This chapter has two main sections. In the first section I briefly sketch Immanuel Kant’s moral theory as laid out in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). I explain Kant’s claim that morality must be grounded on what he calls a categorical imperative and examine his three formulations of this categorical imperative. In the second section I explain the distinction between “deontological” and “teleological” ethical theories. Kantian ethics is often presented as the paradigm example of a deontological ethical (...) theory, but I question whether Kant’s ethics should be understood as purely deontological. (shrink)

El objetivo principal de este artículo es sostener que el sentimiento de lo sublime - tal como es planteado por Kant en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar- supone el vínculo de la mente con el cuerpo propio. De otro modo, no podríamos explicar la variación de las fuerzas vitales que caracteriza al sentimiento de lo sublime. Ahora bien, la conciencia de la propia corporalidad constituye una condición necesaria - aunque no suficiente- del sentimiento de lo sublime. Consideramos que (...) además de la conciencia de las propias fuerzas vitales, el sentimiento de lo sublime supone la referencia a un principio espiritual. Por estos motivos, creemos que el sentimiento de lo sublime implica una superposición del sentimiento de vida y el sentimiento del espíritu. Con el fin de iluminar algunos aspectos problemáticos presentes en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, analizaremos algunos pasajes pertenecientes a la Antropología en sentido pragmático. The principal aim of this article is to support that the feeling of the sublime -as it is considered by Kant in the Critique of the power of Judgment- supposes the link of the mind with the own body. Otherwise, we might not explain the variation of the vital forces that characterizes the feeling of the sublime. However, the conscience of the own corporeality constitutes a necessary condition -though not sufficient- of the feeling of the sublime. We think that besides the conscience of the own vital forces, the feeling of the sublime supposes the reference to a spiritual principle. For these reasons, we think that the feeling of the sublime implies an overlapping of the feeling of life and the feeling of the spirit. In order to illuminate some problematic aspects in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we will analyze some passages belonging to the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. (shrink)

RESUMEN El objetivo principal de este estudio es analizar el vínculo entre lo sublime dinámico y la moralidad en el marco del pensamiento critico de Kant. Defenderemos la tesis según la cual el sentimiento de lo sublime dinámico es irreducible a la moralidad aun cuando este sentimiento supone necesariamente la moralidad. Subsidiariamente, intentaremos señalar que lo sublime dinámico implica una referencia necesaria a la propia corporalidad. Asimismo, esbozaremos una hipótesis en torno a la posibilidad de pensar el rol de la (...) propia corporalidad en el marco de la teoría moral kantiana. Las principales conclusiones de nuestro análisis son las siguientes: 1. lo sublime dinámico y la moralidad son esferas claramente diferenciadas en el pensamiento de Kant; 2. lo sublime dinámico supone la moralidad. ABSTRACT The main aim of this study is to analyze the link between the dynamic sublime and the morality in the framework of Kant's critical thought. Our study will be restricted to the analysis of the dynamic sublime. We will defend the thesis according to which the feeling of the dynamic sublime is irreducible to the morality even if this feeling necessarily supposes the morality. Subsidiarily, we will try to indicate that the dynamic sublime implies a necessary reference to the own corporeality. Likewise, we will outline a hypothesis concerning the possibility of thinking the role of the own corporeality in the framework of the Kantian moral theory. The main conclusions of our analysis are the following: 1. the dynamic sublime and the morality are clearly differentiated spheres in Kant's thought; 2. the dynamic sublime supposes the morality. (shrink)

Although much work has been done on Kant’s theory of moral agency, little explored is the possibility of a Kantian account of the moral agency of groups or collectives that comprise individual human beings. The aim of this paper is to offer a Kantian account of collective moral agency that can explain how organized collectives can perform moral actions and be held morally responsible for their actions. Drawing on Kant’s view that agents act by incorporating an incentive into their maxims, (...) it is argued that groups of agents can engage in practical deliberation in much the same way individual agents can, resulting in the formulation of a distinctive “group maxim” for which the group, as such, can be morally responsible. (shrink)

This essay offers an overview of the reasons why tattoos are philosophically interesting. Considered here will be a partial survey of potential areas of philosophical interest with respect to tattoos, fortified by a little historical context. Claims about the ethical significance of tattoos and about the significance of tattoos for self-expression and as expressions of identity will be canvassed in the first two sections, as will questions about what they express or signify, how they might do so, and whose expression (...) we might take it to be. The final sections will address the contention that at least some tattoos are art and will raise various considerations about their closest analogs as well as their authorship. Although it will be argued that analogs can be found between tattoos and works recognized as art, it will also be maintained that tattoos raise unique aesthetic issues for consideration. (shrink)