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Proof, Meaning and Paradox: Some Remarks

Topoi 38 (3):591-603 (2019)

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  1. How to Ekman a Crabbé-Tennant.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Luca Tranchini - 2018 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):617-639.
    Developing early results of Prawitz, Tennant proposed a criterion for an expression to count as a paradox in the framework of Gentzen’s natural deduction: paradoxical expressions give rise to non-normalizing derivations. Two distinct kinds of cases, going back to Crabbé and Tennant, show that the criterion overgenerates, that is, there are derivations which are intuitively non-paradoxical but which fail to normalize. Tennant’s proposed solution consists in reformulating natural deduction elimination rules in general form. Developing intuitions of Ekman we show that (...)
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  • A note on Etchemendy's and Prawitz's reduction principles for the Tarskian and model‐theoretic concept of consequence.Antonio Piccolomini D'Aragona - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):1014-1036.
    One of Etchemendy's arguments against the Tarskian and model‐theoretic notion of logical truth is based on a reduction principle according to which a universally quantified sentence is true if, and only if, all of its instances are logically true. The reduction of logical truth to mere truth reveals that the concept of validity at play in Tarski and in model‐theory relies upon extra‐logical assumptions. A similar reduction had already been put forward by Prawitz, although not with focus on extra‐logical assumptions. (...)
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  • The proof-theoretic square.Antonio Piccolomini D’Aragona - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-34.
    In Prawitz’s semantics, the validity of an argument may be defined, either relatively to an atomic base which determines the meaning of the non-logical terminology, or relatively to the whole class of atomic bases, namely as logical validity. In the first case, which may be qualified as local, one has to choose whether validity of arguments is or not monotonic over expansions of bases, while in the second case, which may be qualified as global, one has to choose whether the (...)
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  • Denotational Semantics for Languages of Epistemic Grounding Based on Prawitz’s Theory of Grounds.Antonio Piccolomini D’Aragona - 2021 - Studia Logica 110 (2):355-403.
    We outline a class of term-languages for epistemic grounding inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. We show how denotation functions can be defined over these languages, relating terms to proof-objects built up of constructive functions. We discuss certain properties that the languages may enjoy both individually and with respect to their expansions. Finally, we provide a ground-theoretic version of Prawitz’s completeness conjecture, and adapt to our framework a refutation of this conjecture due to Piecha and Schroeder-Heister.
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  • Calculi of Epistemic Grounding Based on Prawitz’s Theory of Grounds.Antonio Piccolomini D’Aragona - 2022 - Studia Logica 110 (3):819-877.
    We define a class of formal systems inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. The latter is a semantics that aims at accounting for epistemic grounding, namely, at explaining why and how deductively valid inferences have the power to epistemically compel to accept the conclusion. Validity is defined in terms of typed objects, called grounds, that reify evidence for given judgments. An inference is valid when a function exists from grounds for the premises to grounds for the conclusion. Grounds are described (...)
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  • A Note on Paradoxical Propositions from an Inferential Point of View.Ivo Pezlar - 2021 - In Martin Blicha & Igor Sedlár (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2020. College Publications. pp. 183-199.
    In a recent paper by Tranchini (Topoi, 2019), an introduction rule for the paradoxical proposition ρ∗ that can be simultaneously proven and disproven is discussed. This rule is formalized in Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory (CTT) and supplemented with an inferential explanation in the style of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics. I will, however, argue that the provided formalization is problematic because what is paradoxical about ρ∗ from the viewpoint of CTT is not its provability, but whether it is a proposition at all.
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