Contrary to current individualistic epistemology, Classical rhetoric provides us with a pragmatical and particularly dynamic conception of ‘testimony’ as a source made available for the orator by the particular community in which she acts. In order to count as usable testimony, a testimony to which one could appeal in further communications, any discourse must comply with specific rules of social sanction. A deliberate attention to the social practices in which testimony is given and assessed may offer us a more accurate (...) view of its epistemological role. (shrink)

Contrary to most current epistemologists who concentrate on core cases of rather ‘spontaneous’ trust and belief in the face of assertions, Classical rhetoricians addressed the study of ‘testimony’ as an two-acts phenomenon: that of the ‘disclosure’ of information and that of the ‘appeal’ to its authority in subsequent discursive practices. Moreover, they primarily focused on this second phase as they assumed that it was such argumentative setting that finally gave ‘testimonial’ relevance to the first act. According to this ‘rhetorical’ model, (...) then, it is the dynamics and pragmatics of such complex process that is the core issue regarding ‘testimony’. (shrink)

I consider some uses of citations in academic writing and analyze them as instances of the “appeal to expert opinion” argumentative scheme to show that the critical questions commonly linked to this scheme are difficult to apply. I argue that, by considering citations as special communicative and argumentative situated acts, their use in real practice can be explained more adequately. Adaptation to the audience and to the social constraints is common and necessary in order to collaborate with others and to (...) advance in a discipline, but also to attain rhetorical goals that differ from strictly cognitive ones. (shrink)