Two of the most important contributions that Bimal Krishna Matilal made to comparative philosophy are his doctoral dissertation The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy and his classic: Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowing. In this essay, we aim to carry forward the work of Bimal K. Matilal by showing how ideas in classical Indian philosophy concerning absence and perception are relevant to recent debates in Anglo-analytic philosophy. In particular, (...) we focus on the recent debate in the philosophy of perception centering on the perception of absence. In her Seeing Absence, Anya Farennikova argues for the thesis that we literally see absences. Her thesis is quite novel within the contexts of the traditions that she engages: analytical philosophy of perception, phenomenology, and cognitive neuroscience. In those traditions there is hardly any exploration of the epistemology of absence. By contrast, this is not the case in classical Indian philosophy where the debate over the ontological and epistemological status of absence is longstanding and quite engaging. In what follows, we engage Farennikova’s arguments, and those of John-Rémy Martin and Jérome Dokic in their response to her work. Using the work of Matilal, Bilimoria and Shaw we show that there are several engaging ideas that can be taken from Indian philosophy into the terrain explored by Farennikova, and Martin & Dokic. Our aim is to provide an updated comparative engagement on absence and its perception for the purposes of enhancing future discussions within global philosophy. However, we do not aim to do this merely by focusing on the history of primary texts or on twentieth century commentary on primary texts. Instead, we hope to show that the living tradition of Indian philosophy that Matilal embodied carries forward in his students and colleagues as they revive, revise, and extend Indian philosophy. (shrink)

Sometimes seeing sandal from non-smellable distance we obtain cognition in the form ‘surabhi candanam’ (that sandal out there is fragrant). According to the Naiyāyikas, this cognition is a single qualified visual perception, where fragrance is grasped by visual sense-faculty. Normally visual sense cannot grasp fragrance. But here fragrance is grasped by visual sense through an extraordinary sense-connection. The Nyāya holds that the memory of fragrance, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), connects its object, fragrance, with visual sense. (...) The Naiyāyikas use this thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa to explain illusion. For a direct realist like the Naiyāyikas, it is always difficult to explain illusion. But jñānalakṣaṇa explains how an object, which is absent in front, can be accessed directly by the operating sense-organ through an extraordinary sensory connection. However, there is a possible threat to the thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa. In the mechanism of jñānalakṣaṇa, memory plays a vital role. If one is already acquainted with the fragrance of sandal in some previous occasion, then the memory of fragrance can work as an extraordinary sensory connection for her. But the question arises as to what happens when she acquires the knowledge of fragrant sandal for the first time? Is it also an instance of extraordinary jñānalakṣaṇa perception? It is obvious that in such case no memory is there to help her connect her visual sense to fragrance. However, this first acquaintance is a precondition for the possibility of the later acquaintances of fragrant sandal. Hence, it is necessary for the Naiyāyikas to explain the mechanism of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal. The Naiyāyikas will be able to save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa (and also their direct realism) if they can depict a moment-wise account of the whole process of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal remaining consistent with their own basic tenets. It would require moment-analysis (kṣaṇavicāra) of that cognitive situation. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, several attempts have been made to solve the problem. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī mentions that ‘madhura śarkarā’ or ‘sugandhi ketakī’ are cases of mental perception or mānasa pratyakṣa. He says that here manas functions as the means of perception being aided by external senses to produce such cognition. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains the other cases like illusion and recognition by the same model. On the other hand, Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyakandalī says that in the case of the first acquaintance, at first the fragrance is grasped by the olfactory sense. Then, the visual sense-faculty, taking the perception of the fragrance as an associate cause, produces a cognition of the qualificand. The paper constructs several versions of moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra) for both of these suggestions and evaluates them. It is observed that although Jayanta’s thesis may be accepted as an alternative Nyāya account of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandalwood, Śrīdhara’s account fails partially. On the other hand, Jayanta fails to explicate the inner psychological steps involved in the said cognition. This paper suggests that we can successfully construct moment examination of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal; hence, the Nyāya thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa suffers no threat of internal inconsistency. However, the relevant sensory connection working there is not an olfactory perception. Rather, it also is a memory cognition, which is generated out of the memory-trace of fragrance produced on the spot from the aforesaid olfactory perception. Thus, the Naiyāyikas may save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa as well as their direct realism. (shrink)