In the development and acceptance of Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights, the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization did not involve the Protestant faith tradition in the consultation process. This brings the universality as well as the acceptability of the Declaration and its principles into question. In order to address this issue, it is necessary to involve the Protestant tradition in the discourse by presenting own reasons that support the universal principles in the (...) Declaration. This discourse has shown that respect for cultural diversity, pluralism and the priority of universal shared values can be grounded from a Trinitarian perspective; therefore, the appeal of the Declaration to consider this principle seriously in the field of bioethics can be supported by the Protestant religious tradition. (shrink)

Pragmatism has been understood by bioethicists as yet another rival in the “methods wars,” as yet another theory of moral deliberation. This has led to criticism of pragmatic bioethics as both theoretically and practically inadequate. Pragmatists’ responses to these objections have focused mainly on misunderstandings of pragmatism’s epistemology. These responses are insufficient. Pragmatism’s commitment to radical empiricism gives it theoretical resources unappreciated by critics and defenders alike. Radical empiricism, unlike its more traditional ancestors, undercuts the gaps between theory and practice, (...) and subjective and objective accounts of experience, and in so doing provides the metaphysical and epistemological basis for a thoroughgoing empirical naturalism in ethics. Pragmatism’s strength as an approach to moral problems thus emerges as a result of a much wider array of resources than contemporary interpreters have acknowledged, which makes it a richer, deeper framework for understanding moral deliberation in general and bioethical decision making in particular. (shrink)

According to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, there is an incommensurability between different theories of normative ethics. MacIntyre’s view on the incommensurability of ethical discourse casts doubt upon the pluralistic proposal of Magelssen and colleagues, since the insights gained from the various theories will themselves be incommensurate with one another. However, since there are obvious benefits provided both by arguments for pluralism and the insights of Magelssen and colleagues, I utilize some later work of MacIntyre to offer an alternative means (...) of conceiving of the role of ethical theories not as providing direct insights, but rather as imagined perspectives which will give rise to practical knowledge for the clinical ethicists, which can be used in developing their conclusions. (shrink)