Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Grace Andrus de Laguna’s 1909 critique of pragmatism and absolute idealism: A contextualist response to Katzav.Andreas Vrahimis - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-13.
    In a move characteristic of appropriationist approaches to the history of philosophy, Katzav (Asian Journal of Philosophy 2(47):1–26, Katzav, 2023a) argues that Grace Andrus de Laguna had, already in 1909, developed what is effectively a critique of analytic philosophy (as a form of epistemically conservative philosophy). In response to Katzav’s claim, this symposium paper attempts to pay closer attention to the context of de Laguna’s paper. As Katzav also acknowledges, de Laguna was dialogically engaged with two non-analytic tendencies in her (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Grace de Laguna, Joel Katzav, and the Conservatism of Analytic Philosophy.James Chase & Jack Reynolds - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.
    In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Neurath’s debate with Horkheimer and the critique of Verstehen.Andreas Vrahimis - 2022 - In Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), The History of Understanding in Analytic Philosophy: Before and After Logical Empiricism. London: Bloomsbury.
    During the late 1930s, the failed attempt at collaboration between the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle culminated in Horkheimer’s 1937 paper ‘The Latest Attack on Metaphysics’. Horkheimer ([1937] 1972), relying on a caricature of positivism as espousing an uncritical myth of the given, drew far-reaching conclusions concerning positivism’s conservative prohibition of the radical questioning of appearances. Horkheimer (1940) later applied some of these criticisms to Dilthey’s conception of Verstehen, while presenting Logical Empiricism as dismissing Dilthey’s proposals nothing more than (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark