This paper uses argumentation tools such as argument diagrams and argumentation schemes to analyze four examples of argument from analogy, and argues that to proceed from there to evaluating these arguments, features of the context of dialogue need to be taken into account. The evidence drawn from these examples is taken to support a pragmatic approach to studying argument from analogy, meaning that identifying the logical form of the argument by building an argument diagram of the premises and conclusion is (...) not by itself sufficient for argument evaluation. To get further, it is argued, the argument evaluator needs to take into account how this particular argument was used in context to support a conversational goal.Cet article utilise des outils d'argumentation tels que des diagrammes d'argument et des schèmes d'argumentation pour analyser trois exemples d'argument par analogie, et soutient que pour évaluer ces arguments de manière adéquate, il est nécessaire de tenir compte du contexte d'utilisation de l'argument. Ces exemples suggèrent que l’étude des arguments par analogie à partir de seulement l’identification de leur forme logique n'est pas adéquate. Pour aller plus loin, on avance que l'analyste d'argument doit prendre en compte comment un argument particulier a été utilisé dans un contexte pour soutenir un but conversationnel. (shrink)

In this paper, a case study is conducted to test the capability of the Carneades Argumentation System to model the argumentation in a case where forensic evidence was collected in an investigation triggered by a conflict among art experts on the attribution of a painting to Leonardo da Vinci. A claim that a portrait of a young woman in a Renaissance dress could be attributed to da Vinci was initially dismissed by art experts. Forensic investigations were carried out, and evidence (...) was collected by art history experts and scientific experts. The expert opinions were initially in conflict, but new evidence shifted the burden of proof onto the side of the skeptics. This paper presents an analysis of the structure of the interlocking argumentation in the case using argument mapping tools to track the accumulation of evidence pro and con. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to indicate the systematic place of arguments based on the concept of analogy within the theoretical framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments, a new method for describing and classifying arguments that integrates traditional dialectical accounts of arguments and fallacies and rhetorical accounts of the means of persuasion (logos, ethos, pathos) into a comprehensive framework. The paper begins with an inventory of existing approaches to arguments based on analogy, similarity and adjacent concepts. Then, the (...) theoretical framework of the table will be expounded and several concrete examples of arguments based on these concepts will be analyzed in terms of the framework. Finally, the results of these analyses will be summarized and it will be indicated how they can be refined in further research related to the Periodic Table of Arguments. (shrink)

Argument schemes are abstractions substantiating the inferential connection between premise(s) and conclusion in argumentative communication. Identifying such conventional patterns of reasoning is essential to the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation. Whether studying argumentation from a theory-driven or data-driven perspective, insight into the actual use of argumentation in communicative practice is essential. Large and reliably annotated corpora of argumentative discourse to quantitatively provide such insight are few and far between. This is all the more true for argument scheme corpora, which tend (...) to suffer from a combination of limited size, poor validation, and the use of ad hoc restricted typologies. In the current paper, we describe the annotation of schemes on the basis of two distinct classifications: Walton’s taxonomy of argument schemes, and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments. We describe the annotation procedure for each, and the quantitative characteristics of the resulting annotated text corpora. In doing so, we extend the annotation of the preexisting US2016 corpus of televised election debates, resulting in, to the best of our knowledge, the two largest consistently annotated corpora of schemes in argumentative dialogue publicly available. Based on evaluation in terms of inter-annotator agreement, we propose further improvements to the guidelines for annotating schemes: the argument scheme key, and the Argument Type Identification Procedure. (shrink)

Inferential or epistemic conditional sentences represent a blueprint of someone’s reasoning process from premise to conclusion. Declerck and Reed (2001) make a distinction between a direct and an indirect type. In the latter type the direction of reasoning goes backwards, from the blatant falsehood of the consequent to the falsehood of the antecedent. We first present a modal reinterpretation in terms of Argumentation Schemes of indirect inferential conditionals (IIC’s) in Declerck and Reed (2001). We furthermore argue for a distinction between (...) epistemic-modal strong and deontic-modal weak IIC’s. In addition, we extend the category of the indirect inferential conditionals in order to include several other deontic-modal subtypes. On the basis of the undesirability of the consequent the hearer in these cases infers that the antecedent is also undesirable. In this way the rhetoric-argumentative strategy of Reductio ad Absurdum is extended from the realm of deductive reasoning to that of practical reasoning. (shrink)

Information technology is so ubiquitous and AI’s progress so inspiring that also legal professionals experience its benefits and have high expectations. At the same time, the powers of AI have been rising so strongly that it is no longer obvious that AI applications (whether in the law or elsewhere) help promoting a good society; in fact they are sometimes harmful. Hence many argue that safeguards are needed for AI to be trustworthy, social, responsible, humane, ethical. In short: AI should be (...) good for us. But how to establish proper safeguards for AI? One strong answer readily available is: consider the problems and solutions studied in AI & Law. AI & Law has worked on the design of social, explainable, responsible AI aligned with human values for decades already, AI & Law addresses the hardest problems across the breadth of AI (in reasoning, knowledge, learning and language), and AI & Law inspires new solutions (argumentation, schemes and norms, rules and cases, interpretation). It is argued that the study of AI as Law supports the development of an AI that is good for us, making AI & Law more relevant than ever. (shrink)

Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether (...) there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 220 Seiten: 19-40.

It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being (...) critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism? (shrink)

To illustrate the development of argumentation theory, the paper traces the journey of the pragma-dialectical theory as it widened its scope, step by step, from an abstract model of critical discussion to the complexities of actual argumentative discourse. It describes how, having contextualized, empiricalized and formalized their approach, pragma-dialecticians are now putting the theory’s analytical instruments to good use in identifying prototypical argumentative patterns in specific communicative activity types in the various communicative domains. This means that they can now start (...) answering the crucial question about the typical characteristics of their discourse asked by interested lawyers, politicians, academics and other practitioners of argumentation. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis of the cultural embeddedness of arguments, raised as a part of the Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention. The method I employed was the localization procedure of Generalized Argumentation theory. Through a qualitative analysis of empirical argumentation data, I identified arguments in favour of or against the ratification of the Istanbul convention. Information about the cultural background against which these arguments were raised, i.e. about Bulgarian culture, was gathered from the part of (...) the ninth wave of the European Social Survey that used the Portrait Value Questionnaire—an instrument for measuring human values, based on Schwartz’s theory of human values. By establishing a certain relationship between the arguments and the cultural background information, I came to the conclusion that the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the ratification represented a conflict between the basic values of universalism and tradition, and more particularly, between the lower-order values of equality and respect for tradition. (shrink)

False dilemma is a specific form of reasoning : despite the fact that it is based on a deductively valid argument form, it is rightly depicted as fallacy. A systematic exposition of false dilemma is missing in theoretical approaches to fallacies. This article formulates six criteria for a well-grounded exposition of a fallacy, suggesting also a systematic exposition of false dilemma. These criteria can be used to both explain, and categorise, the various false dilemma fallacies. The article introduces distinction between (...) four types of false dilemma : False quandary, Defeasible sound quandary, False obstruction and Defeasible sound obstruction. The types of criticism appropriate for each variant of false dilemma are suggested. Being able to discover false dilemma in situations when it is important to make good and free choices is a significant dimension of critical thinking. It may liberate us from accepting the consequences that necessarily follow from prearranged alternatives, when these are not the only alternatives possible. It may also liberate us from refraining from actions on the basis of obstructive disjunctive statements. In that respect, the faculty of critical thinking directed at uncovering reasoning based on false dilemma may also initiate the discovery of new alternatives, or discover the ways of unifying seemingly opposing alternatives. Thus, a well-developed ability to understand the tricky argumentative moves of false dilemma may be a good step towards initiating some features of creative thinking. (shrink)

The New Rhetoric identifies the self-deliberator as one of three main types of audience. But such a turn toward the self is at odds with studies of contemporary argumentation, particularly social argumentation. Argumentation takes place “out there”, modifying the environments in which audiences operate. Equally interesting is the use of self-deliberation as a rhetorical strategy. Arguing with oneself, especially when that self is distanced in some way from the individual involved, employs self-deliberation beyond the ends that Perelman assigned to it. (...) In this paper, my goal is to explore the nature of the self-deliberator as an audience and self-deliberation as a rhetorical strategy employed in argumentation. (shrink)

This paper discusses the ways in which a person’s character ( ethos ) and a hearer’s emotional response ( pathos ) are part of the complex judgments made about experts’ claims, along with an actual assessment of those claims ( logos ). The analysis is rooted in the work of Aristotle, but expands to consider work on emotion and cognition conducted by Thagard and Gigerenzer. It also draws on some conclusions of the general epistemology of testimony (of which expert testimony (...) is a special subset), where it is argued that we learn not just from the transmission of another’s beliefs, but from the words they speak. This shifts the onus in testimony away from the intentions of a speaker onto the judgments of an audience, capturing better its social character and reflecting our experience of receiving testimony. I conclude, however, that accepting the arguments of experts involves much more than simply believing what they say. (shrink)

Through the example of a paradigmatic deliberative speech from classical oratory, the paper addresses two fundamental questions of teaching rhetorical reasoning. First, the paper shows that a speech from ancient Greek and Roman political or judicial oratory could provide effective means to teach a variety of argumentation skills, the recognition of fallacies and an awareness of biases in the target audience. Second, the paper uses the speech to consider an elusive problem of rhetorical or critical reasoning instruction, namely how students (...) may use historical models to adapt their knowledge of a case to real-life situations, where a large number of uncertain variables demands a constant awareness of the conditions affecting the audience`s decision and may require a swift change in the argumentative strategy. The paper will argue that the application of a new model of strategic reasoning called heuristic rhetoric to Cicero`s speech could illustrate a workable solution to both problems. (shrink)

The article focuses on the new rhetoric category of quasi-logical arguments, defined as arguments similar to logical or mathematical demonstrations, and therefore having an effect on the audience. Connecting the similarity of arguments to formal demonstrations with the claim of effect on audience is conceived in this article as the thesis of effectiveness of quasi-logical arguments. The components of the thesis are reconstructed and analyzed, and their precise definitions are proposed. The analysis shows that the category of quasi-logical arguments is (...) ambiguously defined and currently includes three different concepts based on a different understanding of similarity. Subsequently, it is showed that based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s works, the explanation of quasi-logical arguments’ effect on an audience can be offered in terms of socially shared standards of community or in terms of individual processing of arguments. It is shown that these explanations can be in conflict each other regarding the assumption of the addressee’s acquaintance with formal principles. (shrink)

Arguers sometimes cite a decision made in an earlier situation as a reason for making the equivalent decision in a later situation. I argue that there are two kinds of “case-to-case arguments”. First, there are arguments by precedent, which cite the mere existence of the past decision as a reason to decide in the same way again now, independent of the past decision’s merits. Second, there are case-to-case arguments from parralel reasoning which presuppose that the past decision was justified and (...) are used to show that an equivalent present decision would also be justified. Both arguments are a type of argument by analogy. They differ in their structures and conditions of cogency, even though they often look the same in presentation. Their similar appearance poses a risk of miss-evaluation and fallacious use. Therefore a clearly theorized distinction is important. (shrink)

We designed scaffolded tasks that targeted the skill of identifying reasoning errors and conducted a study with 472 middle school students. The study results showed a small positive impact of the scaffolding on student performance on one topic, but not the other, indicating that student skills of writing critiques could be affected by the topic and argument content. Additionally, students from low-SES families did not perform as well as their peers. Student performance on the critique tasks had moderate or strong (...) correlations with students’ state reading and writing test scores. Implications of the scaffolding and critique task design are discussed. (shrink)

“Deductivism” is a broad label for various theories that emphasize the importance of deductive argument in contexts of rational discussion. This paper makes a case for a very specific form of deductivism. The paper highlights the dialectical importance of advancing deductively valid arguments in natural-language reasoning. Sections 2 and 3 explain the various forms that deductivism has taken. Section 4 makes a case for a particular form of deductivism. Section 5 discusses the value of deductive argument in law. Section 6 (...) concludes and acknowledges critical questions that need to be addressed more fully in future work. (shrink)

Naszym celem jest dostarczenie formalnego modelu oceny możliwie szerokiej klasy argumentacji, w szczególności tych, które pojawiają się w kontekstach naturalnych. We wprowadzeniu przedstawiamy elementarne sposoby rozbudowywania argumentacji prostych w coraz bardziej złożone struktury. W drugim rozdziale podajemy ścisłe definicje pojęć służących do opisu tych struktur — argumentację definiujemy jako niepusty i skończony zbiór sekwentów, tj. jako niepustą i skończoną relację zachodzącą pomiędzy niepustymi i skończonymi zbio-rami zdań a pojedynczymi zdaniami danego języka; wprowadzamy także kilka pojęć (nie-spójność, rozbieżność, kolistość), które pozwalają (...) wyróżniać niektóre nietypowe lub wadliwe struktury argumentacyjne. W trzecim rozdziale proponujemy ogólną, liczbową metodę oceny siły argumentacji. Metoda ta pokazuje, jak wiarygodność przesłanek pierwszych przekłada się na wiarygodność konkluzji głównej w zależności od budowy argumentacji (wiarygodność wyrażamy za pomocą liczb wymiernych z domkniętego przedziału <0, 1>). Jedną z charakterystycznych własności argumentacji potocznej jest występowanie w niej wzajemnie wzmacniających się tzw. rozumowań równoległych. Dlatego za istotny składnik proponowanej metody należy uznać wzór: a * b = 2a+2b-2ab-1. Wzór ten pozwala obliczyć wiarygodność (konkluzji) dowolnej argumentacji równoległej, składającej się z dwóch wzajemnie niezależnych rozumowań, które brane z osobna uwiarygodniają konkluzję w stopniach a oraz b (zakładamy przy tym, że obie te wartości są większe niż ½). (shrink)

Central to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s philosophical revival of rhetoric and dialectic is the importance given to the temporal character of argumentation. Unlike demonstration, situated within the “empty time” of a single instant, the authors of The New Rhetoric understand argumentation as an action that unfolds within the “full time” of meaningful human life. By taking a broader view of his work beyond The New Rhetoric, I first outline Perelman’s understanding of time and temporality and the challenge that it poses for (...) the study of argumentation. Next, I emphasize the distinction between argumentation’s internal and external temporal structures, and then show how Perelman problematizes a static view of a number of basic argumentative concepts by bringing out their essentially temporal character. Finally, in clarifying what is at stake in Perelman’s account, I conclude by drawing attention to a number of issues in contemporary argumentation studies that may benefit from a reconsideration of Perelman’s analysis of time. (shrink)

Can argumentation schemes play a part in the critical processing of argumentation by lay people? In a qualitative study, participants were invited to come up with strong and weak arguments for a given claim and were subsequently interviewed for why they thought the strong argument was stronger than the weak one. Next, they were presented with a list of arguments and asked to rank these arguments from strongest to weakest, upon which they were asked to motivate their judgments in an (...) interview. In order to assess whether lay people apply argument scheme specific criteria when performing these tasks, five different argumentation schemes were included in this study: argumentation from authority, from example, from analogy, from cause to effect, and from consequences. Laypeople’s use of criteria for argument quality was inferred from interview protocols. The results revealed that participants combined general criteria from informal logic and scheme-specific criteria. The results supported the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical argument scheme rule in a strong sense and provided a more fine-grained view of central processing in the Elaboration Likelihood Model. (shrink)

I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross will be connected to the views (...) on theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Consequently, the mere comprehension of a legal concept will be distinguished from the application of the concept to a particular legal system, since application presupposes a doctrinal commitment, namely, the belief that the inferences constituting the concept hold in that system. Then, I shall consider how concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology. Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts. (shrink)

In this paper the conception of argumentation theory as applied epistemology is discussed. The point of departure is the description of four perspectives that are considered as founders of the modern theory of argumentation, in order to observe whether there was a similar concept in those theories or if they provided the patterns to go into that direction. Further on the reasons why contemporary scholars have given this emphasis to the notion of argumentation theory is discussed. En este artículo se (...) discute la visión de la teoría de la argumentación como una forma de epistemología aplicada. El punto de partida es la descripción de cuatro perspectivas que se consideran fundadoras de la teoría moderna de la argumentación, para desde allí observar si en ellas hubo un concepto similar o si se dieron las pautas para tomar esa dirección. Luego, se reflexiona en torno a las razones por las que los teóricos posteriores han dado énfasis a esta visión de la teoría de la argumentación. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the inferential configuration of arguments, generally referred to as argument scheme. After outlining our approach, denominated Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT, see Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2006, 2009; Rigotti 2006, 2008, 2009), we compare it to other modern and contemporary approaches, to eventually illustrate some advantages offered by it. In spite of the evident connection with the tradition of topics, emerging also from AMT’s denomination, its involvement in the contemporary dialogue on argument schemes should not be (...) overlooked. The model builds in particular on the theoretical and methodological perspective of pragma-dialectics in its extended version, reconciling dialectic and rhetoric; nevertheless, it also takes into account numerous other contributions to the study of argument schemes. Aiming at a representation of argument schemes able to monitor the inferential cohesion and completeness of arguments, AMT focuses on two components of argument scheme that could be distinguished, readapting pragma-dialectical terms, as procedural and material respectively. The procedural component is based on the semantic-ontological structure, which generates the inferential connection from which the logical form of the argument is derived. The material component integrates into the argument scheme the implicit and explicit premises bound to the contextual common ground (Rigotti 2006). In this paper, the comparison of the AMT to other approaches focuses on the inferential configuration of arguments and not on the typologies of argument schemes and on the principles they are based on, which the authors intend to tackle in a further paper. (shrink)

En este trabajo proponemos un análisis de los esquemas de argumento por signo que fueron identificados en las etiquetas interpretativas de las exposiciones permanentes de los museos de la región de la Araucanía. Se analizan cualitativa y críticamente tres casos de los veintiún esquemas por signo identificados. Las herramientas teóricas esgrimidas proceden de la pragma-dialéctica y la lógica informal. Nuestro objetivo es caracterizar los esquemas por signo identificados en las etiquetas de las exhibiciones de los museos de la Araucanía, en (...) la búsqueda de orientar su manejo en el diseño de exhibiciones museísticas significativas. Para ello, hemos desarrollado una matriz metodológica que adopta el levantamiento de una estructura argumental. Así, fue posible identificar los puntos de vista como las razones que lo justifican, además de identificar los esquemas argumentativos, a los cuales se les ha aplicado sus respectivas preguntas críticas. El análisis nos permitió concluir que en el empleo del esquema por signo siempre es necesario apoyarse en el entorno cercano donde se maneja el argumento, esto incluye la noción de lugar o de territorio en sus distintos niveles de significación. Asimismo, se ha comprobado como fundamental la incorporación de la tercera pregunta crítica al esquema por signo, la cual hace referencia al contexto donde se presenta el argumento. Por último, se ha detectado que los esquemas considerados complejos también realizan una referencia al lugar, pero con la utilización y combinación de variadas figuras retóricas, como la resignificación o sustitución. (shrink)

The Argument Web is maturing as both a platform built upon a synthesis of many contemporary theories of argumentation in philosophy and also as an ecosystem in which various applications and application components are contributed by different research groups around the world. It already hosts the largest publicly accessible corpora of argumentation and has the largest number of interoperable and cross compatible tools for the analysis, navigation and evaluation of arguments across a broad range of domains, languages and activity types. (...) Such interoperability is key in allowing innovative combinations of tool and data reuse that can further catalyse the development of the field of computational argumentation. The aim of this paper is to summarise the key foundations, the recent advances and the goals of the Argument Web, with a particular focus on demonstrating the relevance to, and roots in, philosophical argumentation theory. (shrink)

The view that argumentation is a desired reasoning practice in the classroom is well reported in the literature. Nonetheless, it is still not clear what type of reasoning supports classroom argumentation. The paper discusses abductive reasoning as the most adequate for students’ arguments to emerge in a classroom discussion. Abductive reasoning embraces the idea of plausibility and defeasibility of both the premises and the conclusion. As such, teachers’ role becomes the one of guiding students through formulating relevant hypotheses and selecting (...) the most plausible one according to criteria. Argumentation schemes are proposed as useful tools in this process.L'idée que l'argumentation est une pratique de raisonnement souhaitée en classe est bien documentée dans la littérature. Néanmoins, il n'est toujours pas clair quel type de raisonnement soutient l'argumentation en classe. Dans cet article on discute du raisonnement abductif comme étant le plus adéquat pour que les arguments des élèves émergent dans une discussion en classe. Le raisonnement abductif emploie l'idée de plausibilité et de la révocabilité des prémisses et de la conclusion. En tant que tel, le rôle des enseignants consiste à guider les élèves à formuler des hypothèses pertinentes et à sélectionner le plus plausible selon des critères. Les schèmes d'argumentation sont proposés comme des outils utiles dans ce processus. (shrink)

Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation, Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument (sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views (...) on argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes (topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name, still discussed in modern argumentation theory. (shrink)

In this article the argumentation structure of the court’s decision in the Popov v. Hayashi case is formalised in Prakken’s (Argument Comput 1:93–124; 2010) abstract framework for argument-based inference with structured arguments. In this framework, arguments are inference trees formed by applying two kinds of inference rules, strict and defeasible rules. Arguments can be attacked in three ways: attacking a premise, attacking a conclusion and attacking an inference. To resolve such conflicts, preferences may be used, which leads to three corresponding (...) kinds of defeat, after which Dung’s (Artif Intell 77:321–357; 1995) abstract acceptability semantics can be used to evaluate the arguments. In the present paper the abstract framework is instantiated with strict inference rules corresponding to first-order logic and with defeasible inference rules for defeasible modus ponens and various argument schemes. The main techniques used in the formal reconstruction of the case are rule-exception structures and arguments about rule validity. Arguments about socio-legal values and the use of precedent cases are reduced to arguments about rule validity. The tree structure of arguments, with explicit subargument relations between arguments, is used to capture the dependency relations between the elements of the court’s decision. (shrink)

In this paper a new use case for legal argumentation support tools is considered: supporting discussions about analyses of complex criminal cases with the help of Bayesian probability theory. By way of a case study, two actual discussions between experts in court cases are analysed on their argumentation structure. In this study the usefulness of several recognised argument schemes is confirmed, a new argument scheme for arguments from statistics are proposed, and an analysis is given of debates between experts about (...) the validity of their arguments. From a practical point of view the case study yields insights into the design of support software for discussions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases. (shrink)

Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...) some novels exhibit a cogent and special argument structure restricted to fictional narratives. I contend that this is the case for a kind of transcendental argument. The reason is the inclusion and pattern of occurrence of the predicate ‘believable’ in the schema. Believability with respect to fictional stories is quite a different thing than it is with respect to nonfictional stories or anything else. (shrink)

Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth (...) of e or for a term in e to have a referent. In contrast, an assumption of an argument pertains to the argument as a whole in that it is integral to the reasoning or inferential structure of the argument. A logical assumption of an argument is essentially a proposition that must be true in order for the argument aside from that proposition to be fully cogent. Nothing that is both comparable and distinguishing can be said about presumptions of arguments. Rather, presumptions of arguments are distinctively conventional; they are introduced through conventional rules (e.g., those that concern how to treat promises). So not all assumptions and not all presuppositions of arguments are presumptions of those arguments, although all presumptions of arguments are either assumptions or presuppositions of those arguments. This account avoids making the (monological) notion of presumption vacuous and dissolving the distinction between assumption and presumption, which is a vulnerability of alternative views such as Hansen’s and Bermejo-Luque’s, as is shown. (shrink)

Trust is a natural mechanism by which an autonomous party, an agent, can deal with the inherent uncertainty regarding the behaviours of other parties and the uncertainty in the information it shares with those parties. Trust is thus crucial in any decentralised system. This paper builds on recent efforts to use argumentation to reason about trust. Specifically, a set of schemes is provided, and abstract patterns of reasoning that apply in multiple situations geared towards trust. Schemes are described in which (...) one agent, A, can establish arguments for trusting another agent, B, directly, as well as schemes that A can use to construct arguments for trusting C, where C is trusted by B. For both sets of schemes, a set of critical questions is offered that identify the situations in which these schemes can fail. (shrink)

In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as much as most commentators would hope or even predict. In this paper, I discuss what obstacles bar the way to more widespread success of argument technologies and venture some suggestions on how to circumvent such difficulties: doing so will require a significant shift in how this research area is typically understood and practiced. I begin by exploring a much broader yet closely related question: To (...) what extent are people natively good at arguing? This issue has always been central to philosophical reflection and it has become even more urgent nowadays, with the explosion of persuasive technologies and unprecedented opportunities for large-scale social influence. The answer hinges on what aspect of argumentation is taken under consideration: evidence suggests that people are relatively bad at analyzing the structure of arguments, especially when these are presented out of context and in abstract terms; in contrast, data show that even laymen tend to excel in the interactive practice of argumentation, in particular when motivation is high and something significant is at stake. Unfortunately, current argument technologies are more closely tailored to the former type of activity than to the latter, which is the main reason behind their relative lack of success with the general public. Changing this state of affair will require a commitment to ecological argument technologies: that is, technologies designed to support real-time, engaging and meaningful argumentative interactions performed by laypeople in their ordinary life, instead of catering to the highly specific needs of a minority of niche users. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the possibilities of acknowledging the argumentative character of narration. Two basic models will be revised: 1) primary narratives, regarding issues and facts under discussion, which may work as implicit arguments about the coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility and 2) secondary narratives, imaginatively inserted in discourse, and serving as evidence for diverse lines of analogical or exemplary argumentation.

This work pretends to unveil the relationship between the psychosocial features grouped under the argument frame concept and the degree of discursive density that is reached by a sample of 243 older adults in the production of argumentative discourses. In order to specify the main psychosocial features of the sample’s subjects, the Hample test was employed. In order to evaluate argumentative density, all of the participants were asked for an essay about a controversial situation derived from the Dilemma of the (...) D.I.T. Questionnaire. The information crossover between both instruments allowed the establishment of a significant relationship between the way in which the older adults frame reality and the discursive products through which it is communicated. (shrink)

‘AI & Law’ research has been around since the 1970s, even though with shifting emphasis. This is an overview of the contributions of digital technologies, both artificial intelligence and non-AI smart tools, to both the legal professions and the police. For example, we briefly consider text mining and case-automated summarization, tools supporting argumentation, tools concerning sentencing based on the technique of case-based reasoning, the role of abductive reasoning, research into applying AI to legal evidence, tools for fighting crime and tools (...) for identification. (shrink)

TED Talks are still an unexplored genre of argumentation in which narrative arguments are often used in TED speakers’ strategic maneuvering to support a standpoint. In the present study, I combine the constructs of narrative positioning (NP) and strategic maneuvering (SM) to offer a conceptualization of how narrative is used in pragmatic argumentation as well as provide an exemplary analysis of a specific case of narrative arguments that were used in Winch’s (How to practice emotional first aid. https://www.ted.com/talks/guy_winch_the_case_for_emotional_hygiene.2014, 2014) TED (...) Talk. The proposed integration aims to provide a theoretical framework and empirical tools for reconstructing narrative arguments through connecting the underlying formal structure of narrative with aspects of TED speakers’ strategic maneuvering. Drawing on NP and SM constructs, the critical analysis explores how Winch’s narratives or “small stories” were strategically manipulated to support his stance with regard to the importance of mental health and to examine whether or not the use of narrative arguments as argumentation moves helped to enhance the dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness of Winch’s argument. The analysis shows that the macro context and the knowledge gap between TED speakers and the audience makes the use of narrative arguments extremely effective. Although narrative arguments often receive criticism about their validity in providing sufficient evidence for a standpoint, their dialectical power lies in the flexibility of describing events in different fashions to draw pragmatic inferences that support the speaker’s stance. The study fills an important gap in the literature as it integrates recent approaches in narrative theory in the reconstruction and evaluation of narrative arguments in TED Talks. (shrink)

In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance (...) suggests. Unlike other critics of this argument, who take issue with the empirical evidence on expert performance, David Botting says that he wants to take issue with the premise that reliability is a necessary condition for the strength of appeals to expert opinion. I respond to Botting’s objections and argue that they miss their intended target. I also argue that his attempt to show that arguments from expert opinion are strong is unsuccessful. (shrink)

When the phrase “playing God” is used in debates concerning the use of new technologies, such as cloning or genetic engineering, it is usually interpreted as a warning not to interfere with God’s creation or nature. I think that this interpretation of “playing God” arguments as a call to non-interference with nature is too narrow. In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation of “playing God” arguments. Taking an argumentation theory approach, I provide an argumentation scheme and accompanying critical questions (...) that capture the moral concerns expressed by “playing God” arguments. If I am right, then “playing God” arguments should be understood, not as a warning to leave God’s creation or nature alone, but rather as an invitation to think carefully about all the ways in which the use of new technologies could go seriously wrong. (shrink)

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...) judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified. (shrink)

In “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies” (2012) Santibáñez Yañez offers constructive comments and criticisms of the argumentative theory of reasoning. The purpose of this reply is twofold. First, it seeks to clarify two points broached by Yanez: (1) the relation between reasoning (in this specific theory) and dual process accounts in general and (2) the benefits that can be derived from reasoning and argumentation (again, in this specific theory). Second, it suggests (...) one domain—the categorization of arguments—in which argumentation studies and the argumentative theory of reasoning could usefully complement each other to yield a better understanding of the processes of argumentation. (shrink)

Abstract How do people find arguments while engaged in a discussion? Following an analogy with visual search, a mechanism that performs this task is described. It is a metarepresentational device that examines representations in a mostly serial manner until it finds a good enough argument supporting one’s position. It is argued that the mechanism described in dual process theories as ‘system 2’, or analytic reasoning fulfills these requirements. This provides support for the hypothesis that reasoning serves an argumentative function. Content (...) Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9256-1 Authors Hugo Mercier, Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, 313 Cohen Hall, 249 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X. (shrink)

Current methods to capture, analyse and present the audience participation of broadcast events are increasingly carried out using social media. Uptake of such technology tools has so far been poor amongst older adults, and it has the worrying effect of excluding the demographic from participation. Our work explores whether a common desire to interact with debates can be tapped with technology with a very low barrier to entry, to both support better engagement with broadcast debates and encourage greater use of (...) social media. This paper describes experiments where older adults interact with a BBC radio debate programme: The Moral Maze. As a result, we obtained common interaction patterns which then are used to define recommendations for software-supported interaction with debates based on theories of argumentation. Our goal is to combine research on computational models of argument and user-driven research on human-centred computing in a project with the potential for high-profile impact in addressing older adults inclusion in the digital economy. (shrink)

La concepción predominante de la argumentación sigue privilegiando la dimensión representacional del lenguaje y, en consecuencia, ignora o infravalora las funciones compromisorias, directivas o expresivas de la argumentación. En este artículo examino los usos de la argumentación en la esfera pública -con especial atención a la deliberación y a la negociación- para poner de manifiesto y reivindicar la importancia de las funciones no persuasivas de la argumentación, entre las que se destaca la construcción y moldeado de identidades sociales.

My purpose here is to describe a type of argument characterized by the fact that one of its premises is a directive—i.e. what is expressed by a directive sentence: a general instruction how to proceed or act. This directive premise brings an ostensive mechanism for the inclusion of visual or multimodal elements in an argument. If an argument is an invitation to inference, by using such a directive utterance the addresser is inviting the addressee to make an inference from an (...) image, not from a proposition. Hence I will call them arguments from ostension or from deixis. (shrink)

According to a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification—‘the standard conception’—an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This conception tends to serve as the starting-point in contemporary debates about the nature and scope of inferential justification: as neutral common ground between various competing, more specific, conceptions. But it’s a deeply problematic starting-point. This paper explores three questions that haven’t been (...) given the attention they deserve, that complicate the application of the standard conception to cases, and that reveal it to be underspecified at the core—in ways that aren’t resolved but inherited by more specific (extant) versions of it. The goal isn’t to answer the questions, but to articulate them, explain what turns on them, and invite a critical re-examination of the standard conception. (shrink)