In this paper we study the idea of theories with containers, like sets, pairs, sequences. We provide a modest framework to study such theories. We prove two concrete results. First, we show that first-order theories of finite signature that have functional non-surjective ordered pairing are definitionally equivalent to extensions in the same language of the basic theory of non-surjective ordered pairing. Second, we show that a first-order theory of finite signature is sequential (is a theory of sequences) iff it is (...) definitionally equivalent to an extension in the same language of a system of weak set theory called WS. (shrink)

In this paper we study several translations that map models and formulae of the language of second-order arithmetic to models and formulae of the language of truth. These translations are useful because they allow us to exploit results from the extensive literature on arithmetic to study the notion of truth. Our purpose is to present these connections in a systematic way, generalize some well-known results in this area, and to provide a number of new results. Sections 3 and 4 contain (...) some recursion- and proof-theoretic results about Kripke-style fixed-point theories of truth. Section 5 shows how to derive full second-order arithmetic from principles of truth. Section 6 investigates the proof-theoretic strength of disquotation without an arithmetical base theory. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation into what could be a goodexplication of ``theory S is reducible to theory T''''. Ipresent an axiomatic approach to reducibility, which is developedmetamathematically and used to evaluate most of the definitionsof ``reducible'''' found in the relevant literature. Among these,relative interpretability turns out to be most convincing as ageneral reducibility concept, proof-theoreticalreducibility being its only serious competitor left. Thisrelation is analyzed in some detail, both from the point of viewof the reducibility axioms and of modal logic.

Guaspari (J Symb Logic 48:777–789, 1983) conjectured that a modal formula is it essentially Σ1 (i.e., it is Σ1 under any arithmetical interpretation), if and only if it is provably equivalent to a disjunction of formulas of the form ${\square{B}}$ . This conjecture was proved first by A. Visser. Then, in (de Jongh and Pianigiani, Logic at Work: In Memory of Helena Rasiowa, Springer-Physica Verlag, Heidelberg-New York, pp. 246–255, 1999), the authors characterized essentially Σ1 formulas of languages including witness comparisons (...) using the interpretability logic ILM. In this note we give a similar characterization for formulas with a binary operator interpreted as interpretability in a finitely axiomatizable extension of IΔ 0 + Supexp and we address a similar problem for IΔ 0 + Exp. (shrink)

This paper is a presentation of astatus quæstionis, to wit of the problemof the interpretability logic of all reasonablearithmetical theories.We present both the arithmetical side and themodal side of the question.Dedicated to Dick de Jongh on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

This paper is the second in a series of three papers. All three papers deal with interpretability logics and related matters. In the first paper a construction method was exposed to obtain models of these logics. Using this method, we obtained some completeness results, some already known, and some new. In this paper, we will set the construction method to work to obtain more results. First, the modal completeness of the logic ILM is proved using the construction method. This is (...) not a new result, but by using our new proof we can obtain new results. Among these new results are some admissible rules for ILM and GL. Moreover, the new proof will be used to classify all the essentially Δ1 and also all the essentially Σ1 formulas of ILM. Closely related to essentially Σ1 sentences are the so-called self provers. A self-prover is a formula φ which implies its own provability, that is φ → □φ. Each formula φ will generate a self prover φ ^ □φ. We will use the construction method to characterize those sentences of GL that generate a self prover that is trivial in the sense that it is Σ1. (shrink)

This paper is the first in a series of three related papers on modal methods in interpretability logics and applications. In this first paper the fundaments are laid for later results. These fundaments consist of a thorough treatment of a construction method to obtain modal models. This construction method is used to reprove some known results in the area of interpretability like the modal completeness of the logic IL. Next, the method is applied to obtain new results: the modal completeness (...) of the logic ILMo, and modal completeness of ILW*. (shrink)

It can be argued that only the equational theories of some sub-elementary function algebras are finitistic or intuitive according to a certain interpretation of Hilbert's conception of intuition. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation of those restricted forms of equational reasoning to classical quantifier logic in arithmetic. The conclusion reached is that Edward Nelson's ‘predicative arithmetic’ program, which makes essential use of classical quantifier logic, cannot be justified finitistically and thus requires a different philosophical foundation, possibly (...) as a restricted form of logicism. (shrink)

It is often supposed that, unlike typical axioms of mathematics, the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is indeterminate. This position is normally defended on the ground that the CH is undecidable in a way that typical axioms are not. Call this kind of undecidability “absolute undecidability”. In this paper, I seek to understand what absolute undecidability could be such that one might hope to establish that (a) CH is absolutely undecidable, (b) typical axioms are not absolutely undecidable, and (c) if a mathematical (...) hypothesis is absolutely undecidable, then it is indeterminate. I shall argue that on no understanding of absolute undecidability could one hope to establish all of (a)–(c). However, I will identify one understanding of absolute undecidability on which one might hope to establish both (a) and (c) to the exclusion of (b). This suggests that a new style of mathematical antirealism deserves attention—one that does not depend on familiar epistemological or ontological concerns. The key idea behind this view is that typical mathematical hypotheses are indeterminate because they are relevantly similar to CH. (shrink)

Provability logic is a modal logic for studying properties of provability predicates, and Interpretability logic for studying interpretability between logical theories. Their natural models are GL-models and Veltman models, for which the accessibility relation is well-founded. That’s why the usual counterexample showing the necessity of finite image property in Hennessy-Milner theorem (see [1]) doesn’t exist for them. However, we show that the analogous condition must still hold, by constructing two GL-models with worlds in them that are modally equivalent but not (...) bisimilar, and showing how these GL-models can be converted to Veltman models with the same properties. In the process we develop some useful constructions: games on Veltman models, chains, and general method of transformation from GL-models/frames to Veltman ones. (shrink)

-/- Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. -/- From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because (...) the concept of provability in a fixed theory of arithmetic has a unique and non-problematic meaning, other than concepts like necessity and knowledge studied in modal and epistemic logic. Furthermore, provability logic provides tools to study the notion of self-reference. (shrink)

This paper contains a completeness proof for the system ILW, a rather bewildering axiom system belonging to the family of interpretability logics. We have treasured this little proof for a considerable time, keeping it just for ourselves. Johan’s ftieth birthday appears to be the right occasion to get it out of our wine cellar.