According to a widespread view, neuroscientific basic research tells us more about the essence of the mind than psychology and may, in the long run, even replace those higher level approaches. Contrary to this view, it is demonstrated that many features can only be observed and explained on a certain level of complexity. This is particularly obvious in the case of neuromarketing and neuroeconomics. In both cases, neuroscientific methods depend on behavioral paradigms. Still, neuroscientific research in these fields may enhance (...) our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms. In addition, neuroeconomics provide excellent conditions for the study of human decision making. (shrink)

The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume (...) another bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and non-mental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates non-linguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Self-consciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject. (shrink)

Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (...) (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind.​. (shrink)

Este trabajo despliega la pertenencia “específica” o “más propia” de ciertas maneras del ser (p.e. existencia, ser-a-la-mano) a ciertos entes, tema que Heidegger menciona, pero no profundiza. La exposición se articula en cuatro pasos. Primero, se aclara la confusa con-ceptualidad de las maneras del ser. Segundo, se indaga el vínculo entre las maneras del ser y los entes, considerando a ambos como fenómenos y mostrando en ello la imposibilidad de captar este vínculo y la consecuente pertenencia específica según un “subjetivismo” (...) u “objetivismo”. Tercero, se acredita la propuesta principal de esta investigación, a saber, el rasgo fenoménico, ni subjetivo ni objetivo, de la pertenencia específica de las maneras del ser a los entes y la posibilidad de su modificabilidad. Cuarto, se aborda el existir preteoré-tico del Dasein en cuanto el suelo analítico en que se explicita hermenéutico-fenomenológicamente la pertenencia específica y su modificabilidad. (shrink)

The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness (...) in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the theory of changes in perspectives allows a different presentation of the problems which arise from a loss of recognition as an element of punishment, particularly in reference to others, the entire structure of the interaction is changed. Communicative conditions of moral discourses assume that every participant of the argumentation process takes place in all spheres of social life and can assume the perspective common to all other participants. The main task (...) of criminal law is, then, the protection of elementary aspects of one’s role as a participant of interaction without which the chain of mutual recognition and understanding could be freely and at any moment infringed by any given participant of interactions, i.e. the protection of such rights. (shrink)

Obwohl in der Forschung es nicht selten ist, Heideggers Gedanken im Lichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu betrachten, benimmt Heidegger sich selbst gegen diese Dichotomie. Um die Kritik Heideggers an dieser Dichotomie und seine Konzeption der ursprünglichen Einheit zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu verstehen, muss auf Heideggers Lektüre der aristotelischen praktischen Philosophie zurückgeführt werden. Es wird zu zeigen versucht, dass Heideggers Ontologisierung der Praxis darauf abzielt, den vortheoretischen Praxisbegriff, der im Unterschied zur Einheit von Theorie und Poiesis ist, (...) herauszuarbeiten. Die Ontologisierung kommt durch die Methode der formalen Anzeige zustande, die in diesem Sinne im Mittelpunkt Heideggers Philosophie steht. (shrink)

On the one hand, it is commonly agreed that we make choices in which we are guided by a core of personal commitments, wishes, feelings, etc. that we take to express who we are. On the other, it is commonly agreed that some of these ‘existential’ choices constitute who we are. When confronting these two matters, the question of agency inevitably arises: Whether and in what sense can we choose ourselves? The paper will argue for a new perspective on existential (...) choice. (shrink)

Habermas claims that the concept of ?communicative action? can be explained by illocutionary acts alone. It appears tó me that his explanation collapses into a sort of intentional theory (2[i]). Habermas maintains further that a speech act consists of three components which are ?correlated? to three worlds and to three validity claims. However, he also seems to mean that all worlds and validity claims are correlated to just one; the so?called propositional component. One consequence is that the propositional content, not (...) the illocutionary act, determines the main mode of at least some speech acts. Another is that the T as used in an expressive speech act will occur in the propositional part of the act and not, as claimed by Habermas, in the performative sentence (2[iii]). In 2(ii) two other problems concerning Habermas's view on the concept of ?I? ('the subject') are discussed. (shrink)

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of ?formal indication? is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer ?the ontological question of the being of the ?sum?? (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question ?what is it to be the entity I (...) am?? On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence. (shrink)

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20th century's great anti-Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology-driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de-center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti-Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in (...) SZ§§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de-center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend? (shrink)

The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an (...) infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account. (shrink)

: The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.

The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.

In ancient as well as in early modern theories of emotion, philosophy is often described as some kind of therapy. However, the assumption that philosophical reflection can influence our emotional life is only plausible, if the following requirements are met. First, one has to defend a realist account of self-knowledge. Second, one must allow for some kind of constructivism in regard to the description of one′s own experience. Finally, one has to maintain a strictly cognitivist conception of emotion. The article (...) discusses these three conditions and shows that, while the idea of a therapeutic influence of philosophical reflection is valid in principle, it is only of a restricted use. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se lleva a cabo un análisis comparativo de las concepciones fundamentales de la “autoconciencia” de J. G. Fichte y G. H Mead. Tal análisis busca demostrar, como tesis central, que ambas concepciones convergen en la configuración de una idea del sujeto autoconsciente en la que la interacción intersubjetiva se pone a la base de condición de posibilidad del “yo” (Fichte) o del “sí mismo” (Mead). Esta demostración obliga a explicitar los modelos de intersubjetividad que subyacen a (...) las respectivas nociones de autoconciencia, representados, en el caso de Fichte, en la teoría de la “exhortación” y, en Mead, en la teoría de la “asunción de roles”. En esta exploración se busca poner de manifiesto que ambas nociones describen un orden de la intersubjetividad práctica en virtud de la significación normativa contenida en ambos modelos, es decir, en virtud de las actitudes y comportamientos que exigen de los sujetos para toda relación intersubjetiva lograda. Esta significación normativa permite apropiarse finalmente del sentido último que encierran ambas nociones de la autoconciencia: el que ésta es, para ambos pensadores, un fenómeno posible sólo por la mediación social que le precede y en la que se halla originariamente inmersa. (shrink)

Whether there are philosophically relevant connections between the expressive role of first-personal vocabulary and self-knowledge is an on-going debate in analytical philosophy. We will take a look at this debate by considering Ludwig Wittgenstein’s distinction between the two uses of ‘I’ as object and as subject and work out a further distinction within the subject-use of ‘I’. This relates to a problem that is inherent in Robert Brandom’s inferentialist program regarding the role of first-personal vocabulary. It can be shown that (...) subject-related aspects of language are necessary elements of inferentially articulated discourses—and not, like Brandom assumes, merely contingent features. (shrink)

This article starts from two observations. The first is that some of the most prominent debates in social and political philosophy over the last few decades have been deeply obscured by the confusion of ontological/methodological and normative questions. And the second is that the renewed interest in Hegel's social philosophy has not yet yielded anything like a widely shared view as to whether it should be banned as a totalitarian or reappraised as a liberal account. The aim of this article (...) is first to specify systematically the ontological/methodological and normative dimensions of social philosophy by giving precise definitions of core concepts and paramount positions. Secondly, it is argued that Hegel's social philosophy can be characterized as combining what is called vertical holism with liberal communitarianism. This, thirdly, sheds new light both on the nature of fundamental questions in social philosophy and on the systematic relevance of Hegel's social philosophy. (shrink)

"Continental philosophy" is now a well-established term in the English-speaking world: it has a point and is taken to refer to a fairly well-defined entity. It is, for example, regularly used in job descriptions. But any explanation that goes beyond something like the following, "Continental philosophy is the sort of philosophy produced by or in the wake of philosophers such as Heidegger and Adorno, Habermas and Apel, Sartre and Lévinas, Foucault, Lacan, Althusser and Derrida" is likely to be controversial. The (...) term excludes analytical and other types of exact philosophy done on the continent.1 Nor is the contrast between Analytic and Continental Philosophy supposed to encourage the assumption that Wittgenstein and Carnap are honorary Anglo-Saxons. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMarx und Simmel gehören zur Tradition der Moderne, die seit Rousseau und Hegel die moderne Gesellschaft für verschiedene Phänomene der „Entfremdung“ kritisiert. Während der junge Marx noch eindeutig „Entfremdung“ negativ bewertet, analysiert und bewertet der reife Marx des Kapitalbuches Entfremdungsphänomene als differente „Verdinglichungen“ und „Vergleichgültigungen“ und bewertet diese Indifferenzen kontextspezifisch positiv oder negativ. Ihm folgt Georg Simmel, der besonders in seiner „Philosophie des Geldes“ Indifferenz als Signatur der modernen Gesellschaft bestimmt und für ihre negativ bewerteten Auswirkungen positive Kompensationen aufzeigt und (...) verfolgt. Der Aufsatz skizziert Marxens Analyse und Kritik von Kapital-verursachten Indifferenzen und verfolgt dann Simmels mehr kulturphilosophische Diagnosen von gesellschaftlichen Indifferenzen an den Phänomenen „Lebensstil“, „Ästhetisierung des Lebens“, „Tragödie der Kultur“ u. a. mehr, die alle auf die Frage hinauslaufen: Warum gelingt der Übergang von modernen Befreiungsprozessen durch Indifferenzen zu neuen Bindungen nicht „vollständig“? (shrink)

Ansgar Beckermann's account of self-consciousness can be seen as an attempt to locate the origin of self-conscious states in social cognition. It is assumed that in order to acquire self-consciousness, a cognitive system has to 'see itself through the eyes of the others'. This account, however, is doomed to failure, for principled reasons. It cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the special, identification-free reference of first-person thoughts and, thus, fails to explain crucial features of attitudes. In addition, Beckermann's account exhibits (...) various other shortcomings. German Ansgar Beckermanns Theorie zur Erklärung von Selbstbewusstsein kann als exemplarischer Versuch verstanden werden, die Wurzeln selbstbewusster Zustände in sozialer Kognition zu suchen. Dabei wird angenommen, dass eine notwendige Bedingung zur Entwicklung von Selbstbewusstsein darin besteht, dass sich kognitive Wesen in sozialer Interaktion ,mit den Augen eines anderen sehen' lernen. Dieser Ansatz scheitert aber aus prinzipiellen Gründen, da er die besondere, identifikationsfreie Referenz von Ich-Gedanken nicht erklären kann und damit eine Erklärung wesentlicher Züge von de-se -Zuständen schuldig bleibt. Zudem ist Beckermanns Theorie im Besonderen durch einige weitere, grundlegende Unzulänglichkeiten gekennzeichnet. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the ontological meaning of mood in Heidegger’s conception of Attunement, in order to relate this notion of Stimmung specifically to our “attunement” to a form of life, as conceived in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It claims that moods spell out the constitutive impossibility to grasp and found the human experience as such. However, this impossibility is not a lack of human knowledge, but rather corresponds to the necessary opacity, indeterminability and groundlessness of every human experience, which make (...) it possible as such. The paper argues that the ontological mood of anxiety in Heidegger’s thought cannot be understood as a dark feeling, since it points to a constitutive sense of disorientation, which involves the impossibility to found and ensure the very familiarity of our ordinary experience. Moreover, the paper claims that the same impossibility is also involved in our “attunement” to language and to a form of life, as described by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. By analyzing the mood of trust sketched out by Wittgenstein in On Certainty, the paper suggests that the ontological mood of trust, as the groundless certainty of our praxis, points to the very impossibility to found and ensure every human experience. From this perspective, moods reveal the groundlessness of human experience and make us acknowledge it. (shrink)

La modernidad establece las condiciones para un nuevo tipo de sujeto: aquel que se determina a sí mismo y que debe buscar su propia identidad en su historia y en la vida compartida con otros sujetos autónomos. Para ello es central la concepción de autonomía.

The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states – the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious "collapse of the wave (...) function" by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as "potentia" or "objective tendencies" are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. _German_ Diese Arbeit untersucht mögliche Lesarten von Heisenbergs späten Bemerkungen über die Natur von Quantenzuständen. Insbesondere wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Heisenberg als Vertreter der epistemischen Auffassung von Quantenzuständen gelten kann – der Idee, dass Quantenzustände nicht Beschreibungen der objektiven Eigenschaften von Quantensystemen sind sondern die epistemischen Beziehungen von Beobachtern zu diesen Systemen widerspiegeln. Einerseits erscheint es plausibel, dass Heisenberg dieser Sichtweise zustimmt, wenn man sich ansieht, wie er den berüchtigten,,Kollaps der Wellenfunktion" verteidigt, indem er ihn mit einer plötzlichen Änderung in der Kenntnis des ein Messergebnis registrierenden Beobachters in Zusammenhang bringt. Andererseits sind seine Bemerkungen über quantenmechanische Wahrscheinlichkeiten als,,Potentia" oder,,objektive Tendenzen" mit einer solchen Lesart nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen. Die Positionen, die Heisenberg den verschiedenen möglichen Lesarten zufolge vertritt, werden eingehenden Untersuchungen unterzogen; gleichzeitig werden ihre jeweiligen Vorzüge und Probleme diskutiert. (shrink)

Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

In the 1960s, a school formed in Heidelberg around Dieter Henrich that criticized—with reference to J. G. Fichte—the ‘reflection model’ of self-consciousness according to which self-consciousness consists in a representational relation between two mental states or the self-representation of a mental state. I present a new “Heidelberg perspective” of pre-reflective self-consciousness. According to this new approach, self-consciousness occurs in two varieties which regularly are not sufficiently distinguished: The first variety is egological self-consciousness that exists in connection with the use of (...) concepts. It consists in the consciousness of having an awareness of oneself as the Ego of a conscious state. The second variety is anonymous pre-reflective self-consciousness, which is awareness of consciousness but does not contain egological information. The pre-reflective self-consciousness does not exhibit a subject-object structure and thus cannot be appropriately determined as a representation, self-representation, or even acquaintance relation. Rather, anonymous self-consciousness is characterized by an indistinction of subject and object. However, pre-reflective self-consciousness is the basis of egological self-consciousness. (shrink)

Alexei Krioukovs Studie widmet sich einem der sowohl interessantesten als auch in theoretischer Hinsicht schwierigsten Themen der zeitgenossischen Philosophie: dem Problem der Intersubjektivität. In praktischem Sinn handelt es sich dabei um die Beziehung zwischen Menschen (Subjekten). Was alltäglich nicht zu beweisen ist, bildet auf theoretischer Ebene ein grundsätzliches Problem: Wer sind die Subjekte der Intersubjektivität? Auf welche Weise, mit welchem Recht und mit welcher Methode kann man einen Bezug zwischen diesen Subjekten rechtfertigen? Alexei Krioukov geht detailliert auf diese Fragen ein (...) und diskutiert sie ausführlich anhand der Theorien von Husserl und Sartre. (shrink)

This paper presents a new cognitivist account for the old puzzle of self-consciousness or knowing self-reference. Knowing self-reference does not rely on reflection on some putative pre-existent pre-reflexive self-consciousness, nor is it the result of a process of identification of oneself as the employer of the relevant token of “I” according to the token-reflexive rule of the first-person pronoun. Rather, it relies on the architecture of the cognitive system. By exploiting the acquaintance relation that every brain has to one’s own (...) body, a “mental file” is opened in a subliminal way to house information about oneself gained through the appropriate proprioceptors. Knowing self-reference based on self-files dispenses with self-identification because the opening of the file in the same brain/body is not a deed of the cognitive system but rather something that takes place sub-personally. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth PLA) overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, (...) I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts (henceforth PCs) is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads after we learn of what is going on outside (PI §580). In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no de re awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation words; for example, I am never aware of the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensations is always de dicto. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that (de dicto knowledge) blue is the color that usually causes us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...) or reflectively introspects one's experiences, or in the instant of self-recognition of one's image in the mirror, or in the proper use of the first-person pronoun, or in the construction of a self-narrative. Rather, these different kinds of self-consciousness are to be distinguished from the pre-reflective self-consciousness which is present whenever I am living through or undergoing an experience, i.e., whenever I am consciously perceiving the world, whenever I am thinking an occurrent thought, whenever I am feeling sad or happy, thirsty or in pain, and so forth. (shrink)

It is shown that at least part of the terminology of the theory of speech acts can be methodically introduced within the constructive ortholanguage-programm. There is evidence that a methodical constraint leads the reconstruction of the basic speech-act-types from requests via statements to questions. Moreover there is evidence that requests and questions don't involve "propositional acts".

Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. (...) The journal "Der Gedanke", the organ of the PGB, reported closely how Kant returned to the spotlight of German philosophy. The reactions of the PGB members to the Kant revival was not only critical. Over the course of the 1860s the interest on Kant among the members grew little by little. (shrink)

O artigo visa mostrar como o gesto filosófico reinholdiano de construção de uma filosofia elementar e o fichteano de fundamentar toda filosofia como ciência rigorosa em uma intuição intelectual alcançada através de um postulado, mais do que uma traição da impostação fundamental da crítica da razão kantiana, refletem uma tentativa de aprofundar elementos implícitos nela, sobretudo no que diz respeito à sua dimensão metodológica. Isto permite estabelecer uma continuidade entre o criticismo de Kant e o chamado de idealismo alemão que (...) ultrapassa toda concepção baseada sobre uma apropriação indevida ou uma assimilação seletiva do criticismo por parte deste último, e pode ser entendida como presentificação. (shrink)

Tugendhat ha propuesto tentativamente en los últimos quince años recuperar el papel de la antropología como disciplina filosófica central o filosofía primera. Este peculiar regreso al pensamiento alemán de los años 20 es una proyección del conjunto de la trayectoria intelectual del autor. Pero además nos permite encarar problemas epistemo­lógicos clásicos de la disciplina: su objeto y conteni­dos, su método, su lugar en los estudios filosóficos. Básicamente se critica la posi­ción de Tugendhat a estos respectos, pero valorando como estimable esas (...) especie de regreso a Kant que considera la antropología como el motor y el telos autorreflexivo último de los estudios filosóficos. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que o conceito de imaginação, tal como é concebido pelo mentalismo filosófico ou psicológico, é uma ilusão gramatical que pode ser desfeita pelo regresso ao "solo áspero" da linguagem ordinária.This paper proposes to demonstrate that the concept of imagination, as it is conceived by philosophical or psychological mentalist doctrines, is a grammatical illusion, which can be solved by means of a movement back to the "rough ground" of ordinary language.