The paradox of Gandhi being treated as an ivory-tower idealist despite being one of the most successful political leaders of the twentieth century, can be traced to his using a method to understand social processes that is fundamentally different from the dominant tendency to reduce reality to an underlying system. The fact that his method did not fit into the ideological systems that dominated the twentieth century contributed to it being ignored. This paper seeks to revisit the Gandhian method by (...) first identifying the limitations of viewing democracies entirely in terms of systems. It then goes on to explore Gandhi's alternative view of reality as a mass of actions. It finally uses this philosophical method to understand a rather violent example of identity politics, namely the destruction of the Babri Masjid in the Indian town of Ayodhya. (shrink)

In the 1920s, Austrian‐school economists began to argue that in a fully socialized economy, free of competitively generated prices, central planners would have no way to calculate which methods of production would be the most economical. They claimed that this “economic calculation problem” showed that socialism is “impossible.” Although many believe that the Austrian position was later vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Austrian school's own methodology disallows such a conclusion. And historical evidence suggests that poor incentives—not (...) lack of economic calculation—were the main source of the economic defects of “really existing socialism.”. (shrink)

Do markets generate a “just” wage? The answer to this question will depend upon the particular theory of the market that the political economist employs. When comparing actual labor markets with the neoclassical theory of competitive equilibrium as its normative benchmark, Joseph Heath argues that factor pricing is orthogonal to normative issues such as distributive justice. We argue that Heath’s conclusion, though not invalid, follows from a similar normative benchmark of equilibrium, one that evaluates factor pricing without taking into account (...) the institutional conditions within which factor prices emerge. Though indeed classical political economists and early neoclassical economists failed to deliver an explicit theory of distributive justice, what Heath overlooks is that implicit to their understanding of the market process was an institutional theory of distributive justice. (shrink)

I have been writing and publishing in economics for 50 years and much of my work has been debated and criticised. But I think that this is the first time that someone has honoured me by a full-scale article criticising an unpublished working paper. I am very grateful to Lynne Chester for bringing the questions I raise to a wider audience. The working paper that she criticizes went through several versions, of which the 12 July 2017 draft that Lynne downloaded (...) from the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research (WINIR) website is not the final version. In addition, the working paper has now expanded into a book entitled Is There a Future for Heterodox Economics? (Hodgson, 2019). Lynne's criticisms help me to attempt to make the text clearer and deal with some misunderstandings that have arisen... (shrink)

What is typical of Hayek's challenge concerning socialism is that he always maintained that this question was for economic theory to decide. Sketching the historical background of what has come to be known as the "socialist calculation debate" (section 1), I try to link this debate with the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem and show that the Pareto-Barone approach has determined the theoretical form of this economic controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's 'inapplicability' argument (section 2) and try to show how (...) it is related to Mises' 'logical impossibility’ argument. This is followed by an examination of Hayek's second argument (section 3), which I refer to as 'the evolutionary argument'. I display what is the specific gist of this argument and connect it tightly to the first one. I then discuss certain methodological issues (section 4) pertaining to the allegedly radical difference between Mises' arguments and Hayek's tentative refutation of socialism. Here I challenge the received view that Mises' based his case on the 'impossibility in principle' of socialism, whereas Hayek's own position was to challenge the 'possibility in practice' of a centrally planned economy. This reading (especially by Willem Keizer) of Hayek's contribution to the debate seems to me misguided and unwarranted. I attempt to propose, on the contrary, that both lines of reasoning involve the same kind as arguments since both of them should be interpreted as impossibility theorems. Finally (section 5) I try to give an appropriate and adequate answer to the question raised in the title of this paper. (shrink)