Research often characterized as “new materialist” has staged a return/turn to nature in social and critical theory by bringing “matter” into the purview of our research. While this growing impetus to take nature seriously fosters new types of interdisciplinarity and thus new resources for knowing our nature-cultural worlds, its capacity to deal with power’s imbrication in how we understand “nature” is curtailed by its failures to engage substantively with the epistemological interventions of postcolonial feminist science studies. The citational practices of (...) many new materialist thinkers eschew the existence of what Sandra Harding has called “a world of sciences.” I argue that the “science” privileged and often conflated with matter in new materialist storytelling is the same science destabilized by postcolonial feminist science studies. This does not mean that new materialist feminisms and postcolonial feminist science studies are necessarily at odds, as new materialist storytelling and prevailing conceptualizations of the postcolonial seem to suggest. On the contrary, I suggest that thinking creatively, capaciously, pluralistically, and thus irreverently with respect to the rules of science––about the boundaries and meanings of matter, “life,” and “humanness”––could be understood as a central project for a postcolonial feminist science studies. (shrink)

In this Introduction, we present a collection of articles under the topic “the reproductive bodies of postgenomics.” Through individual and collective research, the articles explore—sociologically, ethnographically, and philosophically—how bioscience in the postgenomic age is changing our understanding of reproductive bodies, and more broadly, how it is challenging existing ideas of heredity, embodiment, kinship, and identity. Feminist and postcolonial theories of technoscience are at the heart of this collection, and our aim is to further biosocial thinking while being cognizant that practices (...) of postgenomics also continue to reproduce deterministic paradigms. The concepts of “knowledge,” “experience,” and “justice” form the reference points animating our investigations. We bring these concepts into conversation with one another to disentangle how postgenomics operate differently on the reproductive body, namely on the levels of practice, discourse, and norms. This is an important exercise as it will enable social science and humanities scholars to evaluate the political capacities of postgenomics for the future study of reproduction. (shrink)

In gestational surrogacy arrangements, the womb is often figured as a holding environment that brings the child of commissioning parents to fruition but does not shape fetal identity. This article probes the racial imaginary of such a figuration—what I term the “nonracializing womb”—where gestation is seen as peripheral to racial transmission. Drawing on feminist science studies frameworks and data from interviews with parents who commissioned surrogates, this article traces the cultural politics of the nonracializing womb, positioning it as an index (...) for broader understandings of race, reproductive labor, and kinship that hinge on nuclear and biogenetic forms. It then problematizes this figure of gestation by engaging emerging research on environmental epigenetics, which offers a lively model of pregnancy as shaping fetal biology, blurring the lines between surrogate and fetus. I argue that epigenetics offers a resource to reimagine gestation as a racializing process, by theorizing race not as solely genetic, but as relational, socio-environmental, and forged through distributed kinship lineages. (shrink)

Monogamy in Western countries has recently undergone criticisms, because it is perceived as an oppressive institution, adjacent to reactionary cultural values. In this article, I argue that monogamy is in fact a force of social progress and women’s empowerment. I point out that, given our natural tendencies, the most likely alternative to monogamy is polygyny. By its very nature, polygyny faces a numerical difficulty, to the extent that (given the equitable male to female ratio) when one man engages in romantic (...) or sexual relationships with multiple female partners, inequality and social conflict ensues. I present historical and sociological data that sustains the argument that polygyny is associated with greater inequality, violence, poverty and women’s vulnerability. Nevertheless, while monogamy can be considered a force of social progress, I argue that the State is not morally entitled to prosecute non-monogamous lifestyles, but there may still be non-coercive ways to promote monogamy. (shrink)

In both popular and scholarly discussions, sexual consent is gaining traction as the central moral consideration in how people should treat one another in sexual encounters. However, while the concept of consent has been indispensable to oppose many forms of sexual violence, consent-based sexual ethics struggle to account for the phenomenological complexity of sexual intimacy and the social and structural pressures that often surround sexual communication and behavior. Feminist structural critique and social research on the prevalence of violation even within (...) consensual sex suggest that consent is insufficient to ground responsibility; a more fundamental orientation toward the value of sexual agency provides a better foundation for sexual ethics. Using feminist critical theory, phenomenology, and black feminist thought, this dissertation develops a socially situated and relational notion of sexual agency and diagnoses how such agency is neglected in prevailing discussions of consent in moral philosophy and legal theory. I argue that the ethical question of responsibility to another in a sexual encounter—apart from juridical considerations—should be reframed around the value of each person’s socially situated practices of agency. Preceding and extending beyond the obligation to gain valid consent for an action, responsibility demands adapting one’s intentions and behaviors in response to the wider range of another’s communicative expressions of agency. However, communicative expressions can be ambiguous or overdetermined by social context and cultural norms; they often offer only provisional traces of agency. To address this inherent uncertainty in intimacy, I propose drawing on insights from Emmanuel Levinas about the dynamic, open-ended nature of relationality, responsibility, and communication. Responsibility toward another does not depend on securing certainty about their “yes” or “no,” but requires responding continuously under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, adapting behaviors and intentions to make room for another’s agency despite its opacity. (shrink)