Among the methodological rules of the social sciences we find the principles of value-neutrality and the principle of criticism. Both principles are of vital importance in the social sciences, but both seem to conflict with one another. The principle of criticism excludes value-judgments from the social sciences, because they cannot be empirically tested. Hence, criticism methodologically implies value-neutrality. Yet there is the opposing view that it is precisely the critical social researcher who looks beyond mere 'social facts' taking into account (...) the value framework of the society. Thus, criticism does not lead to value-freedom, but points to the value impact of the so-called social facts. In this paper, the two principles are stated. Then it is shown how and why they are incompatible. Finally, several suggestions are discussed to resolve this methodological conflict. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

A history of the logic of action is outlined, beginning with St Anselm. Five modern authors are discussed in some detail: von Wright, Fitch, Kanger, Chellas and Pratt.

We shall introduce a set of fundamental legal concepts, providing a definition of each of them. This set will include, besides the usual deontic modalities (obligation, prohibition and permission), the following notions: obligative rights (rights related to other’s obligations), permissive rights, erga-omnes rights, normative conditionals, liability rights, different kinds of legal powers, potestative rights (rights to produce legal results), result-declarations (acts intended to produce legal determinations), and sources of the law.

We provide a formally rigorous framework for integrating singular causation, as understood by Nuel Belnap's theory of causae causantes, and objective single case probabilities. The central notion is that of a causal probability space whose sample space consists of causal alternatives. Such a probability space is generally not isomorphic to a product space. We give a causally motivated statement of the Markov condition and an analysis of the concept of screening-off. 1. Causal dependencies and probabilities1.1Background: causation in branching space-times1.2What are (...) probabilities defined for?2. Basic transitions2.1Basics of basic transitions2.2Sets of basic transitions3. Causal probability theory3.1Some simple cases3.2General causal probabilities3.3Application: probability of suprema of a chain. (shrink)

The necessity to model the mental ingredients of norm compliance is a controversial issue within the study of norms. So far, the simulation-based study of norm emergence has shown a prevailing tendency to model norm conformity as a thoughtless behavior, emerging from social learning and imitation rather than from specific, norm-related mental representations. In this paper, the opposite stance—namely, a view of norms as hybrid, two-faceted phenomena, including a behavioral/social and an internal/mental side—is taken. Such a view is aimed at (...) accounting for the difference between norms, on one hand, and either behavioral regularities (conventions) on the other. This paper, in particular, is addressed to find out the internal ingredients required for the former distinction, i.e., to model norms as distinct from mere conventions, and defined as behaviors spreading to the extent that and because the corresponding commands and beliefs do spread as well. After a brief presentation of a normative agent architecture, the results of agent-based simulations testing the impact of norm recognition and the role of normative beliefs in the emergence and innovation of social norms are presented and discussed. More specifically, the present work will endeavour to show that a sudden external constraint (e.g. a barrier preventing agents from moving among social settings) facilitates norm innovation: under such a condition, agents provided with a module for telling what a norm is can generate new (social) norms by forming new normative beliefs, irrespective of the most frequent actions. (shrink)

A single global authority is not sufficient to regulate heterogenous agents in multiagent systems based on distributed architectures, due to idiosyncratic local situations and to the need to regulate new issues as soon as they arise. On the one hand institutions should be structured as normative systems with a hierarchy of authorities able to cope with the dynamics of local situations, but on the other hand higher authorities should be able to delimit the autonomy of lower authorities to issue valid (...) norms. In this paper, we study the interplay of obligations and strong permissions in the context of hierarchies of authorities using input/output logic, because its explicit norm base facilitates reasoning about norm base maintenance, and it covers a variety of conditional obligations and permissions. We combine the logic with constraints, priorities and hierarchies of authorities. In this setting, we observe that Makinson and van der Torre’s notion of prohibition immunity for permissions is no longer sufficient, and we introduce a new notion of permission as exception and a new distinction between static and dynamic norms. We show how strong permissions can dynamically change an institution by adding exceptions to obligations, provide an explicit representation of what is permitted to the subjects of the normative system and allow higher level authorities to limit the power of lower level authorities to change the normative system. (shrink)

Peer review is often taken to be the main form of quality control on academic research. Usually journals carry this out. However, parts of maths and physics appear to have a parallel, crowd-sourced model of peer review, where papers are posted on the arXiv to be publicly discussed. In this paper we argue that crowd-sourced peer review is likely to do better than journal-solicited peer review at sorting papers by quality. Our argument rests on two key claims. First, crowd-sourced peer (...) review will lead on average to more reviewers per paper than journal-solicited peer review. Second, due to the wisdom of the crowds, more reviewers will tend to make better judgments than fewer. We make the second claim precise by looking at the Condorcet Jury Theorem as well as two related jury theorems developed specifically to apply to peer review. (shrink)

Normative systems have been advocated as an effective tool to regulate interaction in multi-agent systems. The use of deontic operators and the ability to represent defeasible information are known to be two fundamental ingredients to represent and reason about normative systems. In this paper, after introducing a framework that combines standard deontic logic and non-monotonic logic programming, deontic logic programs (DLP), we tackle the fundamental problem of equivalence between normative systems using a deontic extension of David Pearce’s Equilibrium Logic and (...) its monotonic basis, the logic of Here-and-There. We also show how deontic logic programs can be used to represent and reason about normative systems, and establish a strong connection with input-output logic. (shrink)