Hud Hudson has argued that if MaxCon, Ned Markosian's favored answer to the Simple Question, is true, then there couldn't be gunky objects. If Hudson's argument succeeds, then those who believe that gunky objects are possible have a good reason to reject MaxCon. However, I show that Hudson's argument relies on substantive metaphysical claims that a proponent of MaxCon need not accept. Thus, one who endorses MaxCon need not reject the possibility of gunky objects and those who believe that gunky (...) objects are possible need not reject MaxCon. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I address a variety of issues in the metaphysics of space and related areas. I begin by discussing the popular thesis that regions of space are identical to sets of points in space. I present three arguments against this thesis and conclude that we should be skeptical of it. In its place, I propose an axiomatic theory of regions of space that is consistent with both reductive accounts of their nature and with accounts that treat them as (...) sui generis entities. -/- I next explore the consequences of the aforementioned considerations. In particular, I describe five different sorts of structure each of which is such that the claim that space could have that structure is consistent with the axiomatic theory previously proposed. I claim that this fact, together with the skepticism concerning reductive accounts argued for earlier, shows that we should take seriously the claim that space could have any of these structures. -/- Having argued that we should be skeptical of the thesis that regions of space are identical to sets of points in space and suggesting that space could have different sorts of structure, I discuss how best to analyze continuity. I present an analysis of continuity inspired by remarks of Richard Cartwright in his 1975 paper ‘Scattered Objects’. I argue that this Cartwrightian analysis should be rejected because it identifies regions of space with sets of points in space, and I present a modified version of the analysis that does not do so. I note, however, that there is an intuitive notion of continuity that is not captured by this modified Cartwrightian analysis. I present and defend an analysis of continuity that better captures this intuitive notion. -/- I then turn to the issue of how to analyze what it is for a region of space to be open and what it is for a region of space to be closed. Here I argue that Cartwright’s analyses of these notions are incorrect. I then present a series of alternative analyses, revising each in response to objections. This process culminates with my proposed analyses of what it is for a region of space to be open and what it is for a region of space to be closed. -/- Finally, I discuss the Maximally Continuous Account of Simples (MaxCon), originally formulated and defended by Ned Markosian in his 1998 paper ‘Simples’. I argue that Markosian’s version of MaxCon, which identifies regions of space with sets of points in space and relies on the Cartwrightian analysis of continuity, should be rejected. I then formulate a new version of MaxCon that builds on the views defended earlier in my dissertation and defend this new version of MaxCon from objections. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the task, begun by Lewis and Lewis in their seminal paper on the topic, of offering a theory of holes according to which a hole is simply its hole-lining. I begin by motivating the theory, arguing that it holds interest even absent its original animating concerns of nominalism and materialism, and present desiderata any such theory must satisfy. With this in place, I offer a definition both of a lining and of hole sameness, arguing (...) that these can overcome the most prominent standing objections to identifying holes with linings. Finally, I present a more powerful counterargument in the spirit of Casati and Varzi, and conclude with an emended version of the theory meeting all our earlier desiderata. I conclude by dispelling some possible worries about the nominalist and materialist credentials of my theory. (shrink)

The literature suggests two main answers to the question of what it is for a material object to be located at a region of spacetime. Both have a number of virtues. However, both suffer from well-known problems. According to one answer, location is a primitive relation with no informative metaphysical analysis. But this makes a number of necessary truths seem mysterious and leaves them unexplained. According to the other answer, to be located at a region is just to be identical (...) to that region. But this is inconsistent with a number of independently plausible theses about material objects and their locations. In this paper, I explore a new theory of location and argue that it has the virtues of these familiar theories but not their vices. I then explore some further connections the new theory has with some contemporary issues in metaphysics. (shrink)

The core doctrine of supersubstantivalism is that material objects are identical to their spacetime locations. One powerful consideration for the view is the argument from harmony—supersubstantivalism, it is claimed, is in a position to offer an elegant explanation of a number of platitudes concerning objects and their locations. However, I will argue that identifying material objects with their locations does not provide a satisfying explanation of harmony. What the supersubstantivalist needs is not a theory about the identity of objects, but (...) another theory about the identity of some relations. This paper proposes such a theory and shows that with it in place, the argument from harmony can be repaired. (shrink)

On its intended interpretation, logical, mathematical and metaphysical discourse sometimes seems to involve absolutely unrestricted quantification. Yet our standard semantic theories do not allow for interpretations of a language as expressing absolute generality. A prominent strategy for defending absolute generality, influentially proposed by Timothy Williamson in his paper ‘Everything’, avails itself of a hierarchy of quantifiers of ever increasing orders to develop non-standard semantic theories that do provide for such interpretations. However, as emphasized by Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo, there (...) is pressure on this view to extend the quantificational hierarchy beyond the finite level, and, relatedly, to allow for a cumulative conception of the hierarchy. In his recent book, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Williamson yields to that pressure. I show that the emerging cumulative higher-orderist theory has implications of a strongly generality-relativist flavour, and consequently undermines much of the spirit of generality absolutism that Williamson set out to defend. (shrink)

Ned Markosian has recently defended a new theory of composition, which he calls regionalism : some material objects xx compose something if and only if there is a material object located at the fusion of the locations of xx. Markosian argues that regionalism follows from what he calls the subregion theory of parthood. Korman and Carmichael agree. We provide countermodels to show that regionalism does not follow from, even together with fourteen potentially implicit background principles. We then show that regionalism (...) does follow from five of those background principles together with and two additional principles connecting parthood and location, which we call and. While the additional principles are not uncontroversial, our conjecture is that many will find them attractive. We conclude by mentioning that fills a previously unnoticed gap in the formal theory of location presented in Parsons. (shrink)

The Multiverse Thesis is a proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox. It is popular and well promulgated, found in fiction, philosophy and (most importantly) physics. I first offer a short explanation on behalf of its advocates as to why it qualifies as a theory of time travel (as opposed to mere 'universe hopping'). Then I argue that the thesis nevertheless has an unwelcome consequence: that extended objects cannot travel in time. Whilst this does not demonstrate that the Multiverse Thesis is (...) false, the consequence should give pause for concern. Even if it does not lead one to reject the thesis, I briefly detail some reasons to think it is interesting nonetheless. (shrink)

Recently, many philosophers have been interested in using locative relations to clarify and pursue debates in the metaphysics of material objects. Most begin with the relation of exact location. But what if we begin instead with the relation known as weak location – the relation an object x bears to any region not completely bereft of x? I explore some of the consequences of pursuing this route for issues including coincidence, extended simples, and endurance, with an eye to evaluating the (...) prospects for taking weak location as our fundamental locative relation. (shrink)

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it (...) does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

Mereological nihilists are faced with a difficult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about material objects. Popular paraphrase strategies involve plurals, arrangements of particles, or fictions. In this paper, a new paraphrase strategy is put forward that has distinct advantages over its rivals: it is compatible with gunk and emergent properties of macro-objects. The only assumption is a commitment to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing to accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. The author (...) suggests reinterpreting the parthood and composition relations as modal. According to this paraphrase, composition is a kind of counterpart relation. The author shows that one can accept that mereological nihilism is metaphysically necessary, while endorsing all the claims of classical mereology. As a result, the nihilists are in exactly the same position as the classical mereologist when it comes to explaining talk about ordinary objects, but without the additional ontology. (shrink)

The paper addresses various questions about the logical and metaphysical relations between notions of parthood, location and persistence. In particular it argues that the conjunction of mereological extensionalism and multilocation, is highly problematic, if not utterly inconsistent. It thus provides an alternate route to reject multilocation, one that does not rely on Barker and Dowe's well known argument, at least for those who endorse extensionality of parthood. It then argues that other major metaphysical theses such as three-dimensionalism turn out to (...) be at odds with extensionalism. (shrink)

We think of a boundary whenever we think of an entity demarcated from its surroundings. There is a boundary (a line) separating Maryland and Pennsylvania. There is a boundary (a circle) isolating the interior of a disc from its exterior. There is a boundary (a surface) enclosing the bulk of this apple. Sometimes the exact location of a boundary is unclear or otherwise controversial (as when you try to trace out the margins of Mount Everest, or even the boundary of (...) your own body). Sometimes the boundary lies skew to any physical discontinuity or qualitative differentiation (as with the border of Wyoming, or the boundary between the upper and lower halves of a homogeneous sphere). But whether sharp or blurry, natural or artificial, for every object there appears to be a boundary that marks it off from the rest of the world. Events, too, have boundaries — at least temporal boundaries. Our lives are bounded by our births and by our deaths; the soccer game began at 3pm sharp and ended with the referee's final whistle at 4:45pm. It is sometimes suggested that even abstract entities, such as concepts or sets, have boundaries of their own, and Wittgenstein could emphatically proclaim that the boundaries of our language are the boundaries of our world. Whether all this boundary talk is coherent, however, and whether it reflects the structure of the world or simply the organizing activity of our mind, are matters of deep philosophical controversy. (shrink)

Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.

An object is T-gunky just in case all its parts (i) have proper parts and (ii) are of non-zero measure in every spatial dimension. I show that a recent argument due to Hud Hudson—though not intended as a threat to gunk—bears on the possibility of T-gunky material objects in non-gunky space. I then show that the friend of T-gunk can circumvent Hudson’s argument without abandoning pointy space or standard mereology. What is needed is a novel conception of the relation of (...) exact occupation of pointy regions by T-gunky objects. With the new conception in hand, the friend of material T-gunk need not look to theories of gunky spacetime in order to reconcile the possibility of material gunk with mathematical physics. (shrink)