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The explanation of first person authority

In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter (1993)

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  1. Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.
    Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.
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  • Davidson on First Person Authority and Knowledge of Meaning.William Child - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):157–177.
  • Davidson, First-Person Authority, and Direct Self-Knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.
    Donald Davidson famously offered an explanation of “first-person authority”. However, he described first-person authority differently across different works—sometimes referring to the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions of their current mental states, and sometimes referring to the direct self-knowledge that agents often have of said states. First, I show that a standard Davidsonian explanation of first-person authority can at best, and with some modification, explain the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions. I then develop two Davidsonian accounts of direct self-knowledge—one accounting for (...)
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  • Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.
    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...)
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