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  1. Emotional Behaviors, Emotivational Goals, Emotion Strategies: Multiple Levels of Organization Integrate Variable and Consistent Responses.Ira J. Roseman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (4):434-443.
    Researchers have found undeniable variability and irrefutable evidence of consistencies in emotional responses across situations, individuals, and cultures. Both must be acknowledged in constructing adequate, enduring models of emotional phenomena. In this article I outline an empirically-grounded model of the structure of the emotion system, in which relatively variable actions may be used to pursue relatively consistent goals within discrete emotion syndromes; the syndromes form a stable, coherent set of strategies for coping with crises and opportunities. I also discuss a (...)
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  • O projeto de psicologia científica de Edward Tolman.Carlos Eduardo Lopes - 2009 - Scientiae Studia 7 (2):237-250.
    Os projetos de psicologia científica enfrentam pelo menos duas ameaças. A primeira delas surge quando uma proposta de psicologia tenta seguir os cânones da ciência moderna. Nesse caso, torna-se necessário "objetivar o fenômeno psicológico", o que, geralmente, é feito por meio da sua tradução em termos fisiológicos. Mas, nesse ponto, a especificidade da psicologia é ameaçada pelo reducionismo fisiológico. A segunda ameaça aparece quando um projeto de psicologia tenta evitar o reducionismo fisiológico defendendo a natureza subjetiva irredutível do fenômeno psicológico. (...)
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  • O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.
    It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, (...)
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