Zusammenfassung Die „romantische Liebe“ bildet unter modernen Bedingungen eine zentrale Quelle sozialer Anerkennung. Ihr nicht selten durch die Verwendung religiöser Semantik signalisierter Bedeutungszuwachs sorgt aber zugleich für eine Steigerung der Verletzlichkeit des einzelnen. Der damit beschriebenen spannungsvollen Eigenart, die der Anerkennungssphäre der Liebe unter modernen Bedingungen zukommt, wird in diesem Text nachgegangen. Dabei stehen zwei Autorinnen der Gegenwart, die sich mit den Ambivalenzen heutiger Liebesbeziehungen besonders eindrücklich auseinandergesetzt haben, im Fokus: die Kultursoziologin Eva Illouz und die Schriftstellerin Sally Rooney. Nach (...) einem einführenden Blick auf die den beiden Autorinnen gemeinsame Thematik, geht es um spezifische Unsicherheitserfahrungen, die sich mit dem Aufstieg der Liebe zu einer zentralen Anerkennungssphäre verbinden. Dann wird die für romantische Beziehungen ebenfalls charakteristische Spannung zwischen Anerkennung und Autonomie ins Auge gefasst. Es folgen schließlich theologische Überlegungen, die an Illouz‘ eigene Ausführungen zur religiösen Dimension der Liebe anknüpfen. (shrink)

Jordan Peterson has attracted a high level of attention. Controversies may bring people into contact with Peterson's work, but ideas are arguably what keep them there. Focusing on those ideas, this book explores Peterson’s answers to perennial questions. What is common to all humans, regardless of their background? Is complete knowledge ever possible? What would constitute a meaningful life? Why have humans evolved the capacity for intelligence? Should one treat others as individuals or as members of a group? Is a (...) single person powerless in the face of evil? What is the relation between speech, thought, and action? Why have religious myths and narratives figured so prominently in human history? Are the hierarchies we find in society good or bad? After devoting a chapter to each of these questions, Champagne unites the different strands of Peterson’s thinking in a handy summary. Champagne then spends the remaining third of the book articulating his main critical concerns. He argues that while building on tradition is inevitable and indeed desirable, Peterson’s individualist project is hindered by the non-revisable character and self-sacrificial content of religious belief. This engaging multidisciplinary study is ideal for those who know little about Peterson’s views, or for those who are familiar but want to see more clearly how Peterson’s views hang together. The debates spearheaded by Peterson are in full swing, so Myth, Meaning, and Antifragile Individualism should become a reference point for any serious engagement with Peterson’s ideas. (shrink)

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired (...) by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief. (shrink)

In this article, I will examine St. Edith Stein’s theory of religious language. Stein, who was both a professional philosopher and a mystic, and deeply rooted both in the tradition of negative theology and early phenomenology, held a peculiar version of univocity with regard to religious language. On the one hand, our concepts have something objectively in common with the thing they signify. On the other hand, our concepts are merely representations of the real. Therefore, when mystics say that God (...) can be addressed “without words or images,” this does not entail anti-realism or non-cognitivism. Instead, according to Stein, this only means that words are not needed when the thing itself is present without mediation in the mystical experience. (shrink)

There is a need for inner recollection opposed to our everyday distraction. Our distraction is partly based on anthropological features and partly on social and cultural features. As well as feelings of distraction, we know experiences of being focussed from everyday life. As feelings in which distraction is absent, and as feelings in which we are partly and temporarily released from our own egocentric perspective, they remind us that a different kind of relation to ourselves and the world is possible. (...) Therefore, they can motivate a process of self-transformation aiming at a mystical state of mind, which is of a more profound and enduring kind than ordinary experiences of being focussed. The mystical state of mind is a state in which we transcend ourselves in the face of the universe and thereby relativize our own affective involvement. It is a feeling of an all-encompassing unity which ultimately concerns us; and it is a feeling of love, joy, and peace of mind. Mystical feelings thus shape and restrict spaces of possibilities, and they comprise an altered sense of what it means to be real. Therefore, they can be classified as existential feelings. Still, the mystical state of mind differs from prototypical existential feelings because it is a positive feeling, necessarily comprises active as well as passive moments, and presupposes an explicit way of attending to the world as world. (shrink)

How neuropsychology is necessary but insufficient for understanding spirituality is explored. Multileveled spiritual requisites are systematically examined in terms of their neuropsychological constituents and limitations. The central “problem of integrity” is articulated via the “modularity” of our neuropsychology, and evidence is presented for disunities of self and consciousness. It is argued that the integrity of self or spirit is a contingent achievement rather than a necessary given. Integrating possibilities include belief, emotion, and relationships. Understanding integrity, and the transformations of self-surrender (...) and sacrifice, may require explicitly stepping beyond neuropsychology and including the self in a larger system. (shrink)

The positive role of religion in reducing prejudice has remained a neglected theme in Psychology of religion, concerning itself mostly with prejudice and fundamentalism. Recently, noting the absence of a positive antithesis to prejudice and fundamentalism, faith development theory presents xenosophia as going beyond mere tolerance to a creative engagement with other religious faiths to develop new insights and broaden one’s own worldview. The current research undertakes a study of Muslim faith contents to get insights into how these beliefs shape (...) construction of self in relation to other faith communities. Conducting inductive thematic analysis of faith development interviews from 12 Muslim participants from three major religious affiliations in Pakistan in an earlier research, the research analyzes a range of xenological patterns from xenophobia to xenosophia with associated potentials for inter-faith dialogue. Focusing on residents of a country with a dense Muslim population, the study carries implications for religious socialization and religious education in a globalized world. (shrink)

In this paper I engage the theonomous ethics of Paul Tillich to argue that morality is a matter of conviction and concern not determination of right or wrong, and moral imperative is not about doing what “right” is, rather it is the self-actualisation of individual through her intersubjective relationships. The motivational force behind self-actualisation stems from the strength of one’s hold on “ultimate concern”, and not the content of “ultimate concern” that maybe referred to by various names including God. The (...) ultimacy and unconditionality of “ultimate concern” gives morality its religious character and imperativeness. The paper suggests that business should provide an environment in which individual’s moral motivational force can be strengthened through removal of the impediments that weaken one’s hold on “ultimate concern”. (shrink)

For contemporary critical philosophers of education, the thought of Paul Tillich, a protestant theologian, does not seem to be a very likely point of reference. Nevertheless, we decided to read some of his works within a philosophical-educational context. Reading those works of Tillich we realized that they required a pedagogical-philosophical acknowledgement. Scarce as the educational analyses of Paul Tillich’s writings are, they concern mostly either religious education or some specific issues connected with teaching. Our proposal was to read him differently: (...) as a critical tool for grasping contemporary educational issues, independent from a religious or didactic approach. In the article, referring to the thoughts of Tillich, we analyze the three most important tensions of the last and present centuries: kairos I and II, referring to the human condition after World Wars I and II, and kairos III, related mainly to the war on terrorism and to the growing climate crisis. The analysis of these special moments in the history of humankind is related to the postulates and pedagogical attitudes articulated by us. We conclude that as a result of the deepening climate crisis and the looming specter of a cataclysm, the transition to a better aion may enable the pedagogy of radical hope. The essence of this pedagogy is to shape the “courage to be” during grassroots, collective and political action - an existential attitude saturated with resistance, concern and hope that such grassroots, cultural-religious practices can contribute to social change and reduce the fear of inevitable death associated with the risk of annihilation of the Earth. (shrink)

Secular moral philosophy has devoted little attention to the nature and significance of faith. Perhaps this is unsurprising. The significance of faith is typically thought to depend on the truth of theism, and so it may seem that a careful study of faith has little to offer non-religious philosophy. But I argue that, whether or not theism holds, certain kinds of faith are centrally important virtues, that is, character traits that are morally admirable or admirable from some broader perspective of (...) human flourishing. I discuss three varieties of faith that a virtuous person has in people: faith in herself, faith in people to whom she bears certain personal relationships, and faith in humanity. Coming to understand the nature of these forms of faith and the roles they play in human life promises to deepen our understanding of aspects of moral life and aspects of human flourishing that are poorly grasped. Beyond this, it makes valuable contributions to the literature on self-trust and the literature on epistemic partiality in friendship, and it helps us better understand the relation between our epistemic and practical ideals. (shrink)

In A Confession, a memoir of his philosophical midlife crisis, Tolstoy recounts falling into despair after coming to believe that his life, and for that matter all human life, is meaningless and absurd. Although Tolstoy's account of the origin and phenomenology of his crisis is widely regarded as illuminating, his response to the crisis, namely, embracing a religious tradition that he had previously dismissed as “irrational,” “incomprehensible,” and “mingled with falsehood” seems unpromising, at best. Nevertheless, I argue, Tolstoy's account of (...) his response makes a valuable contribution to contemporary thought about the meaning and absurdity of life. I begin by drawing on classic discussions in the philosophical literature, and on Tolstoy's memoir, in order to characterize the problem of meaning and the problem of the absurd, and to clarify the relation between these problems. I then draw on Tolstoy's account of his response to his crisis in order to characterize a form of faith in our deepest values. I argue that such faith supplies one important part of the story concerning how we might respond to the problem of the absurd — a part that has been overlooked by more recent discussions of these issues. (shrink)

The dissociation between the domains of knowledge continues to perpetuate the fragmentation of people’s health and healing experiences. Of particular significance are the polarities that have been created between the objective, subjective and spiritual dimensions of knowledge and human experience. This paper offers a consideration of how faith might serve as a pragmatic avenue towards assuaging the polarities between knowledges and enhancing nurses’ ability to attend to the complex and mulitdimensional nature of health and healing processes.

The nature of mystical experience has been hotly debated. Essentialists divide into two camps: 1) immediate identity beyond any subject-object structure 2) the mystical object maintaining some distinctness at the point of contact. Paul Tillich’s mystical a priori has some affinities with the former, while William James’ model of religious experience coheres only with the latter. Opposing the essentialists are constructivists. After noting some ironies of the constructivist position, this article elaborates difficulties with 1) the traditional model of pure identity (...) with the divine by certain mystics, 2) the Tillichian universal mystical awareness, and 3) the Jamesian direct perceptual model. Finally, it proposes that the human body and brain mediate mystical experience, which consists of a distinctive sense of bodily harmony conjoined with openness to the potentialities of an integrated environment, involving distinctive neurological processes. (shrink)

Little attention has been given to the integral relationship between character strengths and spirituality (the search for or communing with the sacred to derive meaning and purpose). The science of character strengths has surged in recent years with hundreds of studies, yet with minimal attention to spirituality or the literature therein. At the same time, the science of spirituality has steadily unfolded over the last few decades and has offered only occasional attention to select strengths of character (e.g., humility, love, (...) forgiveness) or the universal typology of the VIA Classification of character strengths and virtues. In this exploration, we argue that there is a robust synergy of these sciences and practices revealing that spirituality is vitally concerned with promoting character strengths. At the same time, character strengths can enhance and deepen spiritual practices, rituals, and experiences. We elaborate on how character strengths and spirituality come together in the context of the psycho-spiritual journey toward wholeness. By wholeness, we are referring to a way of being in the world, which involves a life-affirming view of oneself and the world, a capacity to see and approach life with breadth and depth and the ability to organize the life journey into a cohesive whole. We further discuss six levels by which spirituality can be integrated within the VIA Classification, including a meta-perspective in which wholeness represents a meta-strength or superordinate virtue. We frame two pathways of integration: the grounding path, in which character strengths offer tangibility and thereby deepen and enhance spirituality, and the sanctification path, in which spirituality elevates character strengths. Finally, we turn to research-based practices and examine how character strengths might facilitate and contribute to spiritual practices and, conversely, how spirituality might enhance character strength practices. Such multifaceted integration offers insight and wisdom to both areas of study and opens up new directions for psychospiritual research and practices to deepen and broaden our understanding of what it means to be human. (shrink)

In this article I look at the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions in light of the dynamics of ancient Indian debate. Doing so foregrounds a dimension of the Buddha's interaction with his interlocutors that is central for understanding the problem of what are known as the Undetermined or Unanswered Questions: namely, the Buddha's knowledge and authority vis-à-vis rival teachers.

The double subjectivity of conscience and the need to test conscientious objections -/- Abstract In spite of the collapse of the traditional objective concept of conscience and the subsequent subjectivation of conscience, conscientious objections are still often considered as a valid ground for exemption from legal and professional obligations. Conscientious objections are seen as more serious than ordinary moral objections. It is not evident why this is so. I argue, with Niklas Luhmann, that the function of conscience is to protect (...) the moral core of a person’s identity. Overruling conscientious objections threatens this core. Claims of conscience are usually founded on the right of freedom of conscience. This right is not absolute. I discuss the view of Richard Arneson who rejects the right of freedom of conscience and defends the right against conscience. I agree with Arneson that, at the one hand, conscientious objectors may constitute a threat to the social and legal order when their objections are not recognised and, at the other hand, too easy giving in to conscientious objections may also threaten the viability of social and legal order. That is why it is needed to determine when conscientious objections cannot be taken at face value, but should be subjected to a series of tests. The aim of these tests is to contain the number of objectors. I discuss 6 criteria for determining whether conscientious objections ground an exemption to legal and professional obligations. At the end of the article I discuss the conscientious objections of medical doctors. (shrink)

A review of recent research suggests that academic and popular distinctions between “religion” and “spirituality” are unfounded. Working from a meaning systems perspective, it is argued that recognizing that “religious” and “spiritual” are part of the same broad category does not go far enough. It is argued that a wider perspective that considers the interplay of many different cultural and social factors on both beliefs and practices is more useful. This broadening of the multi-level, interdisciplinary paradigm to examine all existential (...) cultures, including the secular and non-religious, offers the potential to better understand the complexity and diversity of lived religion. Increased use of idiographic methodologies and a more reflective approach to the constructs used in nomothetic methodologies are advocated as a way to advance the field and better explore beliefs and practices in a more ecologically valid way. (shrink)

Many Christians seek to understand how their Christian faith relates to what goes by the name “philosophy.” They eventually see that no single well-defined subject goes by the name “philosophy.” It does not help matters that the term “philosophy” is among the most variably used terms in the English language, even among academic philosophers. This raises the question of how a Christian philosopher should proceed with inquiry about the relation between Christian faith and philosophy. This paper offers an answer in (...) terms of “Christ-shaped” philosophy, and replies to some criticisms from William Hasker. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a newborn child and the Mother, defined as any person who takes up the role of other,1 reflect the ontological connectedness of God and humankind. The relationship between the infant and other is experienced by the child as if the two are one, and in this, life is first experienced by the infant as being ‘not alone’. The human interactions that we experience, or do not in early infancy, have such a profound psychological effect (...) on us that we continue to be impacted by them for our whole lives and to this end I assert that the experience of at-one-ness I will write about, fundamentally establishes the experience of the infant in the context of God, self and the other. (shrink)

Diversos trabajos han abordado la influencia del protestantismo en la configuración del mundo moderno. Más allá de la influencia del protestantismo en la sociedad moderna desde distintos ámbitos particulares (la economía, el derecho, la política, etc.), podría considerarse la existencia de algún vector aglutinante de penetración de dicha influencia. Es aquí donde la filosofía se intuye definitiva. La comprensión del ser humano pasa para el creyente por su comprensión de la fe. Este trabajo revisa las coincidencias, similitudes, relaciones o simples (...) compatibilidades entre el pensamiento existencialista y el luteranismo. Se concluye que ambos se muestran significativamente afines no sólo en la problemática acometida y sus conclusiones, sino también en lo relativo al talante y la retórica utilizados. (shrink)

We are all aware that our idea of natural/unnatural has been changing over the centuries. According to Donna Haraway, we must exit the maze of dualisms that has marred the relationships between human and non-human nature for centuries. Cyborg is a figure of speech and asymbol, but preeminently a description of our actual being in contemporary technonature. Her idea has been picked up by artists and philosophers and theologians. The cyborgian organism/human and the world cannot be articulated in terms of (...) black-and-white, us and them, friend and foe, kin and alien, good and evil etc. Our technonatural creatures require our care and love, curiosity and investigation, and there will always be unexpected consequences. (shrink)

An "overview article" that (a) clarifies the nature of theological anti-realism and how that thesis should be formulated, and (b) negatively assesses some of the most common arguments for being a theological anti-realist.

This paper traces the distinction between the claims of love and the claims of morality in the work of Raimond Gaita, and disputes it using examples from Gaita’s work – particularly his use of “decency” in place of morality – which I try to understand better through this scrutiny. I disclose in Gaita’s work the tension between highlighting love and praise of decency and I try to show that the tension between love and decency indeed remains present in his writing, (...) but not as a contrariness of claims from both departments. Though they constitute two different claims, their mixture is imaginable and valuable even if, by taking part in it, the sense of both love and decency changes, which, however, might be seen as an opportunity to open new horizons for working both of them into human life. (shrink)

Following in general a history of religions analysis, the paper argues that myth lays a basis for morality in that it sets forth a picture of “how things really are” (the is), to which humans seek to conform their actions (morality, the ought). A parallel argument locates the capacity for morality and values orientation in the process of evolution itself. A hypothesis is formulated concerning the function of myth in the emergence of Homo sapiens, namely, to motivate the action required (...) if creatures so culturally formed as humans were to survive. The Christian love command (understood as altruism) is interpreted as an example of the general hypothesis. (shrink)

In his book God After Darwin John Haught provides a useful categorization of theological approaches to evolution: some theologians actively oppose Darwinian evolution, another group maintains that science and religion have nothing to say to one another, and a third seeks to engage evolution. Haught wishes to pursue the third way. But many theological attempts to talk about divine action in the world, including divine involvement in the process of evolution, run afoul of the scientific principle of the conservation of (...) matter‐energy. Haught's reliance on the now‐familiar notion that information can have causal efficacy does not in fact escape this difficulty. I suggest a fourth approach, represented by a constructive reading of Paul Tillich's theology. The central argument is that Tillich offers a way of taking Darwinian evolution up into one's ultimate concern without claiming that God has any causal relation to evolution. God provides no historical telos for evolution, but rather a “depth teleology” that springs from the manner in which God, as the depth of the structure of finite being, is the object of Christian faith. (shrink)

Abstract.In this essay I examine the new sciences of religion, spanning the traditional fields such as the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of religion to new fields such as the economics, neurosciences, epidemiology, and evolutionary psychology of religion. The purpose is to welcome these approaches but also delineate some of their philosophical and theological limitations. I argue for pluralistic methodologies in the scientific study of religious and spiritual phenomena. I argue that religious persons and institutions should welcome these investigations, because science (...) affects only interpretative strategies and does not present a fundamental challenge to core religious commitments. Indeed, the new sciences of religion can help religions in becoming more effective and wholesome. I am critical of confusing the scientific study of religion with scientism and trace this ideological project back to August Comte. In the end I deconstruct the metaphoric boundary that places religion on the inside as the object and science as the subject on the outside looking in. (shrink)

Practical wisdom enables moral decision-making and action by aligning one’s apprehension of proximate goods with a distal, socially embedded interpretation of a more ultimate Good. A focus on purpose within the overall process mutually informs human moral psychology and moral AI development in their examinations of practical wisdom. AI practical wisdom could ground an AI system’s apprehension of reality in a sociotechnical moral process committed to orienting AI development and action in light of a pluralistic, diverse interpretation of that Good. (...) Defining AI purpose in terms of the human struggle to determine the moral “ought” (versus the way reality is) can overcome practical and normative limitations of principle-based approaches to AI ethics without requiring idiosyncratic moral reasoning or a premature commitment to a single ethical theory, which could hinder navigating the moral implications of future unknowns. Dividing practical wisdom into proximate, mediating, and distal processes enables each division to incorporate the moral dimensions of the situation, individual AI system, and sociotechnical community, respectively. Drawing upon externalist (4E) and ecological cognitive psychology theories to extend Xavier Zubiri’s sentient intelligence, proximate apprehension of what an object affords the perceiver includes affordances for practical and moral purposes. Those apprehensions are structured by moral and other social-cognitive schemas that mediate moral constructs, the apprehended situation, and individual commitments and other motivating identifications in a process Ignacio Ellacuria calls historical reality. Distally, Josiah Royce’s community of interpretation characterizes one way of organizing a sociotechnical process to synthesize diverse interpretations of the Good, orient AI moral practice, and align AI development with human and AI moral purpose. (shrink)

Religion is a significant social force on organizational practice yet has been relatively underexamined in organization theory. In this article, I assert that the institutional logics perspective is especially conducive to examine the macrolevel role of religion for organizations. The notion of the religious logic offers conceptual means to explain the significance of religion, its interrelationship with other institutional orders, and embeddedness into and impact across interinstitutional systems. I argue for intrainstitutional logic plurality and show that specifically the intrareligious logic (...) plurality has been rather disregarded with a relative focus on Christianity and a geographical focus on “the West.” Next, I propose the concept of interinstitutional logic prevalence and show that the religious logic in particular may act as a metalogic due to its potential for uniqueness, ultimacy, and ubiquity. Through illustrations from Islamic Finance and Entrepreneurship, I exemplify implications of logic plurality and prevalence for organizations and societies. (shrink)

Arguments about the relationship between science and religion often proceed by identifying a set of essential characteristics of scientific and religious worldviews and arguing on the basis of these characteristics for claims about a relationship of conflict or compatibility between them. Such a strategy is doomed to failure because science, to some extent, and religion, to a much larger extent, are cultural phenomena that are too diverse in their expressions to be characterized in terms of a unified worldview. In this (...) paper I follow a different strategy. Having offered a loose characterization of the nature of science, I pose five questions about specific areas where religious and scientific worldviews may conflict - questions about the nature of faith, the belief in a God or Gods, the authority of sacred texts, the relationship between scientific and religious conceptions of the mind/soul, and the relationship between scientific and religious understandings of moral behavior. My review of these questions will show that they cannot be answered unequivocally because there is no agreement amongst religious believers as to the meaning of important religious concepts. Thus, whether scientific and religious worldviews conflict depends essentially upon whose science and whose religion one is considering. In closing, I consider the implications of this conundrum for science education. (shrink)

. A partial analogy exists between the lifespan neuropsychological development of individuals and the biological evolution of species: In both of these major categories of growth, progressive emergence of wholes transcends inherently limited part‐processes. The remarkably small purview of each moment of consciousness experienced by an individual may be a crucial aspect of maintaining organization in that individual's cognitive development, protecting it from combinatorial chaos. In this essay I summarize experimental psychology research showing that working memory capacity comprises the so‐called (...) magical number 7±2 items, not only for words and digits but for spatial items and other sorts of cognitive materials, and not only in humans but also in other species. This is so to such an extent that 7±2 may be a “constant of nature.” The small quantity range 7±2 independent items, which builds upon a more elementary, instantaneous working memory capacity of three or four items, is surprisingly independent of the time duration of a cognitive task. Moreover, it is largely independent of ontogeny. Explanations of these powerful facts about working memory are offered here within both a functionalistic framework and a framework of hypothetical neural processes. At the neural level, working memory dynamics may comprise certain brain wave harmonics or topological relationships in the sheetlike cortex. Within the functionalistic framework, I suggest an additional analogy, pertaining to cultural evolution, with Tom Gilbert's work on risk analysis and “the global problematic” that follows from unforeseen consequences of the expansiveness of human ambition. Several connections are drawn with ideas presented by participants in the Chicago Religion and Science Group about how theologies and sciences try to understand the possibility of adaptive exercises of human freedom in the face of the extreme finiteness of each human individual. (shrink)

This paper will discuss the notion of solastalgia or climatic anxiety (Albrecht et al., 2007; Galea et al., 2005,) as a form of anxiety connected to traumatic environmental changes that generate an emotional blockage between individuals, their environment (Cloke et al., 2004,) and their place (Nancy, 1993,). I will use a phenomenological approach to explain the way in which emotions shape our constitution of reality (Husserl, 1970; Sartre, 1983, 1993, 1996; Seamon and Sowers, 2009; Shaw and Ward, 2009). The article’s (...) overall goal is to describe the relationship between environment and “climatic” emotions to understand what we can do to improve our well-being. I believe that scientistic and reductionistic ways of looking at climatic anxiety do not consider this complex dynamic and fail to propose actual solutions for the well-being of both the environment and the individuals. (shrink)

The pursuit of health is one of the most basic and prevalent concerns of humanity. In order to better attain and preserve health, a fundamental and unified description of the concept is required. Using Paul Tillich's ontological framework, I introduce a complete characterization of health and disease is that is useful to the philosophy of medicine and for health-care workers. Health cannot be understood merely as proper functioning of the physical body or of the separated levels of body, mind, and (...) soul. Rather, the multidimensional unity that is the essence of human life requires a new understanding of health as balanced self-integration within the multiple human dimensions. The ontological description of health and disease has concrete implications for how health-care workers should approach healing. It calls for a multidimensional approach to healing in which particular healing is needed and helpful if it considers the other realms of the human. It reveals the importance of accepting limited health as well as the value of faith understood as an ultimate concern because of its ability to wholly integrate the person. (shrink)

This essay explores forms of religious narrative that shape self-understanding and engagement with the world through the idea of redemption. An analysis of the landscape of religious perspectives within the context of globalization shows a bifurcation between competing notions of redemption in fundamentalist and postmodern narratives. Where fundamentalism uses meta-narrative that is hyper-theistic, postmodernism uses contextual narratives that deconstruct narrative and can lose a sense of the transcendent. The purpose of the essay is to show how these two competing notions (...) can become entrenched and destructive to the very redemption they seek. Using Paul Tillich’s understanding of courage, these positions are placed into a dialectical tension that points to a third understanding of redemption as the perpetual mediation between the desire for belonging to a community and the desire to recognize the limitations of any individual or community’s perspective and understanding of the world in relationship to the holy. (shrink)

Should religious reasons be used in political discourse? Habermas argues that religious reasons can enter the public sphere so long as they undergo a translation that meets the standards of public reason. I argue that such a translation may be either unnecessary or impossible. Habermas does not sufficiently consider the possibility that religious reasons are already publicly accessible such that no translation is required. Moreover, Habermas entirely fails to consider the possibility that, if he is right about religious reasons not (...) being publicly accessible, these reasons may be of a kind such that they cannot be translated into a publicly accessible idiom as he supposes they can be. (shrink)

I examine a tension between temporal and spatial conceptualization of the genesis of the cosmos to show how chronological characterization of ‘beginnings’ occludes ontological interpretation of our existential orientations, to help my audience distinguish symbolic expressions of wonder that the cosmos exists from explanations for it. I bring together resources from multiple intellectual and religious traditions to perform a philosophy of religions that goes beyond the narrowness, intellectualism, and insularity of institutionalized philosophy of religion. I turn to Ibn Rushd, Tillich, (...) Pamela Sue Anderson, and Sara Ahmed to expose problems of confusing symbols with concepts. I bring Aristotle, Nagarjuna, Maimonides, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Nasr together in conversation about the notion of a ‘beginning.’ Through this, I seek to shift questions of cosmic linearity to questions of spatial symbols of inclusivity and suggest that our orientation toward chronology distracts us from inclusive ontologies, inadvertently getting us stuck in imagistic representation of a closed cosmos rather than critical conceptualization of open symbols for an inclusive cosmos. (shrink)

It is by way of the call that one is enabled to wake up to responsibility. What is the illocutionary mood of the ‘call’ of conscience, though? Is this transcendental enabler of responsibility an imposing demand or an invitational question? Both Levinas and Heidegger emphasize the impositional character of the call in conscience. The call seems to be the very essence of imperatives. I develop an apology for questioning by way of appeal to crumbs scattered throughout Jewish traditions as well (...) as throughout the works of Levinas and Heidegger. Perhaps we are invited to be rather than told to be. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 378-385, May 2022.

(2013). Hope and Fear: The Theological Side of Framing Environmental Change. Ethics, Policy & Environment: Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 152-155. doi: 10.1080/21550085.2013.801187.

ABSTRACT Jean-Luc Nancy’s so-called ‘deconstruction of Christianity’ is usually understood as both a philosophy of culture and a critique of metaphysics. This article, however, argues that its primary concern is neither the Christian religion as a cultural formation, nor the exhaustion of the metaphysical enterprise. Instead, by looking at some of the philosophical sources on which Nancy’s project is built – namely, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger –, the article suggests that its true aim is to develop a (...) new understanding of reason, or to renew the experience of reason. Though these authors have largely been neglected by the growing discussion of Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity, the article shows how it is only by developing his occasional references to them that we can come to appreciate an important but neglected dimension of this project: namely, the fact that it is an exercise in philosophical anthropology, i.e. an inquiry into the exact nature of the reason that supposedly characterises the rational animal. (shrink)

Diversos trabajos han abordado la influencia del protestantismo en la configuración del mundo moderno. Más allá de la influencia del protestantismo en la sociedad moderna desde distintos ámbitos particulares (la economía, el derecho, la política, etc.), podría considerarse la existencia de algún vector aglutinante de penetración de dicha influencia. Es aquí donde la filosofía se intuye definitiva. La comprensión del ser humano pasa para el creyente por su comprensión de la fe. Este trabajo revisa las coincidencias, similitudes, relaciones o simples (...) compatibilidades entre el pensamiento existencialista y el luteranismo. Se concluye que ambos se muestran significativamente afines no sólo en la problemática acometida y sus conclusiones, sino también en lo relativo al talante y la retórica utilizados. (shrink)

The article is based on selected findings from a study in the field of rehabilitation in a religious context viewed from the perspective of cognitive psychology and psychology of religion. The study shows how a therapeutic process can be facilitated in cases where the psychotherapeutic intervention is co-ordinated with a creative, sound religious activity. One central phenomenon that emerged from the study was the experience of a therapeutic dialogue with the divine person God and/ or Jesus being apprehended as a (...) crucial therapeutic agent. The material is analysed focusing on criteria for creative persons and products. A basic mechanism of creativity is hypothesised by Martindale to be defocused attention. The greater the spread of the attention capacity, the more likely the combinational leap, giving the rich possibility of combining elements in new ways. Religion can extend the perspective and thereby increase the possibilities of finding new and appropriate emotional and cognitive combinations. The analysis shows significant creative qualities in the treatment model studied. (shrink)