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  1. M-LAMAC: a model for linguistic assessment of mitigating and aggravating circumstances of criminal responsibility using computing with words.Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez, Yarina Amoroso Fernández, Denis Sergeevich Zuev, Marieta Peña Abreu & Yeleny Zulueta Veliz - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence and Law:1-43.
    The general mitigating and aggravating circumstances of criminal liability are elements attached to the crime that, when they occur, affect the punishment quantum. Cuban criminal legislation provides a catalog of such circumstances and some general conditions for their application. Such norms give judges broad discretion in assessing circumstances and adjusting punishment based on the intensity of those circumstances. In the interest of broad judicial discretion, the law does not establish specific ways for measuring circumstances’ intensity. This gives judges more freedom (...)
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  • Editors' Review and Introduction: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law.Henry Prakken, Floris Bex & Anne Ruth Mackor - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1053-1067.
    Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but the decision‐making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant legal–procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives, (...)
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  • When statistical evidence is not specific enough.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12251-12269.
    Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...)
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