Neorepublicans like Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett claim that neorepublicanism provides a superior normative research program compared to egalitarian-liberalism. Particularly, they argue that neorepublicanism offers a better justification of redistributive policies, which are normally associated with egalitarian-liberalism. According to Lovett and Pettit, the neorepublican justification is superior because it rests on parsimonious theoretical assumptions and is more suitable to persuade people of redistributive institutions. We contest these claims on the grounds of methodological and substantive moral reasons. We argue that the (...) neorepublican arguments claiming rhetorical effectiveness and parsimony rest on methodological presuppositions that reflect an unattractive understanding of political philosophy. Additionally, since neorepublicanism lacks a (thin) theory of the good, it does not provide a sufficient basis for justifying redistributive policies. (shrink)

Political philosophy systematically explores the implications of our fundamental moral commitments in order to identify moral principles. These principles provide criteria for the evaluation of the...

Most criticism and exposition of John Rawls’s political theory has focused on his account of distributive justice rather than on his support for liberalism. Because of this, much of his argument for protecting the basic liberties remains under explained. Specifically, Rawls claims that representative citizens would agree to guarantee those social conditions necessary for the exercise and development of the two moral powers, but he does not adequately explain why protecting the basic liberties would guarantee these social conditions. This gap (...) in his argument leads to two problems. First, the Rawlsian argument for the priority of liberty would fail if the gap could not be filled. His argument would still support the protection of individual freedoms, but these freedoms would be treated like other primary goods and regulated by the difference principle. Second, without a full argument, there is not sufficient reason to favor Rawls’s left-liberal conception of the basic liberties over a more right-leaning conception that would prioritize the protection of free-market rights. To address these two problems, this paper fills in the gap in order to better explain Rawls’s full argument for egalitarian liberalism. (shrink)

The republican project of freedom as non-domination commits the State to endowing citizens with the resources and attitudes necessary to both apprehend domination and abstain from dominating others. This, some have argued, renders it incompatible with political liberalism, which eschews the promotion of personal liberal virtues, being derived independently of any 'comprehensive doctrine'. Republican freedom is therefore depicted as penetrating deeper, in its application, into intimate and 'private' spheres. I argue, through a Rousseauist interpretation of Rawls's social contract, that its (...) 'political' stricture need not, however, preclude any socially transformative, emancipatory role. Thus, the promotion of freedom as non-domination is compatible with the 'modelled constraints' of Rawls's original position. Far from transgressing the 'political' limits of State power, the goods associated with non-domination may instead be seen as necessary to the realisation of 'moral personality'—independently of the 'final ends' for which it may be exercised. (shrink)

La filosofía jurídico-política kantiana es —desde hace varios años— protagonista de primer nivel en los debates sobre la justicia, la propiedad y la pobreza. El renacimiento vino de la mano del trabajo de varios filósofos y juristas que, afortunadamente, se apartan de los incómodos y desacertados apodos que recibió Kant en la segunda mitad del siglo pasado: “Kant el político moralista”, “Kant liberal”, “Kant, el defensor de la propiedad privada exclusiva y excluyente”. Ha vuelto ahora con renovado y creciente interés, (...) el “Kant republicano”, luego de casi dos siglos de olvidos. No pretendo realizar una reseña de la abundante bibliografía de uno y otro período interpretativo —el del Kant liberal y el del Kant republicano—; el objetivo principal de este trabajo es recuperar algunas piezas del Kant republicano de la mano de la tradición republicana histórica que se inicia con Aristóteles y reaparece, con fuerza renovada, en algunos representantes modernos del derecho natural, siendo Kant uno de ellos. Comenzaré con una reseña acerca de lo que juzgo como la interpretación contemporánea más influyente sobre la justicia en Kant, la de John Rawls; para luego apuntar algunas tesis sobre el valor de la concepción kantiana de la justicia pública, entendida como el imprescindible correlato institucional del derecho a la libertad innata, el único derecho natural inalienable. (shrink)