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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Folk Knowledge Attributions and the Protagonist Projection Hypothesis.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2021 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-29.details
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Epistemic Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.details
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
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The Myth of Luck: Philosophy, Fate, and Fortune.Steven D. Hales - 2020 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.details
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Folk intuitions and the no-luck-thesis.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):343-358.details
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Getting It Right By Accident.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):72-105.details
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What is mentioned in the famous article by Edmund Gettier.А. М Кардаш - 2023 - Siberian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):127-139.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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I Know I am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.details
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Real Knowledge Undermining Luck.Raphael van Riel - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):325-344.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Is knowledge justified true belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.details
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In defence of single-premise closure.Weng Hong Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.details
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The Method of Cases: A Case Study.Mieszko Tałasiewicz - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):115-131.details
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.details
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‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases.Jim Stone - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Revisability, a priori truth, and evolution.Elliott Sober - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):68 – 85.details
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Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
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Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.details
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Petitio Principii: A Bad Form of Reasoning.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt086.details
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The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):811-820.details
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The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):811-820.details
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Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):373-393.details
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Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard.Lucas Roisenberg Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):683-704.details
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Uma solução não convencional para o problema de Gettier.Luís Estevinha Rodrigues - 2012 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):26-50.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.details
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Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.details
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Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:19-43.details
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Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
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First-Class and Coach-Class Knowledge.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):736-756.details
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Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.details
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Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):929-950.details
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Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?Justin Morton - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312.details
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