Essays in Moral Scepticism, by JoyceRichard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xi + 288.

Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 408-421.

This paper provides a defense of the following thesis: When there is reasonable disagreement over the design of morally necessary collective action schemes, it would not be reasonable to reject the authority of a democratic decision procedure to settle these disputes. My first argument is a straightforward application of contractualist reasoning, and mirrors T. M. Scanlon's defense of a principle of fairness for the distribution of benefits produced by a cooperative scheme. My second argument develops and defends the intuition that (...) treating others morally requires respecting their exercise of moral judgment, or a sense of justice. I conclude by addressing the problem of disagreement over the design of the democratic decision procedure itself, and rebutting Jeremy Waldron's claim that democratic authority is incompatible with judicial review. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anderson exalts the transition from the aristocratic to the modern ethic of debt as one of the most significant cultural achievements of capitalism. Whereas the debitor was once forced to compromise his liberty, dignity, and equality, today the rights and freedoms of insolvents are legally protected, and disadvantaged members of the community can readily obtain credit without personal supplication. Anderson’s intuition was, until recently, widely shared. Then came the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the ensuing global recession, triggered by (...) mass defaults among “sub-prime” borrowers. Many had entered the mortgage market with no proof of income, no assets behind them, no down-payment, a chequered credit history, and a generally reduced repayment capacity. Suddenly a flurry of criticism was unleashed against the lowering of credit standards and the government programs which pressured lenders to service the poor. My aim in this paper is not to assess the democratization of credit from the point of view of economic efficiency or political prudence, but rather to provide a much needed ethical appraisal. Any number of reasons might be advanced for why a particular government policy is morally objectionable. I will concentrate on the least controversial reason conceivable: the policy violates the rights of citizens. Whether this is true of government-driven credit-democratization - specifically, whether it violates the rights of the lenders compelled to act as agents of the policy, the rights of the third parties exposed to the risks associated with the expansion of credit markets, or both – is the question that I take up here. (shrink)

Two generally recognized moral duties are to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. In this paper I want to show that it is not possible to give an adequate account of either duty – or at least one that corresponds to our actual practices – within a contractualist moral theory of the type developed by T. M. Scanlon (1982, 1998). This fact is interesting in its own right, as contractualism is (...) a leading contemporary contender among deontological moral theories, and the two duties I have mentioned are fairly standard ingredients of such theories. But it also serves to highlight a general problem with contractualism, at least in Scanlon’s version – namely its one-dimensional view of the keystone of any plausible deontological theory: the idea of respect for persons. (shrink)

The question of whether or not a closed border entry policy under the unilateral control of a democratic state is legitimate cannot be settled until we first know to whom the justification of a regime of control is owed. According to the state sovereignty view, the control of entry policy, including of movement, immigration, and naturalization, ought to be under the unilateral discretion of the state itself: justification for entry policy is owed solely to members. This position, however, is inconsistent (...) with the democratic theory of popular sovereignty. Anyone accepting the democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control state boundaries. Because the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded, the regime of boundary control must be democratically justified to foreigners as well as to citizens, in political institutions in which both foreigners and citizens can participate. (shrink)