No debate entre liberais e comunitaristas, colocam-se perspectivas distintas sobre temas políticos cruciais, à medida que se busca definir a relação mais apropriada entre o indivíduo e a coletividade, ora salientando-se o valor da autonomia pessoal, ora enfatizando-se a importância da inserção identitária dos sujeitos no contexto social. Embora os escritos de Rousseau precedam a discussão entre essas correntes de pensamento, eles abrangeram temas sobre os quais as duas se debruçam. O autor toma o indivíduo como base para a construção (...) do Estado, mas também mostra que essa unidade natural precisa ser transformada em uma parte de uma comunidade coesa e dotada de sua própria vontade geral. Assim, pretendo realizar um exercício interpretativo que, a partir de questões postas em relevo por aquele debate, analisará como Rousseau aliou seus princípios do direito político à preocupação com as particularidades de cada povo, o que faz suas teses transitarem entre as fronteiras do que, posteriormente, seriam os campos do liberalismo e do comunitarismo. (shrink)

RESUMO:As relações de conflito entre os grupos sociais constituem um tópico relevante para a filosofia política, e as maneiras distintas como elas são interpretadas dependem de uma visão mais ampla sobre as condições apropriadas a um Estado bem-ordenado. Maquiavel, por exemplo, ao refletir sobre o caso da Roma Antiga, procurou refutar aqueles que condenavam os tumultos entre os nobres e a plebe da cidade, como se eles tivessem provocado apenas males à república. Para o autor, tais tumultos estavam entre as (...) principais causas da liberdade romana, visto que a diferença nos “humores” dos grandes e do povo resultou em embates que deram origem às leis favoráveis à liberdade. Rousseau, por sua vez, descreveu a existência de “associações particulares” dentro da sociedade civil como algo potencialmente nocivo à harmonia da república, pois cada uma delas contém um interesse particular passível de se sobrepor ao bem comum, nas deliberações públicas, prejudicando o prevalecimento da vontade geral. Ainda para o genebrino, a ocorrência de longos debates e de tumultos nas assembleias populares poderia ser um sinal de divisões internas capazes de ocasionar a ruína do Estado. Frente a essas duas maneiras de conceber o papel político dos conflitos sociais, o objetivo deste trabalho é realizar uma análise comparativa das ideias de Maquiavel e de Rousseau. ABSTRACT:The conflictual relations between social groups constitute an important topic for political philosophy, and the different ways in which they are interpreted depend on a broader view of the appropriate conditions for a well-ordered state. Machiavelli, for example, by reflecting on the case of Ancient Rome, sought to refute those who condemned the tumultuous conflicts between the nobles and the plebs of the city as if they had only caused harm to the Republic. For this author, these tumults were among the main causes of Roman freedom, since the difference in the “humours” of the great and the people led to clashes that gave birth to laws favorable to freedom. Rousseau, for his part, described the existence of “private associations” within civil society as something potentially harmful to the harmony of the Republic, because each of them had a self-interest that was able to override the common good in public deliberations and jeopardize the prevalence of the general will. For Rousseau, the occurrence of long debates and tumults in the popular assemblies could also be a sign of internal divisions capable of causing the ruin of the state. In the face of these two ways of conceiving the political role of social conflicts, the goal of this article is to make a comparative analysis of Machiavelli’s and Rousseau’s ideas. (shrink)

According to Rousseau, conscience and conscience alone can elevate human beings to a level above that of animals. It is conscience, understood as infallible judge of good and bad, which makes man like God. Conscience itself is, in this context, understood as divine, as an ‘immortal and celestial voice’. Therefore, if the voice of conscience is the same as the voice of God, then conscience is nothing human. However, although this interpretation is correct, there are some problems with it. If (...) we take into consideration the fact that conscience is in the same context defined first as a unifying principle which makes us like God, second as a thing which is in the middle between God and man and thirdly as a middle thing or mediation that integrates extremes organically, then conscience cannot be either simply human or divine. The second problem is the following: How can one who hears the voice of God know that he really hears his voice? And, if he is the only one who hears it, how can we know that he hears it? (shrink)

The chapters of Rousseau’s Social Contract devoted to republican Rome prescribe institutions that obstruct popular efforts at diminishing the excessive power and influence of wealthy citizens and political magistrates. I argue that Rousseau reconstructs ancient Rome’s constitution in direct opposition to the more populist and anti‐elitist model of the Roman Republic championed by Machiavelli in the Discourses: Rousseau eschews the establishment of magistracies, like the tribunes, reserved for common citizens exclusively, and endorses assemblies where the wealthy are empowered to outvote (...) the poor in lawmaking and elections. On the basis of sociologically anonymous principles like generality and popular sovereignty, and by confining elite accountability to general elections, Rousseau’s neo‐Roman institutional proposals aim to pacify the contestation of class hierarchies and inflate elite prerogative within republics – under the cover of more formal, seemingly more genuine, equality. (shrink)

: I explore Rousseau's account of the problem of dependence by means of an analysis of the distinction he makes between dependence on things and dependence on men. With reference to his Second Discourse, I argue that dependence on things alone exists only in the case of primitive man in the earliest stages of the state of nature, while dependence on men is more properly to be understood as dependence on other human beings as mediated by dependence on things. I (...) go on to argue that in the light of Rousseau's account of dependence and his description in the Second Discourse of a spontaneous dependence and inequality generating process, there is a significant problem with his solution to the problem of dependence on other human beings proposed in the Social Contract. This problem can be understood in terms of the relation of the idea of will to that of necessity, and I suggest that Rousseau was himself aware of it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIs Confucian democracy philosophically justifiable? In recent decades, prominent Confucian theorists have answered this question in the negative, arguing that the political system that is c...

The scholarship on Mary Wollstonecraft is divided concerning her views on women's role in public life, property rights, and distribution of wealth. Her critique of inequality of wealth is undisputed, but is it a complaint only of inequality or does it strike more forcefully at the institution of property? The argument in this article is that Wollstonecraft's feminism is partly defined by a radical critique of property, intertwined with her conception of rights. Dissociating herself from the conceptualization of rights in (...) terms of self-ownership, she casts economic independence—a necessary political criterion for personal freedom—in terms of fair reward for work, not ownership. Her critique of property moves beyond issues of redistribution to a feminist appraisal of a property structure that turns people into either owners or owned, rights-holders or things acquired. The main characters in Wollstonecraft's last novel—Maria, who is rich but has nothing, and Jemima, who steals as a matter of principle—illustrate the commodification of women in a society where even rights are regarded as possessions. (shrink)

Abstract Feminists have interpreted Rousseau's attitudes to women as characteristic of a patriarchal ideology in which passion, nature and love are associated with the feminine and repressed in favour of masculine reason, culture and justice. Yet this reading does not cohere with Rousseau's adulation of nature, nor with the repression of writing and culture in favour of natural speech which Derrida finds in his texts. This paper uses Rousseau's accounts of his personal experiences to resolve this conflict and to develop (...) a more complex understanding of Rousseau's attitudes to women. The reading emphasizes that Rousseau operated with a triadic picture in which reason, the passions of the heart and the passions of the body are distinguished. The discussion of Derrida's reading of Rousseau gives rise to some reflections on the relationship of speech and writing to subjectivity, autonomy and women's oppression. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo defiendo la postura según la cual el republicanismo -en comparación con otras nociones o motivos centrales- no se ha interpretado como uno de los rasgos que caracteriza a la filosofía jurídica y política de Kant como un todo. Una posible razón es que el republicanismo kantiano no ha ocupado un lugar destacado dentro de las narrativas republicanas, ya sea históricas o sistemáticas, que son más dominantes en las discusiones contemporáneas. A mi parecer, esto es así porque (...) hay características innovadoras en la empresa republicana kantiana que se encuentran en tensión con otros proyectos republicanos de otra índole. Aquí discuto algunos de los rasgos distintivos del proyecto de Kant en lo que atañe a concepciones suyas sobre el estado de derecho, la ciudadanía, la autoridad política, la libertad de expresión y el derecho internacional, con el fin de señalar que estas son parte integral de una teoría política y legal que todavía es atractiva y sugerente.In this paper, I defend the stance that republicanism -in comparison to other central notions- has not been interpreted as one of the main traits that characterize Kant’s legal and political philosophy. A plausible reason for this is that Kantian republicanism has not occupied a prominent place in the republican narratives, historiographical or systematic, that are dominant in contemporary discussions. To my mind, the reason for this is that some innovative characteristics in the Kantian republican enterprise are at odds with other republican philosophical projects. Here I discuss some distinctive traits of Kant’s project regarding his conceptions of the rule of law, citizenship, political authority, free speech, and international law with the aim of showing that they are an integral part of a political and legal theory that is still attractive and compelling. (shrink)

This article explores the republican critiques of commercial society of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on their kindred analyses of social alienation. The joint study of these thinkers reveals a Rousseauean strand of eighteenth‐century republicanism that effectively combined a traditional (yet idiosyncratic) Stoic view of human flourishing with an innovative, proto‐sociological analysis and critique of quintessentially modern social phenomena. Rousseau and Ferguson regard alienation as a loss of wholeness, both in humans individually and in their relations to their (social) (...) surroundings. The article addresses two specific aspects of alienation in commercial society as the two thinkers see it. The first aspect concerns the insincerity underpinning the new moral vocabulary of polite sociability; the second aspect concerns the division of labor. According to Rousseau and Ferguson, this division threatens true human flourishing as well as political liberty. Finally, the conservative dimension of their republican solutions for overcoming alienation and bolstering liberty is considered. (shrink)

A virtude cívica representa uma peça de fundamental importância na engrenagem política republicana e pode desempenhar uma função decisiva na manutenção da república. Mas, como a virtude cívica se apresenta no republicanismo de Rousseau? Como tornar os cidadãos virtuosos e de que maneira cidadãos dotados dessa aptidão ou disposição podem contribuir para a preservação da república em longo prazo? Tais questões servirão de fio condutor para analisarmos a noção de virtude no arcabouço teórico rousseauísta. Para tanto, nossa análise será dividida (...) em três momentos: primeiro, examinaremos como o conceito de virtude se inscreve no pensamento de Rousseau; segundo, avaliaremos o meio ou meios possíveis para se formar cidadãos virtuosos; terceiro, perscrutaremos como a virtude cívica pode contribuir para a manutenção da república. (shrink)