In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and (...) the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a strong continuity between the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature and the transcendental deduction of the ideas from the first critique. On these grounds, I provide an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature in which I argue that: 1) the necessity of the principle of purposiveness of nature does not derive from its role in solving some specific philosophical problem but from its relation to (...) a cognitive goal; 2) the representation of nature as conforming to the maxims of judgement is a direct, immediate consequence of a certain cognitive goal that the necessity of the empirical laws mentioned by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature is not so much their nomic necessity, but their necessity as consequences of higher laws. (shrink)

My contribution deals directly with the problem of Kant’s apparent commitment to pan- aestheticism, which is in particular attached to the task of explaining the possibility of the free play of the faculties. The aim is to provide an overview of the ways in which this problem can be confronted and eventually solved. In this regard, one way to deal with this problem consists in revisiting the assumption that the free play of the faculties is to be understood as simply (...) occurring without presupposing any concept. By contrast, one can fully endorse Kant’s commitment to pan- aestheticism and hence focus on how Kant’s account explains the fact that one does not actually experience everything as beautiful. Both of these alternatives, I firmly reject. By remarking upon the merely reflecting status of judgments of taste, I explain why Kant’s account of taste does not lend itself to pan-aestheticism. (shrink)

En este trabajo se pretenden mostrar algunas similitudes entre el planteamiento metafísico de Suárez y el desarrollado por Kant en sus lecciones de metafísica. En particular, se busca mostrar cómo ambos autores pensaron los conceptos de unidad discreta y continua. El objetivo de este trabajo es encontrar ciertos puntos de acuerdo en lo que concierne al tratamiento de la unidad en el pensamiento de ambos autores. Esos puntos serán, por un lado, la íntima conexión entre los conceptos de discreto y (...) continuo, así como, por otro lado, la relevancia que tiene la acción del entendimiento en el establecimiento de dicha pareja de conceptos. (shrink)

In questo articolo si analizzano congiuntamente l'origine delle idee e il loro uso regolativo. A questo scopo si comincia considerando la connessione tra uso logico della ragione e definizione della ragione in generale come facoltà dei principi. Si considera poi come la rappresentazione di un incondizionato derivi necessariamente dall'uso logico, e come quindi questo implichi necessariamente un uso reale della ragione. Si considera poi come le varie rappresentazioni dell'incondizionato diano origine alle idee trascendentali. Infine, si considera l'uso regolativo delle idee (...) alla luce della pratica di inferire dal quale derivano. (shrink)