Can research be studied in a way that is neither logical reconstruction nor empirical psychology or sociology of science? In contemporary philosophy of science this is usually denied—in spite of the recent 'paradigm shift' there. A system-philosophy approach in theory of research is outlined by means of some models : a research enterprise is viewed as a productive, innovative system, the research process as a transformation of complexes of knowledge-problems-instruments (software and hard ware). The direction this development takes is guided (...) by preconceptions about the subject matter and a programmatic conception of the discipline based on them ('internal steering factors'). The dynamics of the research process are schematized as a co-agency of 'theoretical and 'empirical' moments, which is viewed as a flow of problems, information, and conceptual frameworks. Empirically discovered pieces of knowledge may resist all attempts to explain them: the flow is disturbed, and only an extraordinary innovation on the 'theoretical' level can restore the balance. This involves a shift in perspective: a shift in the 'internal steering factors'. (In this way one type of 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn's type) is conceptualized). After a perspectival shift one will ask 'Does it constitute progress ?' Types of criteria are suggested. Although they do not apply to all research situations, they over-arch research-traditions. Eventually the above models are applied in the reflection of Research Theory on itself. Research Theory should improve our knowledge about knowledge-production. This knowledge should contribute to improving our image of science and the researcher's sensitivity—by providing better tools for concept ualizing research situations and for imagining possible alternatives. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to outline a schematic system for describing texts or “discourses” with respect to discourse function. In this system the concepts of performative and of descriptive discourse function take a central position. Provisional explicate for the said two concepts are introduced. A special sort of performative is identified, viz. statements; the concept of statement is to function as a pragmatic counterpart to that of description. An examination and comparison is made of the requirements which the (...) communication context of a discourse has to fulfil in order that this latter qualify as a performative in general or as a statement. Then the question is considered how a performative and a descriptive discourse can be “justified” or shown to be adequate. Eventually the aforesaid descriptive system is introduced, and the role is examined which the explicata of performative and descriptive discourse function may play in the philosophy of science and in axiology. (shrink)