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  1. The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation.Carl G. Wagner - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):343-350.
    The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.
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  • Old evidence and new explanation II.Carl G. Wagner - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):283-288.
    Additional results are reported on the author's earlier generalization of Richard Jeffrey's solution to the problem of old evidence and new explanation.
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  • Jeffrey conditioning and external Bayesianity.Carl Wagner - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2):336-345.
    Suppose that several individuals who have separately assessed prior probability distributions over a set of possible states of the world wish to pool their individual distributions into a single group distribution, while taking into account jointly perceived new evidence. They have the option of first updating their individual priors and then pooling the resulting posteriors or first pooling their priors and then updating the resulting group prior. If the pooling method that they employ is such that they arrive at the (...)
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  • Commuting probability revisions: The uniformity rule. [REVIEW]Carl G. Wagner - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):349-364.
    A simple rule of probability revision ensures that the final result ofa sequence of probability revisions is undisturbed by an alterationin the temporal order of the learning prompting those revisions.This Uniformity Rule dictates that identical learning be reflectedin identical ratios of certain new-to-old odds, and is grounded in the oldBayesian idea that such ratios represent what is learned from new experiencealone, with prior probabilities factored out. The main theorem of this paperincludes as special cases (i) Field's theorem on commuting probability-kinematical (...)
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  • Old Evidence and New Explanation III.Carl G. Wagner - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S165 - S175.
    Garber (1983) and Jeffrey (1991, 1995) have both proposed solutions to the old evidence problem. Jeffrey's solution, based on a new probability revision method called reparation, has been generalized to the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation in Wagner 1997, 1999. The present paper reformulates some of the latter work, highlighting the central role of Bayes factors and their associated uniformity principle, and extending the analysis to the case in which an hypothesis bears on a countable family (...)
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