We study several modal languages in which some (sets of) generalized quantifiers can be represented; the main language we consider is suitable for defining any first order definable quantifier, but we also consider a sublanguage thereof, as well as a language for dealing with the modal counterparts of some higher order quantifiers. These languages are studied both from a modal logic perspective and from a quantifier perspective. Thus the issues addressed include normal forms, expressive power, completeness both of modal systems (...) and of systems in the quantifier tradition, complexity as well as syntactic characterizations of special semantic constraints. Throughout the paper several techniques current in the theory of generalized quantifiers are used to obtain results in modal logic, and conversely. (shrink)

We study several modal languages in which some (sets of) generalized quantifiers can be represented; the main language we consider is suitable for defining any first order definable quantifier, but we also consider a sublanguage thereof, as well as a language for dealing with the modal counterparts of some higher order quantifiers. These languages are studied both from a modal logic perspective and from a quantifier perspective. Thus the issues addressed include normal forms, expressive power, completeness both of modal systems (...) and of systems in the quantifier tradition, complexity as well as syntactic characterizations of special semantic constraints. Throughout the paper several techniques current in the theory of generalized quantifiers are used to obtain results in modal logic, and conversely. (shrink)

We do a quantitative analysis of modal logic. For example, for each Kripke structure M, we study the least ordinal μ such that for each state of M, the beliefs of up to level μ characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend these beliefs to higher levels). As another example, we show the equivalence of three conditions, that on the face of it look quite different, for what it means to say that the agents' (...) beliefs have a countable description, or putting it another way, have a "countable amount of information". The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language, where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). The fact that all of these conditions are equivalent shows the robustness of the concept of the agents' beliefs having a "countable description". (shrink)

In this paper we study automated reasoning in the modal logic CPDLreg which is a combination of CPDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic with Converse) and REGc (Regular Grammar Logic with Converse). The logic CPDL is widely used in many areas, including program verification, theory of action and change, and knowledge representation. On the other hand, the logic REGc is applicable in reasoning about epistemic states and ontologies (via Description Logics). The modal logic CPDLreg can serve as a technical foundation for reasoning (...) about agency. Even very rich multi-agent logics can be embedded into CPDLreg via a suitable translation. Therefore, CPDLreg can serve as a test bed to implement and possibly verify new ideas without providing specific automated reasoning techniques for the logic in question. This process can to a large extent be automated. The idea of embedding various logics into CPDLreg is illustrated on a rather advanced logic TEAMLOGK designed to specify teamwork in multi-agent systems. Apart from defining informational and motivational attitudes of groups of agents, TEAMLOGK allows for grading agents' beliefs, goals and intentions. The current paper is a companion to our paper (Dunin-Kęplicz et al., 2010a). The main contribution are proofs of soundness and completeness of the tableau calculus for CPDLreg provided in (Dunin-Kęplicz et al., 2010a). (shrink)

1. There are two distinct lines of research that aim at modelling belief and knowledge: modal logic and uncertainty theories. Modal logic extends classical logic by introducing knowledge or belief...

We introduce a notion of bisimulation for graded modal logic. Using this notion, the model theory of graded modal logic can be developed in a uniform manner. We illustrate this by establishing the finite model property and proving invariance and definability results.

We introduce a class of neighbourhood frames for graded modal logic embedding Kripke frames into neighbourhood frames. This class of neighbourhood frames is shown to be first-order definable but not modally definable. We also obtain a new definition of graded bisimulation with respect to Kripke frames by modifying the definition of monotonic bisimulation.

Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion (...) of bisimulation is required that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models, two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling. (shrink)