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  1. Gender.Holly Lawford-Smith & Michael Hauskeller - 2022 - In Michael Hauskeller (ed.), The Things That Really Matter: Philosophical Conversations on the Cornerstones of Life. London: UCL Press. pp. 65-83.
  • From an Axiological Standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
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  • Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.
    Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value the invariabilism debate (...)
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  • Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.
    Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...)
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  • Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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