The Neo-Confucian notion of wan wu yi ti 万物一体 and Stoic oikeiôsis both come up with a motivational basis for the expansion of concern, but one of the toughest problems in them is how to elaborate on selfhood and self–other relation in moral development. This paper takes a comparative view of Hierocles’ fragments and a few other relevant Stoic texts and Wang Yang-ming’s Inquiry on the Great Learning, and argues that doing so helps eliminate some confusions concerning selfhood and self–other (...) relation. My claim is that the concept of the Stoic oikeiôsis and the concept of Wang’s ‘wan wu yi ti’ have different ideas on selfhood and the self–other relation while showing similarities in basing the ideal of self-development on the original unity between self and world. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 61, Issue 1, pp 82 - 109 Galen talks about tension, _tonos_, in a physiological sense, which seems to be related to either the innate heat of the living being, the good mixture of its humors, or the body’s _pneuma_. This paper shows that Galen, with some important distinctions concerning the substance of the soul, derives this use of _tonos_ from the Stoics. But beyond that, it shows that Galen uses _tonos_ in a strict psychological sense derived (...) from Plato as well, and integrates it in his characterization of the operations of the spirited part of the soul. (shrink)

Entender la dimensión moral de la dietética en la antigüedad exige investigar los avances de las investigaciones médicas gracias a las cuales se establecen las bases de la psicología moral. Por esta razón en este artículo se exploran algunos pasajes de Sobre las opiniones de Hipócrates y Platón, escrito por el médico alejandrino Galeno de Pérgamo (I-II d. C). Según los hallazgos de su investigación sobre la naturaleza del alma, aun cuando ésta tuviera una sustancia propia, ajena a las mezclas (...) humorales del cuerpo, es preciso admitir que sus facultades, incluida la racional, pueden ser ayudadas o impedidas por el equilibrio o por el desequilibrio de los humores del cuerpo. Esta es la tesis que defenderá en su escrito de madurez titulado Las facultades del alma siguen los temperamentos del cuerpo. Para Galeno, como antes para Platón y Aristóteles, la forma de vida, que incluye la nutrición, incide en la salud y en la enfermedad del alma. En la tradición que le antecede ya se aceptaba la dimensión moral de la dietética, pero nuestra tesis es que en las investigaciones de Galeno sobre la fisiología de las facultades del cuerpo, encontramos el fundamento empírico para la afirmación según la cual el cuidado del cuerpo influye en la salud del alma. (shrink)

Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to Musonius Rufus, a noted teacher and philosopher in first–century CE Rome, despite ample evidence for his impact in the period. This paper attempts to situate Musonius in relation to his philosophical predecessors in order to clarify both the contemporary status of the Stoic tradition and the value of engaging with the central figures of that school’s history. I make the case for seeing Cleanthes as a particularly prominent predecessor for Musonius and reaffirm the (...) importance of framing his philosophical commitments in the context of the Stoic tradition. On this latter point, I attempt to connect Musonius’ perspective on askesis and moral development with that of Posidonius (and Seneca). In doing so, I push back against the sometimes overly schematic intellectualism attributed to Stoic ethics generally. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for psychic conflict within Seneca's moral psychology. Some scholars have taken Seneca's explicit claim in De Ira that the soul is unitary to preclude any kind of simultaneous psychic conflict, while other interpreters have suggested that Seneca views all cases of anger as instances of akrasia. I argue that Seneca's account of anger provides the resources for accommodating some types of simultaneous psychic conflict; however, he denies the possibility of psychic conflict between two action-generating impulses, (...) thus rejecting the phenomena of genuine akrasia and enkrateia. Although superficially counterintuitive, Seneca's cognitivist account of anger, according to which anger is complex and requires assent to the propositions that ‘I have been wronged’ and ‘I ought to seek revenge’, renders his denial of akrasia and enkrateia more plausible. (shrink)

This article examines the problem of mental partitioning and mental conflict in Han 漢 dynasty sources. It begins by outlining two Greek psychological models—the Platonic tripartite model and the Stoic monistic model—and explains the connection between the two psychological models and their differing descriptions of mental conflict. It then analyzes passages from a seldom discussed text, the _Extended Reflections_ (_Shenjian_ 申鑒), written by the Eastern Han thinker X un Yue 荀悅. A combined analysis of the _Extended Reflections_ with fragments from (...) other Han dynasty thinkers uncovers debates on mental partitioning and mental conflict that are in some ways analogous to those found in Greek philosophical literature. One view posits that the human psyche is composed of two parts capable of producing conflicting motivations. The other view sees all actions as stemming from a single psychological center. The conclusions of this article offer new perspectives on early Chinese moral psychology that have important implications for modern research on early Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's (...) response. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to focus on some rhetorical strategies of argumentation which play crucial role in the therapeutic discourse of Roman Stoicism, namely in Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Reference is made to Chaim Perelman’s view of ancient rhetoric as an art of inventing arguments. Moreover, it is pointed out that in rhetorical education as well as in therapeutic discourse the concept of “exercise” and constant practice play a crucial role.

Teun Tieleman surveys the history of the philosophical notion of the ‘art of life’, starting from its originator Socrates and his ancient successors down to its role among present-day philosophers. Apart from Socrates, special attention is given to the Stoics, Nietzsche and Foucault. The way in which the notion was defined and functioned throughout the history of philosophy reveals an exceptionally fruitful interplay between continuity and originality.

Kai Whiting, Aldo Dinucci, Edward Simpson, and Leonidas Konstantakos ABSTRACT: In Stoic theology, the universe constitutes a living organism. Humankind has often had a detrimental impact on planetary health. We propose that the Stoic call to live according to Nature, where God and Nature are one and the same, provides a philosophical basis for re-addressing ….

In this paper I explore some ways in which Cicero does not merely report Chrysippus’ view of psychotherapy and mental health in the Tusculan Disputations, but rather adapts them to suit his own Academic and practical purposes. In particular, I argue Cicero is unwilling to wholeheartedly endorse three key Stoic principles: (1) the uniformly rational nature of the mind, (2) the exclusive goodness of virtue, and (3) the possibility of attaining Stoic wisdom. As a result, he allows for greater ethical (...) significance to the removal of psychological disturbances and to the admittedly vulnerable tranquility and constancy achievable by those who fall short of Stoic wisdom. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...) intentional phenomena. One level involves judgments, just as the orthodox Stoic account does. But Posidonius thinks that emotions must also include an element sometimes translated as an "irrational tug". I suggest that we see the "irrational tug" as involving a second level of intentional, but non-conceptual representation. This view satisfies two desiderata: it is a view which would have been available to Posidonius and which is compatible with the views reported to us; and it is a view which is independently attractive. It also makes Posidonius' position less far removed from that of orthodox Stoics than it might otherwise do, while remaining genuinely innovative. (shrink)