Contemporary theory of argumentation offers many insights about the ways in which, in the context of a public controversy, arguers should ideally present their arguments and criticize those of their opponents. We also know that in practice not all works out according to the ideal patterns: numerous kinds of derailments are an object of study for argumentation theorists. But how about the use of unfairstrategiesvis-à-vis one’s opponents? What if it is not a matter of occasional derailments but of one party’s (...) systematic refusal to take other parties seriously? What if one party continually forgoes any form of critical testing and instead resorts to threats or blackmail? Can this be countered by the tools of reason? Or should one pay one’s opponent back in the same coin? To gain some grasp of these issues, we describe a number of strategies used in the public controversy about induced earthquakes in Groningen. We check whether these strategies arefair,i.e.balanced, transparent,andtolerant.We also investigate the effects of the choice for a particular kind of strategy. It appears that, in circumstances, choosing a fair strategy may be detrimental for resolving the controversy and choosing an unfair one beneficial. Following up ideas from social psychology and political science, we formulate some guidelines for the choice of strategies. At the end, we stress the importance — especially for those whose opinions carry little weight — of having a society in which the knowledge and skills needed for assessing the fairness of strategies are widespread. (shrink)

How do crying foul strategies, such as accusing an opponent of trying to “terrify” into a decision, pressure arguers to argue well? I submit that they work by making a norm determinate and making manifest the badness of the tactic. I explain why they generate pressure to repair or abandon questionable tactics, particularly when the norms converge with those of a broader political culture.

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of (...) one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu, E. Feteris, A. Garapon, J. J. Robrieux, C. Perelman, C. M. Stamakis, among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent. (shrink)