El descubrimiento del carácter poietico del principio del Idealismo trascendental motiva a Schelling a denominar el arte como órganon del Sistema de 1800 y a la vez se convierte en el motivo de algunas modificaciones radicales tanto de la metafísica como de la estética moderna. Schelling intenta deducir todos los comienzos relativos a partir de un solo comienzo, de un principio absoluto cuya esencia es poiesis. La filosofía del arte no sólo está relacionada con el principio absoluto, sino también con (...) el fin del Sistema, con la definición de la filosofía. Si el Sistema tiene un fin, si «acaba» en una obra de arte, no significa que lo infinito se agote, que se extinga en lo finito. Absolutum significa lo completo, lo acabado en el sentido de algo perfecto. El sistema acaba, sin «acabar», sin desgastarse, simplemente con auto-definirse, y a la vez autoconfirmarse como intelectivo y productivo, como Idealrealismo. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 2 Seiten: 239-266.

Despite considerable recent attention, important features of Schelling’s famous work, the 1809 treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, remain under-explored. One of these is the methodological dualism which Schelling advocates at the very start of the text. Schelling aims to weld together into a coherent position a first-person phenomenology of freedom and an explanation achieved by locating freedom within a conceptual system articulating the basic structure of the world. Most interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift, however, concentrate on only one of (...) these approaches, thus foreshortening their understanding of Schelling’s enterprise. The article explores this tendency towards one-sidedness by considering two sophisticated recent interpretations of the work, taking opposite tacks. One, by Markus Gabriel, focuses on the distinctive, self-reflexive metaphysics which Schelling proposes, while the other, by Sebastian Gardner, claims that Schelling’s ontology is extrapolated entirely from his account of our moral consciousness, a procedure pioneered by Kant. The article argues that neither of these interpretations can do full justice to Schelling’s project. Furthermore, although the Freiheitsschrift is not entirely successful, and hence points towards later developments in Schelling’s thinking, its treatment of freedom is superior to the ‘soft naturalism’ pioneered by Peter Strawson, and currently influential across various philosophical traditions. (shrink)