Baselines are commonly used to enable harm identification. The temporal, the counterfactual and the duty-based normative baselines are the most prominent. Each of these captures an aspect of common conceptions of what it is to harm and be harmed. However, each baseline also fails to deliver workable identifications of harm when presented with certain types of case. Problematic cases are found readily in childhood, a venue in which harm identification is often called for. Without a reliable means of identifying harm (...) in childhood, harm cannot properly play a central role in normative assessments of parental practices and state intervention. This paper presents childhood cases in which the prominent baselines fail and offers an alternative: the interest-based normative baseline. Should the interest-based normative baseline replace its rivals and reign supreme? I argue not, presenting a case for maintaining a suite of baselines for use in varying contexts. (shrink)

Mill's On Liberty is centrally concerned with avoiding social tyranny. But Mill's Principle of Liberty defines interfering, in the context of social pressure, as intentionally punishing and it seems to allow speech and actions that critics have thought would conflict with liberty in self-regarding matters. To critics, Mill draws distinctions among social influences where no genuine difference is to be found and he permits more social pressure than can be accepted by someone who values liberty highly. In this article, I (...) explain where and why Mill draws the line he does between permitted and forbidden influences and show the line is coherent and tracks a genuine difference. I also show that although the Principle leaves residual social pressure, Mill has resources besides the Principle that can prevent social influences that threaten individuality while retaining beneficial social influences. (shrink)

Mill didn't resolve this puzzle: if prostitution must be tolerated according to his principle of liberty as it doesn't non-consensually harm others, why punish the accessory – the pimp? Yet in On Liberty's passage on pimps (CW 18:296–7) Mill seriously considers restricting pimps’ speech for reasons other than preventing harm: pimps’ speech undermines decisional autonomy for purposes the state regards as immoral, and in response the state may use coercion to counteract such immoral influences. In light of this, I argue (...) that we need to rethink the standard view that Mill opposes restrictions on speech that does not harm others. (shrink)

Mill thinks our attitudes should be held in a way that’s active and ‘alive’. He believes attitudes that lack these qualities—those held dogmatically, or in unreflective conformity—are inimical to our well-being. This claim then serves as a premiss in his argument for overarching principles of liberty. He argues that attitudinal vitality, in the relevant sense, relies upon people experiencing attitudinal conflict, and that this necessitates a prioritization of personal liberties. I argue that, pace Mill, contestation isn’t required for attitudinal vitality. (...) I describe one species of attitudinal vitality that isn’t reliant upon conflict. (shrink)

Mill’s harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between self-regarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill’s own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill’s harm principle. The sphere of protected liberty includes not (...) only self-regarding conduct, but also actions that affect only consenting others. On the other hand, the occasional permissibility of interfering with self-regarding conduct can plausibly be explained by reference to the agent’s consent. Thus, the more important distinction appears to be that between consensual and non-consensual harm, rather than that between the self-regarding and non-self-regarding action. That is, interference can be justified in order to prevent non-consensual harms, but not to prevent consensual harms. It is argued that the harm principle, thus reformulated, both captures Mill’s intentions and is a substantively plausible position. (shrink)

The spread of vaccine misinformation may contribute to vaccine refusal/hesitancy and consequent harms. Nonetheless, censorship is often rejected on the grounds of free expression. This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential defence of free expression but finds that his arguments for freedom apply only to normal, reasonably favourable circumstances. In other cases, it may be permissible to restrict freedom, including freedom of speech. Thus, while Mill would ordinarily defend the right to express false views, such as that vaccines cause autism, (...) he might have accepted restrictions on anti-vaccine misinformation during the present pandemic. This illustrates that even the staunchest defenders of free speech can permit temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances. (shrink)

Every year, 1.35 million people are killed on roads worldwide and even more people are injured. Emerging self-driving car technology promises to cut this statistic down to a fraction of the current rate. On the face of it, this consideration alone constitutes a strong reason to legally require — once self-driving car technology is widely available and affordable — that all vehicles on public roads be self-driving. Here I critically investigate the question of whether self-driving, or autonomous, vehicles should be (...) legally mandated. I develop an argument — premised upon Mill’s Harm Principle — that any legislation mandating the use of self-driving vehicles on public roads is morally impermissible. The Harm Principle, under its most plausible interpretation, has it that the state is warranted in legislating against some activity only if that activity violates the rights of others. In brief, I argue that a human driver, who opts to drive herself on public roads rather than rely on self-driving technology, does not violate anyone’s rights when she so acts. Consequently, when granting the Harm Principle, it follows that the state is not warranted in mandating the use of self-driving vehicles on public roads. If I am correct, the proponent of a self-driving vehicle mandate must reject the Harm Principle. Given its intuitive plausibility and central place in liberal philosophical thought, this is a weighty cost. (shrink)

I consider whether Mill intends for us to see the arguments that constitute his defense of the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in chapter 2 ofOn Libertyas a part of his larger case for the “harm” or “liberty” principle (LP). Several commentators depict this chapter as a digression that interrupts the flow between his introduction of this principle in the first chapter and his exposition and defense of it in the final three. I will argue instead for a reading ofOn (...) Libertyon which chapter 2 is well integrated with the rest of the essay and is in fact where Mill starts constructing his case for LP. (shrink)

Mill advocated an unqualified defense of the liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, which he understood to include not just the freedom to hold but also to express any opinion or sentiment. Yet considerable dispute persists about the nature of Mill’s argument for freedom of expression and whether his premises can support so strong a conclusion. Two prominent interpretations of Mill that threaten to undermine his uncompromising defense of free speech are considered and refuted. A better interpretation can (...) be founded on Mill’s claim that the liberties of conscience are inseparable in practice. This claim can be defended with modern psychological insight about the nature of cognitive bias, and epistemological insight about why justification of creedal beliefs requires the universal toleration of opinion, insights which are largely anticipated by Mill. This argument is especially vital because it highlights the divide between classical liberalism and progressivism that has become a flashpoint in the current political debate over free speech. (shrink)

The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can (...) refer to. (shrink)

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can (...) refer to. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper offers an integrated account of maturity and the requisites of individuality in the political thought of John Stuart Mill, bridging his writings on the individual and society. To do so, it focuses on Mill's account of the relationship between civilization, democracy, class, individuality and custom in his later political thought. Mill draws on these concepts to flesh out his account of maturity in both individuals and societies. Mill's conception of custom, in particular, bridges the individual and society. (...) Maturity, simply defined, is the ability to be self-governing. For Mill, only mature individuals and societies are entitled to be self-determining. In offering a unified account of maturity in Mill, this paper is departing from two different views of maturity in Mill that have become popular in recent scholarship. It also offers interpretations of the relationship between civilization and democracy, and class and custom in Mill. (shrink)

The European Union faced high risks from personal data proliferation to individuals’ privacy. Legislation has emerged that seeks to articulate all interests at stake, balancing the need for data flow from EU countries with protecting personal data: the General Data Protection Regulation. One of the mechanisms established by this new law to strengthen the individual’s control over their data is the so-called “right to be forgotten”, the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of records. In gender transition, this (...) right represents a powerful form of control over personal data, especially health data that may reveal a gender with which they do not identify and reject. Therefore, it is pertinent to discern whether the right to have personal data deleted—in particular, health data—is ethically acceptable in gender transition. Towards addressing the ethical dimensions of the right to be forgotten in this case, this study presents relevant concepts, briefly outlines history, ethics and law of records considering the evolution from paper to electronic format, the main aspects of identity construction and gender identity, and explores the relationship between privacy, data protection/information control and identity projection. Also, it discusses in gender transition the relation between “the right to self-determination”, “the right to delete”, and “the right to identity and individuality”. Conclusions on the ethical admissibility of the ‘right to be forgotten’ to control gender-affirming information are presented. (shrink)

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, the author of Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side, explains his motivation for exploring the dangerous side of the world wide web. This new book is the first comprehensive book on social responsibility on the Internet.

This article advocates employing John Stuart Mill's harm principle to set the boundary for unregulated free speech, and his Greatest Happiness Principle to regulate speech outside that boundary because it threatens unconsented-to harm. Supplementing the harm principle with an offense principle is unnecessary and undesirable if our conception of harm integrates recent empirical evidence unavailable to Mill. For example, current research uncovers the tangible harms individuals suffer directly from bigoted speech, as well as the indirect harms generated by the systemic (...) oppression and epistemic injustice that bigoted speech constructs and reinforces. Using Mill's ethical framework with an updated notion of harm, we can conclude that social coercion is not justified to restrict any harmless speech, no matter how offensive. Yet certain forms of speech, such as bigoted insults, are both harmful and fail to express a genuine opinion, and so do not deserve free speech protection. (shrink)