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J. L. Austin

Mind 70 (278):256-257 (1961)

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  1. Reading Austin Rhetorically.Andrew Munro - 2013 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 46 (1):22-43.
    Given John L. Austin’s Oxonian pedigree, we should expect his discussion of how “to say something is to do something” (1962, 12) to be taken up analytically. However, Austin also offers resources that have been exploited outside of traditional analytic philosophy—think of certain analytic feminist work, for example, or literary critical uses of performativity. For the most part, such work extends and inflects Austin’s notion of illocution and its related concepts of force and performativity for disciplinary-specific ends. This tendency in (...)
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  • The Aporetic Structure of Philosophical Problems.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 3 ((1)):5-18.
    The central idea of this essay is that philosophical thinking revolves around aporetic clusters, i.e., sets of individually plausible, but collectively inconsistent propositions. The task of philosophy is to dissolve such clusters, either by showing that the propositions in question, contrary to first impression, are compatible with each other, or by showing that it is permissible to abandon at least one of the propositions involved. This view of philosophical problems not only provides a very good description of well-understood philosophizing, but (...)
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  • The Growth of Meaning and the Limits of Formalism: In Science, in Law.Susan Haack - 2009 - Análisis Filosófico 29 (1):5-29.
    A natural language is an organic living thing; and meanings change as words take on new, and shed old, connotations. Recent philosophy of language has paid little attention to the growth of meaning; radical philosophers like Feyerabend and Rorty have suggested that meaning-change undermines the pretensions of science to be a rational enterprise. Thinkers in the classical pragmatist tradition, however -Peirce in philosophy of science and, more implicitly, Holmes in legal theory- both recognized the significance of growth of meaning, and (...)
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