.g., psychotherapy. Following this line of thought, I present the idea (...) that narrativising experiences can play an important role in processes of appropriating such embodied self-alienness. Importantly, the notion of narrative used is that of a scalar conception of narrativity as a variable quality of experience that comes in degrees. From this perspective, narrative appropriation is a process of gradually attributing the quality of narrativity to experiences, thereby familiarising the moods, affects, and responses that otherwise govern ‘from behind’. Finally, I propose that the idea of a narrative appropriation of embodied self-alienness is also relevant to the much-debated question of personal responsibility in BPD, particularly as this question plays out in psychotherapeutic contexts where a narrative self-appropriation may facilitate an increase in sense of autonomy and reduce emotions of guilt and shame. (shrink)

Narrative theories currently dominate our understanding of how selfhood is constituted and concretely individuated throughout personal history. Despite this success, the narrative perspective has recently been exposed to a range of critiques. Whilst these critiques have been effective in pointing out the shortcomings of narrative theories of selfhood, they have been less willing and able to suggest alternative ways of understanding personal history. In this article, I assess the criticisms and argue that an adequate phenomenology of personal history must also (...) go beyond narrative. Drawing on a distinction between history and narrative, I outline an account of historical becoming through a process of sedimentation and a rich notion of what I call historical selfhood on an embodied level. Five embodied existentials are suggested, sketching a preliminary understanding of how selves are concretely individuated on a pre-narrative level. (shrink)

I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...) methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein. (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda el tratamiento del “caso Schneider” que MerleauPonty lleva adelante a partir de los análisis neuropsiquiátricos de K. Goldstein. Esto se conecta directamente con el problema del status que adquiere el discurso científico en un modelo que adopta como marco la fenomenología. Mostraremos que este recurso, lejos de implicar un alejamiento de este modelo teórico, constituye un caso de reducción a la experiencia de sujetos cuyo “arco intencional” se presenta distendido y están, por ello, en condiciones de (...) ofrecer datos equiparables a los que se obtienen al amparo de la reducción fenomenológica.This paper addresses the treatment of the Schneider’s case that Merleau-Ponty accomplished from the neuropsychiatric analysis of K. Goldstein. This issue is directly connected with the problema of the status of scientific discourse into a model that adopts a phenomenological framework. It will be shown that this resource, far from implying a departure from this theoretical model, is a case of reduction to the experience of subjects whose “intentional arch” appears relaxed and are therefore able to provide data comparable to those obtained under phenomenological reduction. (shrink)

Traditionelle Personenbegriffe der abendländischen Philosophie rekurrieren oft auf rationale Fähigkeiten wie Vernunft- bzw. Moralfähigkeit oder reflexives Selbstbewusstsein als Grundlage von individuellem moralischem Status bzw. der korrelierenden moralischen Verpflichtung. Dem steht die Erfahrung besonderer moralischer Verpflichtungen etwa gegenüber Kindern, Menschen mit besonderen Bedürfnissen oder Tieren entgegen, die durch ratiozentristische Engführungen aus dem Blick zu geraten drohen. Die gegenwärtigen Diskurse um die Begriffe der Vulnerabilität und Anerkennung sind deshalb eine wichtige Ergänzung, um einerseits die Selektivität klassischer moralphilosophischer Konzeptionen zu mindern, indem sie (...) auf eine universal geteilte Bedürftigkeit statt auf Kompetenzen als Anker der Moralität hinweisen, sowie andererseits auch positive Fürsorgepflichten für angewiesene Wesen zu begründen. Allerdings bedarf diese Ergänzung, wie argumentiert wird, ihrerseits einer Erweiterung, weil sie erstens von der kontingenten Anerkennung der Vulnerabilität in einem jeweiligen Ethos abhängt, ohne selbst hinreichende normative Kriterien an die Hand zu geben, zweitens von geteilten, jedoch nicht singulären Ansprüchen und Bedürfnissen ausgeht und drittens den Motivationsgrund der Verpflichtung nicht klärt, weil sie von Allokationsstrukturen und nicht von konkreten Begegnungen ausgeht. Eine Korrektur von der Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit her, deren Implikationen für moraltheoretische Fragestellungen in den folgenden Ausführungen skizziert werden, scheint daher angezeigt. (shrink)

Several commentators have argued that with his concept of anonymity Merleau-Ponty breaks away from classical Husserlian phenomenology that is methodologically tied to the first person perspective. Many contemporary commentators see Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity as a break away from Husserl’s framework that is seen as hopelessly subjectivistic and solipsistic. Some judge and reproach it as a disastrous misunderstanding that leads to a confusion of philosophical and empirical concerns. Both parties agree that Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of anonymity mark a divergence from classical (...) Husserlian phenomenology. I will question this view and demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity remains Husserlian in two important senses: it analyses senses in terms of constituting selves and communities of such selves, and it accounts for the formation of experience by the temporal sedimentation of intentional activity. The argument proceeds in four steps. The first section argues against the widely spread notion according to which Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous subject is collective. In the second section, I offer an alternative reading by demonstrating that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “anonymous” primarily to characterize the lived body of a personal subject. In section three, I introduce Merleau-Ponty’s idea of trace and show that for him both the perceived thing and the perceiving body are traces and as such refer to earlier constitutive acts of alien subjects. I then argue that Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation are crucial for the understanding of this idea. Finally, in section four, I show how Husserl’s theory of depresentation informs Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity. (shrink)

My purpose is to suggest and open a dialogue between Plato and Adorno, and for this I have chosen the concept of mimesis, a concept that plays a central role in both thinkers both epistemologically and aesthetically. While Plato uses the term in order to expel the poets from Kallipolis, to be more precise certain kinds of poetry such as tragedy and comedy, Adorno uses the term to show the relationship between art and natural beauty, the somatic dimension of knowledge, (...) and the importance subversive poets and artists. For Plato, poets are three times removed from the truth and for Adorno, by contrast, the work of art is a vehicle of truth. This dialogue between an ancient and a modern intends to show not only the presence of the old in the new, but the valuable present and the fruitful transformation that an old concept can have. (shrink)

Following Merleau-Ponty´s inspiration, B. Waldenfels deals with embodiment emphasizing its responsive dimension, i.e., modes of bodily behavior and experience that respond to interpellations of the strange. From this view, the article aims to ex­plaining the intertwining of body and nature with the intention of showing that nature, understood as another side of human being, implies an alterity that cannot be reduced to the logic of intentionality nor to the logic of communication. The interpellation that arises from Nature has, on the (...) one hand, the meaning of appeal in the sense of an address to somebody, and, on the other, of pretention as an interpellation to something. Based on these presuppositions, the second part of the article tries to show how, by means of painting, a responsive action is set in motion. The features of singularity, unavoidable­ness, subsequence, asymmetry, and innovation that characterize the logic of the answer guiding this action. (shrink)

Taking up the body turn in sociology, this paper discusses scientific practices as embodied action from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenological theory of the “Body”. Based on ethnographic data on a biology laboratory it will discuss the importance of the scientist’s Body for the performance of scientific activities. Successful researchers have to be skilled workers using their embodied knowledge for the process of tinkering towards the material transformation of their objects for data production. The researcher’s body then is an instrument (...) of measuring as well as a kind of archive of knowing. Their body becomes a disciplined instrument which has its own place and function inside the laboratory. Furthermore, the appresentational apperception of Bodies (Husserl) is being discussed as a basis for the emotional and ethical concerns towards laboratory-animals. Attitudes towards animals in the laboratory setting (as well as elsewhere) are highly emotional. Nevertheless, following the literature of the sociology of the body, those emotional reactions still follow certain cultural patterns which themselves can be understood as embodied ways of knowing “right” or “wrong”. Besides as an instrument, the scientist’s body can also be understood as a resource of emotional attachment towards animals. It is an instrument for performing transformation as well as one for caring. (shrink)

Waldenfelsovo fenomenološko razumijevanje moderne zasnovano je na razumijevanju stranog kao bitnog određenja moderne. Strano je ovdje odrednica mišljenja koja se eksplicira u kulturnim i društvenim odnosima te ga stoga treba interpretirati upravo u njegovom fenomenalnom realitetu. Kultura i politika u tom značenju više su od pukog imena za skupni naziv značenja i opravdanja djelovanja. One postaju izraz smisaonog konteksta u kojem se iščitava odnos spram stranog kao referentnog mjesta za razumijevanje samog značenja moderne, njene unutarnje diferenciranosti, tokova koji je određuju (...) i karakteristika koje se uspostavljaju u individualnim odrednicama što obilježavaju njenu povijest. Strano se, u cjelini svojega određenja, zasniva iz tjelesnosti kao realiteta njegovog postojanja. U cjelini uzevši, moderna se, smatra Waldenfels, razumijeva u njenoj postranjenosti , u njenom odnošenju spram stranog koje na koncu rezultira i postranjenjem moderne u cijelosti. Ona kao takva nije zastranila, nego po-stranila, i sama se priklonila stranosti kao vlastitom identitetu, u kojem je čvrsto uspostavljen i filozofijski diskurs na kojem se taj identitet brani. Odnos spram tjelesnosti, koji se postulira u modernoj teoriji, u tom smislu je konzekvenca odnosa spram stranog. Zato se problem transformacije filozofije ne nalazi u novom razumijevanju umstvenosti, nego u diskursu nove racionalnosti, fenomenološkom mišljenju partikulariteta okrenutom kritici obuhvatnosti metafizike subjektiviteta i bilo kojeg oblika umstvenih pretpostavki realiteta. Waldenfelsova interpretacija moderne proistječe iz cjelovitog uvida u kontinuitet mišljenja koje je određuje i iskazuje se kroz njegovo sažimanje u ključnim problemima koji određuju njene tokove. U tom smislu fenomenološki diskurs njegove filozofije dobiva svojevrsno značenje ishodišta filozofijskog mišljenja na prijelazu stoljeća.Waldenfels’ phenomenological understanding of modernity is based on the understanding of “the foreign” as an essential definition of modernity. “The foreign” here is the characteristic of thinking explicated in cultural and social relationships, which should therefore be interpreted precisely in its phenomenal reality. Culture and politics in this context are more then a mere names for a collection of meanings and justifications of action. They become the expression of a meaningful context from which one can read-off the relation to “the foreign” as the reference point forunderstanding the very meaning of modernity, its inner differentiation, the streams that determine it and the characteristics that are established in the individual determinants that denote its history. “The foreign” as a whole is grounded in corporality as the reality of its existence. Waldenfels maintains that modernity, taken as a whole, is understood in its orientation towards the foreign, in its relationship with the foreign that, eventually, results in the entire modernity being oriented towards the foreign. Modernity as such did not go astray, but it became oriented towards the foreign, it decided itself to accept some sort of “the foreign” as its identity, in which the philosophical discourse is established for its defence. The relationship towards corporality, postulated in this sense in modern theory, is a consequence of the relationship towards “the foreign”. That is why the problem of transformation of philosophy is not found in the new understanding of the mind, but in the discourse of new rationality, of phenomenological thinking of the particularity oriented towards the critique of the encompassing metaphysics of subjectivity and towards all sorts of rational assumptions bout the reality. Waldenfels’ interpretation of the modernity follows from the integrative insight into continuity of the thinking that determines it, and it is expressed by his summarisation of the crucial problems that determine its paths. It is in this sense that the phenomenological discourse is established, signifying the starting point of philosophical thinking at the turn of the century. (shrink)

En el marco de un nuevo descubrimiento de la fenomenología, este trabajo ofrece diferentes argumentos para superar la clásica interpretación de Husserl considerándolo un representante prototípico del solipsismo. En primer lugar, se refuta la interpretación mentalista de Dreyfus de la fenomenología husserliana, mostrando que su programa filosófico va más allá de la tradicional dicotomía entre internalismo y externalismo; en segundo lugar, se señalan algunas de las principales contribuciones realizadas por la fenomenología de Husserl al campo de las ciencias cognitivas y (...) a la filosofía analítica de las mentes, destacando la importancia concedida a las síntesis pasivas en la llamada fenomenología genética. In the frame of a new discovery of phenomenology, the present essay offers different arguments to overcome the classical interpretation ofHusserl considering him a prototypical solipsist. First we refute Dreyfus' mentalistic misunderstanding of Husserlian phenomenology, and show that his philosophical program is beyond the traditional dichotomy between internalism and externalism. Second, it is our aim to point out some of the fundamental contributions made by Husserl's phenomenology to the cognitive sciences and analytical philosophy of mind, especially highlighting the importance attributed to passive synthesis in his genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that – in order to avoid trivializations – a Philosophy of Birth needs to elaborate a precise concept of transformation and distinguish it carefully from that of adaptation. While transformation goes beyond the limited self-referential perspective of an individual and, on the social level, of the gregarious identity, adaptation aims at strengthening or preserving the old self-referential equilibrium. Transformation is driven by what Zambrano has called, with an exceptionally happy expression, the “hunger to be (...) born completely”. Such a hunger pushes one to continue one’s own birth through the encounter with the Other. Transformation has a creative feature that is made possible by two factors: the surplus of the effect over the cause, and the priority of the real over the possible. These premises lead to a radical questioning of the primacy of the possible on the real, at least as it has been conceived so far in mainstream Western philosophy, with few exceptions, such as Schelling, Bergson and Scheler. In the first part of this text, I shall consider a new Philosophy of Birth in the light of the concept of transformation and in this regard deal with several core themes such as the hunger to be born completely, the new beginning, creative time, the priority of the real over the possible, the limits of finalism, the surplus of effect over cause, and the creative force that expresses itself in the act of ideation. In the second part, I shall analyze the relation between birth and death and focus especially on their intimate and reciprocal connection by referring to the image of the seed that, after falling on the ground, germinates and breaks its own integument. (shrink)

Conceptualism conceives of perceptual experience as a source of reasons. This claim can be read in two ways: in a strong reading, perceptual experience is taken to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to justify doxastic states. In a weak reading, it is assumed to provide only the materials to form reasons, which are conceived as “hybrid entities” made from perceptual contents plus doxastic force. The paper shows that whereas the strong version is in error, the weak version is committed to (...) a dualistic understanding of perception-judgment transitions. This result leads to three further conclusions: conceptualism cannot rule out the existence of nonconceptual content, it is a version of the Myth of the Given, and pace conceptualists, only beliefs can justify other beliefs. (shrink)

My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.

This is an encyclopedia entry for the Interaction-Design.org free IxD encyclopedia. The topic of the entry is the application of the philosophy of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to a theory of interactivity. Comments by Don Norman and Eva Hornecker.

The aim of this work is to elucidate the meaning of 'infinity' from a phenomenological perspective, especially within the framework of Husserl’s theory of knowledge and perception. In the first chapter I firstly sketch the basics of Husserl’s phenomenology of knowledge. Thereafter I delve into the questions concerning the reduction to the 'reellen Bestand', which is hold to be the ground of verification of purports in the "Logical Investigations". I then propose an interpretation of the categorial intuition as directed to (...) the laws an 'Auffassung' follows when it organizes the sensual contents related to an object. In the second chapter I briefly expound Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and I show how perception can be hold as an intentional experience. Afterwards I concentrate on the constitution of space and of thing (Ding). I show in which sense the structures of both constitutions are dependent on the sensations and kinesthesis (i.e. proprioceptions) experienced by the subject. In the third chapter I finally deal with the problem of infinity. I face some recent interpretations of Husserl’s theory of perception according to which infinity is somehow intertwined in and even intuited through thing-perception (Dingwahrnehmung). I claim that thing-perception can not be hold as an access to infinity, i.e. no thing-perception is a perception of something as infinite. Following I show how some other kinds of sensual experience can correspond to a perception of infinity. On the base of some Husserl’s manuscripts and through a brief confrontation with Kant’s Analytic of the Sublime I sustain that infinity can be sensually intuited in the senses of limitlessness and of formlessness. I then show that categorial intuition is necessary in order to constitute the meaning of mathematical infinity, i.e. an endless whole of discrete parts. In fact, the idea of such an “entity” is dependent on the capacity of grasping the law of a serial production. In the conclusion I establish that mathematical infinity is the only kind of infinity which can not find any sensual correlate. This is due to the fact that it is a meaning composed by two contradictory prescriptions: 'reach the limitless' and 'go on without an end'. I consequently argue that the idea of infinity is grounded on sensual experience and does not need any supernatural origin. (shrink)

Resumen Mi intención es sugerir y abrir un diálogo entre Platón y Adorno, para lo cual he elegido el concepto de mímesis, un concepto que juega un papel central en ambos pensadores tanto gnoseológicamente como estéticamente. Mientras que el término le sirve a Platón para expulsar a los poetas de Kallipolis, más exactamente ciertos tipos de poesía como la tragedia y la comedia, Adorno lo usa para mostrar el lazo entre el arte y la belleza natural, la dimensión somática del (...) conocimiento, y la importancia subversiva de los poetas y los artistas. Para Platón los poetas están tres veces alejados de la verdad y para Adorno, por el contrario, la obra de arte es un vehículo de la verdad. Este diálogo quiere mostrar no sólo la presencia de lo antiguo en lo moderno, sino la valiosa actualidad y la fructífera transformación que puede padecer un concepto antiguo.My purpose is to suggest and open a dialogue between Plato and Adorno, and for this I have chosen the concept of mimesis, a concept that plays a central role in both thinkers both epistemologically and aesthetically. While Plato uses the term in order to expel the poets from Kallipolis, to be more precise certain kinds of poetry such as tragedy and comedy, Adorno uses the term to show the relationship between art and natural beauty, the somatic dimension of knowledge, and the importance subversive poets and artists. For Plato, poets are three times removed from the truth and for Adorno, by contrast, the work of art is a vehicle of truth. This dialogue between an ancient and a modern intends to show not only the presence of the old in the new, but the valuable present and the fruitful transformation that an old concept can have. (shrink)

The paper offers the first and the most comprehensive outline of perichronosophy, i.e. a theory of timelessness and its practicing, which are to be taken as a theoretical(perichronology) and practical (atemporalistics) grounds of syncriticism. The fundamental concept of perichronosophy is perichrony expressed by the term perichronosopheme. This concept has been articulated in recent years by applying the syncritic method in the examination of various pre-temporal, intratemporal, and beyond-temporal units of timelessness, as well as their various timeless qualities, linkages and processes (...) taking place in various spheres of timelessness: in pretemporality, intra-temporality as well as between time and timelessness. Perichronosophy goes back mainly to Plato’s theory of timelessness oscillating around the notions of exaiphnes and metaxy. (shrink)

This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...) Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone. (shrink)

Resumen: Siguiendo la inspiración de Merleau-Ponty, B. Waldenfels se ocupa de la corporalidad y pone énfasis en su dimensión responsiva, es decir, en modos de comportamiento y experiencia corporales que responden a interpelaciones de lo extraño. Desde esta perspectiva, este trabajo aspira a elucidar el entrelazamiento cuerpo-Naturaleza con la intención de mostrar que la Naturaleza entendida como otro aspecto del hombre implica una alteridad que no se reduce ni a la lógica de la intencionalidad ni a la lógica de la (...) comunicación. La interpelación que proviene de la Naturaleza tiene, por una parte, el significado de una apelación, comprendida como alocución a alguien, y, por otra, el de una pretensión, en el sentido de una interpelación a algo. Con base en estos presupuestos, la segunda parte de la exposición apunta a ilustrar la manera como a través de la pintura se pone en marcha un actuar responsivo, que se orienta por los caracteres singularidad, ineludibilidad, posterioridad, asimetría e innovación que caracterizan a la lógica de la respuesta.: Following Merleau-Ponty´s inspiration, B. Waldenfels deals with embodiment emphasizing its responsive dimension, i.e., modes of bodily behavior and experience that respond to interpellations of the strange. From this view, the article aims to explaining the intertwining of body and nature with the intention of showing that nature, understood as another side of human being, implies an alterity that cannot be reduced to the logic of intentionality nor to the logic of communication. The interpellation that arises from Nature has, on the one hand, the meaning of appeal in the sense of an address to somebody, and, on the other, of pretention as an interpellation to something. Based on these presuppositions, the second part of the article tries to show how, by means of painting, a responsive action is set in motion. The features of singularity, unavoidableness, subsequence, asymmetry, and innovation that characterize the logic of the answer guiding this action. (shrink)

Resumen: En este trabajo me propongo exponer las relaciones entre racionalidad responsiva y extrañeza en la obra de Bernhard Waldenfels. Expondré esta relación a partir de seis tesis con el propósito de que ellas se complementen mutuamente y logren mostrar, de la manera más apropiada posible, la relación entre responsividad y la experiencia de lo extraño. Estos puntos son: 1. Una breve aclaración terminológica. Diferencia entre lo otro y lo extraño. 2. La relación entre discurso escrito y hablado. 3. La (...) concepción de orden, vinculada con mecanismos de inclusión y exclusión. 4. La relación entre pathos y respuesta, como los puntos focales de la racionalidad responsiva. 5. La relación entre el decir y lo dicho y la temporalidad que los vincula y separa. Y por último, 6. Me ocuparé del problema de cómo hablar sobre lo extraño y el problema del lenguaje indirecto.: The purpose of this paper is to show the relations between responsiveness and strangeness in the work of Bernhard Waldenfels. I will expose this relationship in six theses, so that they complement each other and show, in the most appropriate possible way, the relationship between responsiveness and the experience of the strange. These points are, 1. A brief clarification of terminology. Difference between the other and the strange. 2. The relationship between written and spoken speech. 3. The conception of order, linked to mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. 4. The relationship between pathos and response, as focal points of responsive rationality. 5. The relationship between saying and what is said and the temporality that links and separates them. And finally, 6. I will deal with the problem of how to talk about the strange and the problem of indirect language. (shrink)