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  1. Kein Gehirnereignis kann ein späteres festlegen.Daniel von Wachter - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (3):393-408.
    The claim of this article is that no event can determine a later event and that in this sense there cannot be sufficient causes. Therefore the causal structure of the world does not exclude free will, even if there are no chance processes.
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  • Defending design arguments against Plantinga.Daniel von Wachter - 2014 - Philosophia Reformata 79 (1):54-65.
    This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
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  • The Principle of the Causal Openness of the Physical.Daniel Von Wachter - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (1):40-61.
    The argument from causal closure for physicalism requires the principle that a physical event can only occur through being necessitated by antecedent physical events. This article proposes a view of the causal structure of the world that claims not only that an event need not be necessitated by antecedent events, but that an event cannot be necessitated by antecedent events. All events are open to counteraction. In order to spell out various kinds of counteraction I introduce the idea of ‘directedness.’.
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