This article sets out to analyse some of the most basic elements of our number concept - of our awareness of the one and the many in their coherence with multiplicity, succession and equinumerosity. On the basis of the definition given by Cantor and the set theoretical definition of cardinal numbers and ordinal numbers provided by Ebbinghaus, a critical appraisal is given of Frege’s objection that abstraction and noticing (or disregarding) differences between entities do not produce the concept of number. (...) By introducing the notion of subject functions, an account is advanced of the (nominalistic) reason why Frege accepted physical, kinematic and spatial properties (subject functions) of entities, but denied the ontic status of their quantitative properties (their quantitative subject function). With reference to intuitionistic mathematics (Brouwer, Weyl, Troelstra, Kreisel, Van Dalen) the primitive meaning of succession is acknowledged and connected to an analysis of what is entailed in the term ‘Gleichzahligkeit’ (‘equinumerosity’). This expression enables an analysis of the connections between ordinality and cardinality on the one hand and succession and wholeness (totality) on the other. The conceptions of mathematicians such as Frege, Cantor, Dedekind, Zermelo, Brouwer, Skolem, Fraenkel, Von Neumann, Hilbert, Bernays and Weyl, as well as the views of the philosopher Cassirer, are discussed in order to arrive at an assessment of the relation between ordinality and cardinality (also taking into account the relation between logic and arithmetic) - and on the basis of this evaluation, attention is briefly given to the definition of an ordered pair in axiomatic set theory (with reference to the set theory of Zermelo-Fraenkel) and to the defmition of an ordered pair advanced by Wiener and Kuratowski. (shrink)

This paper does not deal with the topic of ‘the generosity of artificial languages from an Asian or a comparative perspective’. Rather, it is concerned with a particular case taken from a development in the Western tradition, when in the wake of the rise of formal logic at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century people in philosophy and later in linguistics started to use formal languages in the study of the semantics of natural languages. (...) This undertaking rests on certain philosophical assumptions and instantiates a particular methodology, that we want to examine critically. However, that in itself is still too broad a topic for a single paper, so we will focus on a particular aspect, viz., the distinction between grammatical form and logical form and the crucial role it plays in how the relationship between natural languages and formal languages is understood in this tradition. We will uncover two basic assumptions that underlie the standard view on the distinction between grammatical form and logical form, and discuss how they have contributed to the shaping of a particular methodology and a particular view on the status of semantics as a discipline. (shrink)

Here, the logical behaviour of negation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is compared with Demos' account of denial. Even if we hold negation as a pure syntactical device, at least in some context, it brings a handful of complex semantic information – potentially an infinite amount. We advocate then the existence of at least two negations due to the existence of two different and non-reducible types of exclusion. The first negation is a Tractarian and classical one, based on the notion of contradiction, (...) whereas the second is a non-classical negation, based on the notion of contrariety. (shrink)

This article presents a critical analysis of the main modern approaches to the problem of meta-argumentation and suggests a method for developing a general conception of meta-argumentation. A set of theoretical-methodological difficulties along this path is revealed. Overcoming these aporias would constitute the main steps toward developing the body of a theory of meta-argumentation.

Van Heijenoort’s account of the historical development of modern logic was composed in 1974 and first published in 1992 with an introduction by his former student. What follows is a new edition with a revised and expanded introduction and additional notes.