ABSTRACT The purpose of the present study was to explore the issue of a perceived lack of cohesion in moral education in mainland China, and place it in an international academic context, by comparing three student cohorts: grade three and grade six in Primary School and the third year in Junior High School. The study employed mixed research methods; utilising the Chinese Code for Primary and Secondary-School Students as a blueprint for designing a student self-assessment survey. A total of 695 (...) questionnaires were obtained from the three student cohorts, in addition to 25 semi-structured teacher interviews. The findings concur with and add richness to existing policy documents and academic sources. They reveal the perceived symptom of a lack of cohesion in moral education, represented by a U-curve phenomenon based on students’ self-assessment survey results, and corroborated by teacher interviews, where the middle-cohort students are lagging behind the other two cohorts. These findings are compared to other internationally recorded ‘dips’ in moral developmental trajectories. The findings indicate two possible explanations for this phenomenon, and suggestions are offered for educators and policy makers on improving cohesion in moral education. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Developmental research has long sought to understand children’s social ideas, and particularly how those ideas influence their judgments and behaviors toward other people. We examine the idea of common humanity, a social idea that has been investigated historically and philosophically, to re-consider what is already known about children’s notions of social equality and difference and to suggest how research in this area might be expanded. We review the social cognition literature to argue that studying the idea of common humanity—which (...) combines abstract notions of universal equality with explicit attention to social group differences—could substantially advance our understanding of children’s social-cognitive frameworks. We then discuss a subset of the literature related to children’s prejudice and describe how the study of common humanity could shed light on the mechanisms behind interventions that successfully reduce prejudice. (shrink)

This paper addresses three basic questions about moral motivation. Concerning the nature of moral motivation, it argues that it involves responsiveness to both reasons of morality and the value of persons and everything else of value. Moral motivation is thus identified as reason-responsive appropriate valuing. Regarding whether it is possible for people to be morally motivated, the paper relies on self-determination theory (SDT) to show how moral motivation is a likely product of socialization that is need-supportive in modeling appropriate valuing (...) and involves and models the very kinds of reasoning that are essential to moral motivation. Virtuous motivation that inclines people to engage in morally motivated acts is equated with being morally self-determining or achieving the right kind of integrated motivation. SDT shows how people come to be morally motivated, and the paper concludes that an identified aspiration to be virtuous may play a significant role. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Caregivers’ moral reactions to young children’s moral transgressions are informative environmental responses for children’s developing understanding of morality. One central question concerns by which age parents hold their children responsible for moral transgressions. This study indirectly investigated this question by having parents and non-parents rate the appropriateness of caregivers’ moral and non-moral reactions to moral transgressions of 6-month-old, 1-year-old, 2-year-old, and 4-year-old children. Transgressions and reactions were presented as short video clips in an online survey. Results indicated that moral (...) reactions were judged as increasingly appropriate and non-moral reactions as increasingly inappropriate with age. Two years constituted a turning point, after which moral reactions were judged as more appropriate than non-moral reactions. This pattern showed to be the same for parents and non-parents. These findings highlight the growing importance of moral reactions over the first years of life and lend support to theories of intuitive parenting. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Research suggests that young children possess a relatively complex understanding of adult authority that varies by social cognitive domain. However, little is known about how children react to adult authority that strays from expected guidelines. The current study exposed 4- and 5-year-old children to vignettes in which parents issue commands that reinforce social-conventional and moral norms, commands that violate said norms, and personal domain commands. Children were asked to judge the authority’s legitimacy, as well as the child’s obligation to (...) obey. Results showed that children give the most support to typical commands and the least to atypical commands, with personal commands falling in the middle. Age effects also emerged, with older children giving less support to parental commands in the personal domain, and to atypical commands in both conventional and moral domains. Implications for future research and for parent-child relationships are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A crisis we face is that moral character seems to be declining in significance in everyday life and is not particularly relevant in evaluations of current political leaders. A case for character, however, can be mounted through the study of moral exemplars; in demonstrating that character is a viable construct and not an artifact of situational factors, that it explains more of moral functioning than cognition alone, and that it is causally operative in moral action. Aspects of the character (...) of exemplary moral character can be found, for example, in the integrated motivation of agency and communion, the positive framing of life events, an expanded worldview, and beneficial early-life experiences. This better-grounded understanding of character can serve to expand the moral domain, enhance intervention efforts, and promote a more civil and caring society. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPrevious research on children’s moral reasoning usually used a quantitative approach and a pre-determined set of methods in order to establish early moral landmarks. We proposed a qualitative perspective on the basis of which we have formulated three main objectives: 1) to identify the main categories of behaviors that children spontaneously associate with the notion of morality, in line with Turiel’s Domain Theory; 2) to investigate children’s conceptions of moral and social-conventional rules and 3) to assess the gender differences in (...) the use of care and justice reasoning, in line with Gilligan’s assertion that females are care-oriented and that males consistently use the justice orientation and infrequently use the care orientation. Ninety-two children were required to describe morality in behavioral terms without being guided by specific indications from the researchers. Our results reflected a tendency towards morality perceived through behaviors directed towards others, namely through altruism, and also the domination of moral norms as compared to social ones, partially confirming Gilligan’s theory concerning gender specificities regarding moral reasoning in the questions of care and justice. (shrink)

This study examined the application of Lesson Study for professional development for a domain approach to moral education. A comparison was drawn between the effects of Lesson Study with 17 teachers and 144 students representing middle schools in the same district as a prior study employing intensive traditional PD. In Lesson Study, groups of same grade teachers construct lessons taught by one group member and observed by the others. Teachers meet following the lesson to critique and improve the lesson using (...) criteria established by teachers and informed by outside ‘experts.’ Findings from analysis of teacher discourse over nine months and end of year surveys revealed improvements in teacher pedagogy, knowledge of moral development, greater sense of professionalism, and efficacy for engagement in moral education in comparison with controls. Fewer lessons were produced, resulting in fewer gains in student moral and conventional reasoning than observed with intensive individualized PD. (shrink)

Previous research has found that when children engage in social and moral transgressions, they take steps to either remedy or explain their behavior. However, no prior systematic investigation has examined the strategies children employ to ‘correct’ their behavior in future situations. The present study employed a domain theory lens to investigate developmental changes in children’s self-reported strategies for self-correcting their moral and social conventional transgressions as well as adjusting self-perceived personal shortcomings. Participants were 100 children from two regions of the (...) US distributed across five age groups, six-, eight-, 10-, 12- and 16-years. Findings from interviews revealed significant differences in strategies for self-correction by domain and age. Implications for expanding our definitions of moral agency and improving social and emotional learning programs are discussed. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to investigate how bullying incident participant roles and moral reasoning relate to each other in adolescents. To do so, we examined sociomoral judgments about hypothetical bullying incidents and moral disengagement in adolescents identified as bullies, defenders of the victim and passive bystanders. Six-hundred and twenty-six high school students took part in this study and 131 were assigned a specific bullying incident participant role through peer nomination. Findings reveal that defenders of the victim show (...) greater and more uniform moral sensibility than did both bullies and passive bystanders. Sociomoral reasoning helped differentiate between both bully subtypes and passive bystander beyond displaying greater moral disengagement than defenders did. (shrink)

One important socio-cultural medium through which young children’s moral understanding is cultivated is parent/child discourse. Of particular interest to us was young children’s use of basic evaluative concepts, which are ubiquitous in everyday discourse and serve as a potential bridge from the non-moral to the moral domain. We investigated 14 2–5-year-old children’s use of thin evaluative concepts and found that while they frequently used good and bad to morally evaluate other people’s and their own psychological/dispositional states and behaviors—as well as, (...) less frequently, to highlight relevant standards, expectations and rules—they did not use right and wrong. In contrast, a sample of US written and spoken public conversation revealed that adults did. Reasons for this are discussed, along with the frequency of different types of moral evaluations, differences between children and their parents, and age-related trends. (shrink)

This article reasserts the centrality of reasoning as the focus for moral education. Attention to moral cognition must be extended to incorporate sociogenetic processes in moral growth. Moral education is not simply growth within the moral domain, but addresses capacities of students to engage in cross-domain coordination. Development beyond adolescence in moral thinking is in two forms: the gradual application of morality in broader adult contexts, and the result of social discourse and progressive readjustments at the individual and societal level (...) of views of the morality of societal practices. Postconventional moral reasoning is not a rarified stage of moral cognition, but an orientation and set of discourse skills potentially available to all normally developing adult moral reasoners. (shrink)

Eleven teachers and 254 urban middle-school students comprised the sample of this study examining the social and moral development outcomes of the integration of social cognitive domain theory within regular classroom instruction. Participating teachers were trained to construct and implement history lessons that stimulated students’ moral reasoning and conceptions of societal convention. In comparison with baselines and controls, teachers reduced didactic instruction and increased the proportion of class time devoted to small group discussions. Student engagement in transactive discourse significantly increased (...) in participating classes with significantly greater post-test levels of moral reasoning, concepts of social convention, and cross-domain coordination. Student production of operational versus representational transacts through transactive discussion was associated with growth in moral and societal concepts. Teachers continued teaching lessons constructed in the project a year after the research ended. (shrink)

Adolescence is a developmental period characterized by intense changes, which impact the interaction between individuals and their environments. Moral reasoning is an important skill during adolescence because it guides social decisions between right and wrong. Identifying the cognitive underpinnings of MR is essential to understanding the development of this function. The aim of this study was to explore predictors of MR in typically developing adolescents and the specific contribution of higher order cognitive processing using an innovative visual MR assessment tool (...) and measures of executive functioning and intelligence. MR maturity was correlated with four executive functions and was predicted by four variables: age, intelligence, nonverbal flexibility and verbal fluency. Overall, these results contribute to a better understanding of MR during adolescence and highlight the importance of using innovative tools to measure social cognition. (shrink)

Whether moral conceptions are universal or culture-specific is controversial in moral psychology. One option is to refrain from imposing theoretical constraints and to ask laypeople from different cultures how they conceptualize morality. Our article adopts this approach by examining laypeople’s associations of moral character in individualistic- and collectivistic-oriented cultures. Using correspondence analysis we found that the concept of moral character yielded widely shared associations with justice and welfare concerns. Yet, there were also clear cultural differences with individualistic-oriented samples associating more (...) frequently rights-based features and collectivistic-oriented samples more frequently associating duty-based attributes. When matching freelisted trait categories with Schwartz’s value types, moral value hierarchies were similar across cultures and correlated significantly with explicit moral value ratings. We conclude that imposing constraints through an expert-designed category system can narrow the scope of inquiry to common moral aspects related to problem-solving, promotion of prosocial actions and control of antisocial behaviour. (shrink)

The narratives that emerging adults wrote about a time when they learned an important moral, value or lesson were explored in order to determine the characteristics of events that lead to internalized values as well as to compare the way different kinds of moral values are socialized. Lessons resulting from misbehavior were reported most frequently. Those involving direct teaching of values were most highly internalized, with internalization assessed by importance and current impact. Self-reflection and self-generation of values was identified as (...) a key means to value learning and was reported more frequently than any other source of values (e.g., parents, peers). Finally, it appears that a framework for understanding socialization that involves different domains can reflect how individuals categorize their value-learning experiences. (shrink)

Previous research has identified different moral judgments in liberals and conservatives. While both care about harm/fairness (?individualizing? foundations), conservatives emphasize in-group/authority/purity (?binding? foundations) more than liberals. Thus, some argue that conservatives have a more complex morality. We suggest an alternative view?that consistent with conservatism as ?motivated social cognition?, binding foundation activation satisfies psychological needs for social structure/security/certainty. Accordingly, we found that students who were dispositionally threat-sensitive showed stronger binding foundation activation, and that conservatives are more dispositionally threat-sensitive than liberals. We (...) also found that in a heightened threat situation liberals (especially social liberals) showed increased binding foundation activation. These results support the view that the binding foundations function differently in our moral cognition than the individualizing foundations. (shrink)

Moral foundations theory chastises cognitive developmental theory for having foisted on moral psychology a restrictive conception of the moral domain which involves arbitrarily elevating the values of justice and caring. The account of this negative influence on moral psychology, referred to in the moral foundations theory literature as the ?great narrowing?, involves several interrelated claims concerning the scope of the moral domain construct in cognitive moral developmentalism, the procedure by which it was initially elaborated, its empirical grounds and the influence (...) of this conception of the moral domain on research in moral psychology. Examining these claims in light of key theoretical writings on the moral domain concept in cognitive moral developmentalism, the paper shows that the ?great narrowing? narrative is misinformed, superficial and historically inaccurate. On the basis of this critical analysis, we conclude that the primary heuristic value of the ?great narrowing narrative? is as a case lesson in the deep specificity of competing conceptions of the moral domain to the theoretical frameworks in which they are devised. (shrink)

Lawrence Kohlberg slayed the two dragons of twentieth-century psychology?behaviorism and psychoanalysis. His victory was a part of the larger cognitive revolution that shaped the world in which all of us study psychology and education today. But the cognitive revolution itself was modified by later waves of change, particularly an ?affective revolution? that began in the 1980s and an ?automaticity revolution? in the 1990s. In this essay I trace the history of moral psychology within the broader intellectual trends of psychology and (...) I explain why I came to believe that moral psychology had to change with the times. I explain the origins of my own social intuitionist model and of moral foundations theory. I offer three principles that I think should characterize moral psychology in the twenty-first century: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, (2) There?s more to morality than harm and fairness and (3) Morality binds and blinds. (shrink)

A mixed methods approach was used to understand moral reasoning and empathy in 12- to 18-year-old adolescents with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HF-ASD) compared to same age typically developing (TD) youth. Adolescents completed measures assessing empathy (perspective-taking, personal distress, and empathic concern), and moral reasoning, as well as a qualitative interview asking them to discuss a challenging sociomoral situation and recount their moral competencies and strengths in difficult situations. For quantitative results, both groups demonstrated similar empathic concern, but adolescents with (...) HF-ASD had significantly higher personal distress and lower moral reasoning than TD youth. Qualitative results suggest that adolescents with HF-ASD perceived themselves as having empathic concern but struggled to use these feelings to support their actions in spontaneous challenging sociomoral situations. Results suggest that teachers should be educated in providing specific guidance to adolescents with HF-ASD about how to express empathic concern in ways that promote mutually rewarding relationships. (shrink)

To investigate reasoning about family honour, 128 first generation (mean age = 27.2 years) and second generation Hindu Indian-American adults (mean age = 24.7 years) were presented hypothetical scenarios in which male or female protagonists defied common Hindu customs (e.g., arranged marriage, intra-religion marriage and premarital sexual abstinence). Questions assessed beliefs about customs, connections to family honour and socio-moral orientations towards honour violations. Both generations perceived intra-religion marriage and premarital sexual abstinence to function for group identity-related reasons, such as preserving (...) Hindu culture and maintaining Hindu identity. First generation participants judged defiance of marital and abstinence traditions in moral terms more often than second generation participants (mainly for female protagonists). Justifications for moral judgements referenced damage to group identity, including family image, Hindu identity and cultural preservation. Implications for theories of moral psychology are discussed. (shrink)

This article develops a research position that allows cultural sociologists to compare morality across sociohistorical cases. In order to do so, the article suggests focusing analytic attention on actions that fulfill the following criteria: (a) actions that define the actor as a certain kind of socially recognized person, both within and across fields; (b) actions that actors experience—or that they expect others to perceive—as defining the actor both intersituationally and to a greater extent than other available definitions of self; and (...) (c) actions to which actors either have themselves, or expect others to have, a predictable emotional reaction. Such a position avoids both a realist moral sociology and descriptive-relativism, and provides sociologists with criteria for comparing moral action in different cases while staying attuned to social and historical specificity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains (...) how these same dispositions naturally give rise to corresponding moral judgments in individuals. RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, je distingue deux familles théoriques qui conçoivent les normes morales comme des «intrants» ou des «extrants». Je soutiens que l’on peut ultimement unifier la meilleure version de ces deux modèles en un seul modèle théorique que je nomme l’Innéisme Modéré. La différence entre ces deux modèles apparemment antagonistes en est une de perspective plutôt que de contenu : alors que le modèle des intrants analyse l’impact de dispositions émotionnelles sur l’évolution historique des normes morales, le modèle des extrants s’intéresse plutôt au rôle de ces mêmes dispositions dans le développement de jugements moraux individuels. (shrink)

The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion is a key part of Objectivist epistemology as elaborated by Leonard Peikoff. For Peikoff, assertions unsupported by evidence are neither true nor false; they have no context or place in the hierarchy of conceptual knowledge; they are meaningless and paralyze rational cognition; their production is proof of irrationality. A thorough examination of the doctrine reveals worrisomely unclear standards of evidence and a jumble of contradictory claims about which assertions are arbitrary, when they are arbitrary, (...) and what ought to be done about them when they are. A wholesale rejection of the doctrine is recommended. (shrink)

The project of naturalizing ethics has multiple contributions, from cognitive and moral psychology to primatology, neuroscience or evolutionary theory. One of the strategies for naturalizing ethics has been to argue that moral norms and values can be explained away if we focus on their causal history, if it is possible to offer both an ultimate and proximate causal explanation for them. In this article, I will focus on the contribution of cognitive and moral psychology as a way of offering a (...) proximate causal explanation for moral judgments. I am mostly interested in understanding to what extent these cognitive and psychological questions have some bearing in the fields of ethics and meta-ethics. Does this research programme put at stake the contention that ethics is a manifestation of human rationality? Is it true that finding the cognitive underpinnings of some of our moral judgments vindicates some meta-ethical position, namely some kind of reductionist naturalism? In the end, I will argue that even if scientific disciplines such as cognitive psychology give us a naturalized picture of the moral agent, there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself. (shrink)

Recent empirical work on folk moral objectivism has attempted to examine the extent to which folk morality presumes that moral judgments are objectively true or false. Some researchers report findings that they take to indicate folk commitment to objectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010, 2012; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 2004), while others report findings that may reveal a more variable commitment to objectivism (Beebe, 2014; Beebe et al., 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Sarkissian, et al., 2011; Wright, (...) 2018; Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013; Wright, McWhite, & Grandjean, 2014). However, the various probes that have been used to examine folk moral objectivism almost always fail to be good direct measures of objectivism. Some critics (Beebe, 2015; Pölzler, 2017, 2018) have suggested that the problems with existing probes are serious enough that they should be viewed as largely incapable of shedding any light on folk metaethical commitments. Building upon the work of Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe (2018), I argue that many of the existing probes can be seen as good measures of the extent to which people think that the truth of one moral judgment excludes the possibility that a judgment made by a disagreeing party is also true and that the best explanation of the findings obtained using these measures is significant folk support for indexical moral relativism—the view that the content of moral judgments is context-sensitive. If my thesis is correct, many contemporary moral philosophers are deeply mistaken about the metaethical contours of folk morality in one very important respect. (shrink)

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (...) (which people are willing to impose on others regardless of the consequences) and protected values (PVs, values protected from trade-offs). I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be. (shrink)

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (...) and protected values. I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be. (shrink)

Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. In (...) this paper, we propose a novel methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. We begin with an analysis of the (sometimes mixed) explanatory aims of the cognitive science of social norms. From this analysis, we derive a recommendation for a reformed conception of its explanandum: a minimally psychological construct that we call normative regularities. Our central empirical proposal is that the psychological underpinnings of social norms are most likely realized by a heterogeneous set of cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms that vary between norms and between individuals, rather than by a single type of process or distinctive norm system. This pluralistic approach, we suggest, offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of social norms. (shrink)

Ideas from cognitive science are increasingly influential and provide insight into the nature of moral judgement. Three core ideas are discussed: modern schema theory, the frequency of automatic decision-making and implicit processes as the default mode of human information processing. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) measures the beginnings of moral understanding, which are largely non-verbal and intuitive, in contrast to the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI), which measures the highest level of verbal understanding. The positive attributes of the DIT and its (...) conceptualisation of moral judgement schemas are more apparent in a time of increasing respect for implicit knowledge and processing. The DIT offers a means of measuring moral judgement that fits with current views in cognitive science. Although the MJI and interview techniques generally are worthwhile for measuring production competence, the DIT is better able to measure understanding at the level that drives most decisions for most people. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a novel skeptical view about moral disgust. I argue that much recent discussion of moral disgust neglects an important ontological question: is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, and from other psychological states? I investigate the ontological question and propose two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust must satisfy: it must be a genuine form of disgust, and it must be genuinely moral. Next, I examine (...) two prominent accounts of moral disgust by John Kekes and Victor Kumar and argue that neither successfully establishes the existence of genuinely moral disgust: Kekes’ account does not satisfy condition, and Kumar’s view does not meet condition. I claim that an important general lesson can be drawn from my critiques of Kekes’ and Kumar’s accounts: to establish the existence of moral disgust, one must provide unequivocal evidence that genuinely moral disgust, not generic disgust or anger, is being elicited in response to relevant moral violations. I conclude by considering why we ought to be skeptical about the general prospect of giving a positive answer to the ontological question, given the available evidence. (shrink)

Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human species. (...) However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term “morality” is to be defined than by empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define “morality”, “moral cognition”, and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed. (shrink)

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered (...) a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect. (shrink)

Despite its linguistic roots in ancient Greek, the concept of empathy is of recent intellectual heritage. Yet its history has been varied and colorful, a fact that is also mirrored in the multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. In its philosophical heyday at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, empathy had been hailed as the primary means for gaining knowledge of other minds and as the method (...) uniquely suited for the human sciences, only to be almost entirely neglected philosophically for the rest of the century. Only recently have philosophers become again interested in empathy in light of the debate about our folk psychological mindreading capacities. In the second half of the last century, the task of addressing empathy was mainly left to psychologists who thematized it as a psychological phenomenon and process to be studied by the method of the empirical sciences. Particularly, it has been studied by social psychologists as a phenomenon assumed to be causally involved in creating prosocial attitudes and behavior. Nevertheless, within psychology it is at times difficult to find agreement of how exactly one should understand empathy; a fact of which psychologists themselves have become increasingly aware. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the concept of empathy by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. (shrink)

Psychopaths pose a challenge to those who make claims about the strength of moral assessments. These individuals are entirely unmoved by the moral rules that they articulate and purportedly espouse. Psychopaths appear rationally intact but are emotionally broken. In some cases, they commit horrendous crimes yet show no guilt, no remorse. Sentimentalists claim that the empirical evidence about psychopaths’ affective deficits supports that moral judgment is rooted in emotion and that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments—they can’t. Here, I (...) challenge an explanation of psychopathy that indicts psychopaths’ emotional impairments alone. I conclude that there are rational requirements for moral motivation and that psychological and neuroscientific research support that psychopaths do not make the grade. (shrink)

مطالعه روابط دین و فلسفه سابقه‌ای دیرین در آثار حکمای مسلمان دارد. شاید بتوان فارابی را پیشگام فیلسوفان مسلمان در ارائه یک نظریه هماهنگ و فراگیر در باب مناسبات دین و فلسفه قلمداد کرد. وی ضمن باور به یگانگی آموزه‌های این دو منظومه فکری، دین را تجلی تعلیمی و تأدیبی حکمت می‌داند. حکمت عملی به عنوان بخشی از حکمت مطلق که با زبان حقیقت و برهان سخن می‌گوید، از این قاعده مستثنی نیست. از همین رهگذر تعالیم دینی ناظر به افعال (...) ارادی انسان را همان آموزه‌های حکمت عملی می‌داند که به زبان تمثیل و با روش اقناعی القاء شده است و وجه عملی دین، یعنی شریعت را آموزه‌های حکمی مقدر به اعراض و احوال زمانی-مکانی معرفی می‌کند و با پیش‌کشیدن عناصر فراتاریخی-ماوراء طبیعی می‌کوشد تا اعتبار، شمول و دوام آموزه‌های شریعت تبیین نماید. از این رو از طریق اتصال وحیانی اعتبار و شمول آموزه‌های عملی دین را تأمین کرده و با طرح فقاهت به عنوان تکمله‌ای بر ختم نبوت دوام شریعت را تضمین می‌نماید. (shrink)

Explorations of relationships between Haidt’s Moral Foundations Questionnaire and indices of moral decision-making assessed by the Defining Issues Test have been limited to correlational analyses. This study used Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority and Purity to predict overall moral judgment and individual Defining Issues Test-2 schema scores using responses from 222 undergraduates. Relationships were not confirmed between the separate foundations and the DIT-2 indices. Using the MFQ moral judgment items only, confirmatory factor analyses confirmed higher order constructs called Individualizing and Binding (...) foundations. Structural models using these higher order factors fitted the data well, and findings indicated that the Binding foundations significantly positively predicted Maintaining Norms and negatively predicted both overall moral judgment and the Postconventional Schema. Neither Individualizing nor Binding foundations significantly predicted Personal Interest. While moral judgments assessed by DIT-2 may not be evoking the MFQ foundations, findings here suggest the MFQ may not be a suitable measure for capturing more advanced moral functioning. (shrink)

A recent turn in the cognitive sciences has deepened the attention on embodied and situated dynamics for explaining different cognitive processes such as perception, emotion, and social cognition. This has fostered an extensive interest in the social and ‘intersubjective’ nature of moral behavior, especially from the perspective of enactivism. In this paper, I argue that embodied and situated perspectives, enactivism in particular, nonetheless require further improvements with regards to their analysis of the social nature of human morality. In brief, enactivist (...) proposals still do not define what features of the social-relational context, or which kind of processes within social interactions, make an evaluation or action morally relevant or distinctive from other types of social normativity. As an alternative to this proclivity, and seeking to complement the enactive perspective, I present a definition of the process of moral sense-making and offer an empirically-based ethical distinction between different domains of social knowledge in moral development. For doing so, I take insights from the constructivist tradition in moral psychology. My objective is not to radically oppose embodied and enactive alternatives but to expand the horizon of their conceptual and empirical contributions to morality research. (shrink)

Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection (...) cannot explain the traits of individuals. Hence, facts about past selection cannot provide debunking explanations for any of our moral beliefs. The aim of this paper is to explore the conflict between the Debunking Thesis and the Negative View. (shrink)

I consider whether evolutionary explanations can debunk our moral beliefs. Most contemporary discussion in this area is centred on the question of whether debunking implications follow from our ability to explain elements of human morality in terms of natural selection, given that there has been no selection for true moral beliefs. By considering the most prominent arguments in the literature today, I offer reasons to think that debunking arguments of this kind fail. However, I argue that a successful evolutionary debunking (...) argument can be constructed by appeal to the suggestion that our moral outlook reflects arbitrary contingencies of our phylogeny, much as the horizontal orientation of the whale’s tail reflects its descent from terrestrial quadrupeds. An introductory chapter unpacks the question of whether evolutionary explanations can debunk our moral beliefs, offers a brief historical guide to the philosophical discussion surrounding it, and explains what I mean to contribute to this discussion. Thereafter follow six chapters and a conclusion. The six chapters are divided into three pairs. The first two chapters consider what contemporary scientific evidence can tell us about the evolutionary origins of morality and, in particular, to what extent the evidence speaks in favour of the claims on which debunking arguments rely. The next two chapters offer a critique of popular debunking arguments that are centred on the irrelevance of moral facts in natural selection explanations. The final chapters develop a novel argument for the claim that evolutionary explanations can undermine our moral beliefs insofar as they show that our moral outlook reflects arbitrary contingencies of our phylogeny. A conclusion summarizes my argument and sets out the key questions that arise in its wake. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate, starting from both the analysis of Haidt’s Theory of Moral Foundations, and his Intuitionist-social Model, if there is any implicit normative assumption in the author in relation to the value assigned to moral intuitions, both in relation to to its content and possible adaptive functionality, as well as to the mechanisms that trigger such intuitions. An attempt is made to unravel whether the author, beyond considering emotional intuitions as the true cause of moral judgments, ascribes (...) a positive or negative value to this situation. To this end, the motivations underlying various moral intuitions are examined, in order to analyze Haidt’s contributions to the clarification of a problem of normative metaethics of great impact. at present: can the same normative weight be attributed to any moral foundation in force in human societies; or are only some orientations rational, and therefore morally justifiable? Do they all reveal genuine moral concerns, or do some reflect relevant but not specifically moral adaptive interests, or even selfish aspirations functional to the interests of hegemonic sectors? The implications of the FMT are analyzed as a valuable heuristic guide to interpret the moral concerns of conservatives from an evolutionary meta-ethical approach that allows to overcome the monism of the liberal ethical code, for which the spectrum of genuine moral concerns is reduced to questions of justice, rights and protection of the weakest. The need to achieve a clearer articulation between the SIM, which puts more emphasis on the processes of acquisition of intuitions through learning and social interaction, and the FMT, that focuses on its content and its possible links with various adaptive interests. (shrink)

Moral reasoning theorists working in the constructivist tradition have tended to explain unethical behaviour by assuming that a breakdown occurs in the link between a person's moral judgement within a particular situation and his ultimate behaviour in that situation. This breakdown is usually seen as being the result of the individual ignoring his deontic judgement in favour of meeting a competing, non-moral social obligation or of fulfilling a selfish interest. This model of unethical behaviour has led to suggestions that moral (...) educators focus on fostering the incorporation of morality into people's self-concepts and on building moral character. An argument is presented that unethical behaviour, especially that involving relatively minor moral breaches, is often not the result of a moral judgement-behaviour hiatus but rather a corruption of the construal process. This corruption, driven by a desire for personal gain, results in the erroneous conclusion that an unethical action is actually morally acceptable. Immoral behaviour under this scenario is not a result of moral judgement failing to determine action but rather of moral judgement corrupted by self-serving interests succeeding in driving action. The educational implications of this alternative model of immoral behaviour are discussed. (shrink)

Emotional action and communication are integral to the development of morality, here conceptualized as our concerns for the well-being of other people and the ability to act on those concerns. Focusing on the second year of life, this article suggests a number of ways in which young children’s emotions and caregivers’ emotional communication contribute to early forms of helping, empathy, and learning about prohibitions. We argue for distinguishing between moral issues and other normative issues also in the study of early (...) moral development, for considering a wider range of emotional phenomena than the “moral emotions” most commonly studied, and for paying more attention to how specific characteristics of early emotional interactions facilitate children’s development of a concern for others. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.