- Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.details
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Disagreement for Dialetheists.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):192-205.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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The aim of inquiry?Jane Friedman - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):506-523.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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Go figure: A path through fictionalism.Stephen Yablo - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.details
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Hermeneutic fictionalism.Jason Stanley - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.details
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A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism.Davide Fassio - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):343-364.details
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Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist.Veli Mitova - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):471-489.details
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Moral Cognitivism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-193.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.details
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Imagination and Belief.Neil Sinhababu - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 111-123.details
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Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality.Fiora Salis - 2018 - Topoi 39 (4):927-937.details
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Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory.Christopher Mag Uidhir - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400.details
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Knowing what one wants.Krista Lawlor - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.details
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Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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Exemplars as evaluative ideals in Nietzsche’s philosophy of value.Jonanthan Mitchell - unknowndetails
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Unifying the Philosophy of Truth.Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández & Kentaro Fujimoto (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Making Sense of Actions Expressing Emotions.Monika Betzler - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):447-466.details
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Self-deception.Eric Funkhouser - 2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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In defense of a pragmatic picture of belief.Aaron Zimmerman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):449-457.details
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The Quest for Certainty.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):71-95.details
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Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation.Nick Zangwill - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253-289.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Beyond Authority: Hinge Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2261-2283.details
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Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.details
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Hume and the phenomenology of agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517.details
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Extended belief and extended knowledge.Åsa Wikforss - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):460-481.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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The role of pretense in the process of self-deception.Xintong Wei - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):1-14.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1615-1630.details
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Imaginative Desires and Interactive Fiction: On Wanting to Shoot Fictional Zombies.Nele Van De Mosselaer - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (3):241-251.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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Why Be an Agent?Evan Tiffany - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.details
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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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