Chronic shortage in organs for transplantation worldwide is leading many policy-makers to consider various incentives that may increase donation rates.1 These range from giving holders of donor cards some priority on the transplant waiting list or a discount on health insurance premiums, to giving families who consent to donation a medal of honour, reimbursement of funeral expenses, tax incentives or even financial compensation.2–4 Of the various proposed incentive mechanisms, the one that has consistently garnered the most criticism and objection in (...) the literature is that of paying families who consent to donate the organs of a deceased loved one.Arguments against such a policy abound: it could exploit the poor, influence the family to prematurely withdraw care, encourage families to withhold medical information that would result in transplant-transmission of disease, and finally, it would commercialise the value of human life and result in the perception of human organs as commodities. Indeed, to date no Western country has adopted a policy of financial compensation to families for consenting to organ donation.2Recently, a country suffering from severe shortage in organs has implemented a policy of financial incentives that uses cash payments. Wu and Fang5 describe a recent pilot programme in China that compensates families for postmortem donation, through an independent third party and based on consent or presumed consent of the deceased. The particular context within which this programme is implemented validates and even exacerbates some ethical concerns that have been voiced in the Western medical and bioethics …. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 15-17, March 2012.

Because the number of organs available for transplantation does not meet the needs of potential recipients, some have proposed that a potentially effective way to increase registration is to offer a self‐benefit incentive that grants a 'preferred status' or some degree of prioritization to those who register as potential donors, in case they might need organs. This proposal has elicited an ethical debate on the appropriateness of such a benefit in the context of a life‐saving medical procedure. In this paper (...) we review arguments and ethical concerns raised by scholars, and studies of views of members of the public regarding the prioritization incentive system. We also report on our study of the views of those involved in organ transplant and of other medical professionals in Israel, as over half a decade ago Israel implemented a prioritization incentive system. Bioethicists propose that key stakeholders' views can provide additional arguments and perspectives on controversial issues. Proponents justify the prioritization incentive drawing mainly on arguments related to its potential effectiveness, reciprocity and fairness. Opponents point to the fact that registering is not binding and not an actual donation, and raise concerns regarding equity, autonomy and gaming the system. Ethical concerns raised by the practitioners in the study were examined in light of scholars' arguments and actual registration and donation data. Practitioners involved in transplantation raised ethical concerns corresponding to those raised by scholars as well as additional concerns. They also challenged proponents' assumptions regarding the utility of the incentive system from their own experience and argued that proponents obscure the meaning of reciprocity. (shrink)

It has often been proposed to restrict access to postmortal organs to registered donors, or at least to give them priority on the waiting list. Such proposals are motivated by considerations of fairness: everyone benefits from the existence of a pool of available organs and of an organised system of distributing them and it is unfair that people who are prepared to contribute to this public good are duped by people who are not. This paper spells out this rationale and (...) goes on to discuss the main principled objections that have been brought forward to such proposals. The most fundamental objection is that healthcare resources should be allocated in accordance with need, not with merit. The reply to this objection is that the principle of allocation according to need only holds in cases in which the provision of such resources and the fair distribution of the burdens of contribution are independently secured, as they are in an obligatory insurance system. (shrink)

Figuring out what pushes individuals to become organ donors has become the holy grail of social scientists interested in transplantations. In this paper I concentrate on solidarity as a determinant of organ donation and examine it through the history of organ donation in Israel. By following the history of transplantation policies since 1968 and examining them in relation to different types of solidarities, this paper leads to a nuanced understanding of the ties between solidarity and health policy. Attempts to foster (...) an all-encompassing consensus on the definition of brain death yielded the Transplantation and the Brain-Respiratory Death Laws of 2008. It was hoped that a wide “civic solidarity” would render Israel self-sufficient in its organ economy. However, the failure of the law led to the breakdown of civic solidarity in organ donation. As a result, initiatives such as the priority policy and non-directed living organ donations, developed out of a narrower conception of solidarity. Juxtaposing these initiatives sheds light on macro level processes for policy makers and suggests solidarity as a key bioethical concept to understand organ donation policies. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate over regulated organ markets. Especially current markets, where people sell one of their kidneys while still alive, have received increased attention. Futures markets remain an interesting and under-discussed alternative specification of a market-based solution to the organ shortage. Futures markets pertain to the sale of the right to procure people’s organs after they die. There is a wide range of possible specifications of the futures market. There are, however, some major unaddressed efficiency concerns. This article (...) presents this class of concerns and discusses the implication for organ futures markets. It identifies a number of inefficiency sources pertaining to crowding out, bad organs, costs and missed opportunities, family refusals, moral hazard and strength of the provided incentive. However, a complete assessment of futures market requires better knowledge regarding the potential reaction from donors, families and health professionals. (shrink)