Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are (...) complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein. (shrink)

Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading within the secondary literature on (...) reflection and discuss its consequences for interpretations of Locke’s views on empiricism, knowledge, and personal identity. -/- -/- . (shrink)

A great deal of the criticism directed at Locke's theory of abstract ideas assumes that a Lockean abstract idea is a special kind of idea which by its very nature either represents many diverse particulars or represents separately things that cannot exist in separation. This interpretation of Locke has been challenged by scholars such as Kenneth Winkler and Michael Ayers who regard it as uncharitable in light of the obvious problems faced by this theory of abstraction. Winkler and Ayers argue (...) that Locke instead held that to have an abstract idea is to attend selectively to some portion of the content of a particular idea. On this view, to have an abstract idea is not to have a special kind of idea but to have an ordinary idea in a special way. Ayers argues that Locke inherited this theory from Arnauld. I argue that the case made by Ayers for the attribution of the extrinsic theory to Locke rests on a misinterpretation of Arnauld. In fact, both Locke and Arnauld regard selective attention as part of a process whereby a new kind of idea is constructed. (shrink)

Locke often writes that our knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For example, he refers to “our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas” in the second chapter of the Essay's book on knowledge. Similarly, at the beginning of this book he characterizes knowledge as “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas”. Since commentators remark on this formula so frequently, (...) one would expect that major questions about its interpretation would have been settled long ago. But not so. Controversy still prevails about Locke's intent, and especially about his assumption that the knowledge of the existence of real things counts as an instance of the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.Scholars have put forward two sorts of problems about the attempted assimilation of knowledge of real existence to Locke's formula. (shrink)

Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 34A (2003): 329-50.

La relación entre patrimonio y derechos políticos en la obra de John Locke ha sido ampliamente discutida. Por un lado, se encuentran posiciones como las de Kendall y Tully que atribuyen un carácter democrático a la concepción lockeana sobre la sociedad civil. Por otro, interpretaciones como las de Ashcraft que le asignan un sesgo revolucionario e igualitario, próximo a la concepción de los Levellers. Sin embargo, a la luz de una serie de documentos, es posible discutir estas interpretaciones, como ya (...) lo han hecho diversos intérpretes parcialmente. Se mostrará aquí que Locke supone que la discusión parlamentaria compete a quienes, representando a los diferentes sectores productivos, discuten la promoción de sus actividades y que los trabajadores, al no disponer de la formación necesaria para la discusión sobre los asuntos públicos, no son considerados para participar del ejercicio parlamentario sino sólo de una resistencia excepcional. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view (...) on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view. (shrink)

São variadas as interpretações da crítica berkeleyana às idéias abstratas, mas elas costumam concordar na tese de que essa crítica gira em torno da natureza das “idéias”. Isto é, se “idéia” for o mesmo que “imagem”, então a abstração lockeana é impossível, caso contrário, não. Neste artigo eu procuro mostrar que essa crítica não depende de idéia ser ou não uma imagem e que Locke está parcialmente consciente do problema levantado por Berkeley. Locke's general triangle and Berkeley's partial considerationThere are (...) many different interpretations of Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas, but they usually agree in sustaining that this attack depends on the nature of "ideas". That is, if "idea" is the same as "image", then lockean abstraction is impossible, but otherwise not. In this paper I show that this attack on abstract ideas does not depend on the issue concerning the nature of idea as image, and that Locke is partially aware of the problem raised by Berkeley. (shrink)