Is there a substantial difference between a portrait depicting the sitter’s face made by an artist and an image captured by a machine able to simulate the neuro-physiology of facial perception? Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, this paper answers this question by reference to the relation between seeing a visual pattern as (i) a series of shapes and colours, and (ii) a face with expressions. In the case of the artist, and not of the machine, the portrait’s creative process involves (...) the ability to see both aspects. From the perspective of the image’s viewer, the distinction is more difficult to draw. I address this difficulty by further distinguishing between two attributes of portraits: their representational accuracy, and their ability to convey the artist’s reflection on her experience of seeing the sitter face-to-face. While artificial intelligence can mimic this latter reflective ability, it cannot exactly reproduce it. (shrink)

According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental properties, as (...) opposed to non‐mental properties. (shrink)

I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.

The aim of the study is to clarify the aesthetic concept of color perception from the phenomenological reasoning of Edmund Husserl. Today, the orientation diagram of the field of phenomenological research is formed in various zones: from theological to naturalistic. In which of these zones the structures of the phenomenological analysis of color are located is not an easy question. The coloristic region is constituted according to the degree of consciousness, including aesthetic consciousness. It is extremely difficult to meet with (...) the phenomenon of color, if only because its obviousness is fulfilled only by the fervor of the contemplative consciousness with its aesthetic pathos, a consciousness that distinguishes between, as it were, the reality of transcendent color and the aesthetic "continent of givens". We are talking, as Husserl would say, about the halo of consciousness, referring to the essence of perception performed in the mode of turning to the beauty of color. For the first time, approaches to the study of such a complex phenomenological topic as the description of a coloristic attitude, the eidetics of color experiences in Husserl's philosophy are outlined, the significance of its development for the comprehension of aesthetic and artistic consciousness is revealed. The main conclusions of the study are related to the philosophical interpretation of the idea of color as included in phenomenology in the experience of philosophical surprise, which turns into the acquisition of the essence of "phenomenological color" in general, and in aesthetics it is directly correlated with the appearance of its structures on the horizon of the harmonic synthesis of acts of perceptual performance in the imagination, "primordial giving visions" of color, with the creation of a picture coloristic impressions as cognitive emotions, reduced pure color perception, with an understanding of how art makes the very conditions of color visibility obvious, how its artistic synthesis is made, in the structure of which correlation analysis can see an analogue of a priori empiricism – this fundamental characteristic of purely Husserl synthesis and method revealed in domestic studies. (shrink)

Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions, and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further (...) on this foundation for understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents, the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically: there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self. (shrink)

A large part of the contemporary literature on dehumanization is committed to three ideas: (a) dehumanization involves some degree of denial of humanness, (b) such denial is to be comprehended in mental terms, and (c) whatever exact mechanisms underlie the denial of humanness, they belong in the realm of post-perceptual processing. This chapter examines (c) and argues that the awareness of minds might belong to perceptual processing. This paves the way for the possibility that dehumanization might, at least in part, (...) be a perceptual phenomenon, such that dehumanizers visually perceive the dehumanized as exhibiting lesser-than-human minds. It is perhaps unsurprising that the first systematic investigations of dehumanization approached the phenomenon as linked to contexts of war, genocide, extreme hatred, and violence. One guiding hypothesis was that dehumanizers exclude the dehumanized from a moral community of human beings, implicitly conceptualized as displaying distinct individualities and being embedded in caring interpersonal relations. By comprehending the dehumanized as deindividuated entities to which moral norms and considerations of fairness do not apply (Opotow 1990), dehumanizers are able to disengage from moral restrictions and self-sanctions (Bandura 1999). (shrink)