At the core of Heidegger's philosophy, there lies this nagging question: what is the link between language and being? Using a famous formulation by Heidegger as a guide (‘When we go to the well, when we go through the woods, we are always already going through the word “well”, through the word “woods”’), the analysis focuses on the connection Heidegger establishes between being (what woods and well ‘are’), understanding (something is understood ‘as’ woods or well), and temporality (human understanding of (...) woods and well has changed since ancient Greek times, for example). Language is both what grants things their way to matter to us and thus to ‘be’ for us to the extent that we understand them, but language is also linked to a ‘happening’ (Geschehen) or an event so that things are not bound to their Geek being or current being: things ‘become being’ (seiend werden). Language is both the means for things to materialize in historical times: ‘being woods’ or ‘being a well,’ as well as a testimony to their entry into being. This is why language in its poetic use can make beings ‘more being’ (seiender). (shrink)

Our purpose in this study – which stands at the crossroads of contemporary philosophy, anthropology, and religious studies – is to assess critically the plea for radical contingency in contemporary thought, with special attention to the work of Meillassoux, in light, among other things, of the symptomatic presence of Pauline motifs in the late twentieth to early twenty first-century philosophical arena, from Vattimo to Agamben and especially Badiou. Drawing on Aristotle’s treatment of τύχη and Hilan Bensusan’s neo-monadology (as well as (...) on the network biology of David George Haskell, Scott Gilbert’s holobiont hypothesis, and Terrence Deacon’s teleo-dynamics), we ask what is missing in such plea, from a theoretical standpoint. Next, we examine the relation between radical contingency and worldlessness in dialogue with Leroi-Gourhan’s theory of biocultural evolution, Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology, Pierre Clastres’s ethnography, Heidegger’s philosophy of language, and contemporary authors like Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Patrice Maniglier. These two parallel lines of inquiry help us explore what radical contingency, in turn, prevents us from thinking: the intersection of ontology, cosmopolitics, and modality. (shrink)

In The question concerning technology, Heidegger explores actuality in terms of danger. In chapter 3.6 ‘Who has forgotten Being?’ of his We have never been modern, Latour typically ridicules Heidegger and rejects no less than his whole thinking path. I contend that this criticism stems from an inadequate interpretation of Heidegger. By reading the latter in a modern register, Latour turns Heidegger into a modern thinker. Leaving aside the matter of modern elements in Heidegger’s thoughts, these are certainly not the (...) elements that Latour brings forth. Indeed, to understand the danger that hides in actuality, if any, we should turn to Heidegger and read Latour from there. (shrink)

What scope is there for emancipatory politics in light of the postmodern critique of philosophical foundations? This paper examines the response to this question by Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, who for over two decades has defended the emancipatory prospects of what he terms ‘nihilism’. Vattimo conceives the retreat of metaphysics as a progressive weakening of ontological claims and an opening towards new and diverse modes of being. In his view, far from an exclusively tragic experience of loss or meaninglessness, nihilism (...) is a steadily expanding narrative that invites us to face up to our own radical freedom. The paper sets out Vattimo's central arguments and contrasts the ethical thrust of his ‘emancipatory nihilism’ with the distinctly political take on emancipation presented by Ernesto Laclau. While the two converge on the withdrawal of metaphysics as the premise for a radical and democratic freedom, Vattimo's vision remains insufficiently focused on the dynamics of contestation that a generalized nihilism implies. (shrink)

This article begins with Gedankenexperiment proposed in The Adventure of Difference by Gianni Vattimo: Following his suggestion to read Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in terms of Nietzsche’s The Birth of the Tragedy, we attempt to reinterpret the distinction of the authentic and inauthentic existence in the light of the difference between the Dionysian and Apollonian element, which brings us also to a new view on the existential finitude, individuality and co-existence with others. In the background of these existential features we discover (...) the notion of event that breaks the ecstatic unity of temporality and marks the hermeneutical continuity of existence by the radical discontinuity. The image of existence exposed to the power of event is further elaborated with the help of Henri Maldiney who has introduced into the frame of the fundamental ontology the concepts of trans-possibility and trans-passibility that express the existential openness to the event. Such a reformulation of the fundamental ontology, however, brings us into the sphere of heteronomous thought that, instead of preserving its essential autonomy, unity and integrity, becomes other in its relation to the otherness that is encountered in the event. (shrink)

This paper argues for a fundamental re-reading of Heideggerian philosophy, especially regarding the logical structures presented by Heidegger in the thirties and onward. The field, which this logic organizes, shows an explorative formal element of language in and of itself, and is therefore different from an analytic concept of logic. An analytic conceptualization of logic is understood here as a reflection on the inner structures of already existing notions. An explorative logic, on the other hand, explores the relations between already (...) existing notions and the possible, but yet unknown, development of new notions. The logic of Heidegger is explorative, as it describes the relational, formal structures between the already established semantic field and its virtual excess. This virtual excess, while formal, must be nonetheless considered the primary access to whatever we call external to language in the transcendental sense in Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, the central question of this logical re-reading of Heidegger is the formal relation to the unknown real. (shrink)

This article is based on the presupposition that postmodern philosophy has been largely influenced by Nietzsche's writings. The author raises the question of how Nietzsche and postmodern philosophy are interpreted in the contemporary philosophical discourse in Lithuania. The conclusion drawn is that many philosophy critics in Lithuania are interested in Nietzsche's philosophy (Mickevižius, Sodeika, Šerpytytè, Sverdiolas, Baranova) and in the problems of postmodern philosophy (Keršytè, Rubavižius, Žukauskaité, Serpytytè, Šverdiolas, Baranova, Norkus). The article also raises a second crucial question: beyond the (...) critics, are there any truly authentic postmodern thinkers in Lithuania? This article's main hypotheses is that Arvydas Šliogeris' philosophy is the best and perhaps the only example of original Lithuanian postmodern thought; it is based on, and interconnected with, the deeply inherited roots of existential thought in Lithuanian philosophical culture. The arguments for these hypotheses are as follows: first, Šliogeris is the first philosopher in Lithuania who has tried to reason in an interdisciplinary manner, e. g. trying to overcome the modernistic distinction between philosophy and the arts (especially literature, poetry, and the visual arts); secondly, Šliogeris's philosophizing is indispensable to his writings— his texts are examples of an experience of writing as thinking and thinking as writing; thirdly, following Deleuze's presupposition that the philosopher is a creator, one can see this creative aspect in Šliogeris's approach. His texts show how it is possible to synthesize insights from philosophy and poetry. (shrink)

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama dvejopa machinacijos (Machenschaft) samprata Martino Heideg-gerio technikos filosofijoje. Pirmoji susijusi su Vakarų metafizikos destrukcija (Destruktion) ir jos kulmi-nacija reflektuojama moderniosios technikos plotmėje. Pirmiausiai machinaciją Heideggeris pristato kaip pačios Būties atsivėrimo būdą „pirmoje pradžioje“ (ersten Anfang). Machinacija lemia μετά judesio pamatą, nurodantį į nuolatinę transcendencijos aspiraciją bei „techninį“ esinių atvėrimo pobūdį, nors savo „pajėgumų“ prasme machinacija graikų metafizikoje dar glūdi implicitiškai. Eksplicitiškai machi-nacija pasirodo tik moderniojoje technikoje. Kiek kitokią machinacijos sampratą galime aptikti Heideg-gerio „Juoduosiuose sąsiuviniuose“ (Schwarze Hefte), rašytuose 1931–1938 (...) m. Juose pačią modernybės epochą filosofas pristato kaip machinaciją. Taigi straipsnyje siekiama išryškinti šių dviejų Heideggerio sampratų jungtį, kuri yra machinacijos galios (Macht) augimo tikrovės atžvilgiu nuoroda. (shrink)